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Abstract 
 
The epistemological concept of “testimony” refers to the social practice of acquiring beliefs 
and knowledge from what others tell us. Disparaged by philosophers as incompatible with 
rational autonomy and by educationalists as a passive form of learning, it is nevertheless a 
source we rely on for formative learning as children and throughout our lives. Both 
traditionalist and progressivist educationalists have underestimated the cognitive 
achievement involved in comprehending and learning from testimonial speech acts and also 
the role such speech acts play in argumentation. 
Since the Enlightenment debates about testimony have distinguished between 
reductionist and non-reductionist justifications for accepting beliefs from testimony.  
These, like the more recent trust-based theories of testimony, tend to conflate different 
testimonial speech acts, and fail to reconcile a notion of trust in epistemic authority with a 
convincing account of rational autonomy.  
  The thesis confronts epistemological conclusions concerning rational trust in the 
epistemic authority of others with Austinian pragmatics and Bakhtinian dialogism to 
produce an account of responsible pedagogy as valuing both the repertoire of informative 
speech and the virtues and commitments inherent in producing and responding with 
epistemic and linguistic discrimination. Dialogistic and sociocultural theories of pedagogy 
need to be informed by a socialized epistemology that: a) is responsive to the pragmatics of 
language, b) incorporates a notion of autonomy founded on self-trust and integrity, c) 
emphasizes the role of intellectual conscientiousness and virtue in epistemic and linguistic 
achievements.  
Theories of dialogic pedagogy should recognize that valuing discussion and “student 
voice” requires us to acknowledge the importance, as a prerequisite of classroom dialogue, 
of teachers responding sensitively to students as knowers and testifiers with complex 
rational commitments of their own.  
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Yu Tzu said, “To be trustworthy in word is close to being moral 
in that it enables one’s words to be repeated”.  
Confucius, Analects §13. 
~ 
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Introduction:  Why Understanding Testimony Matters 
 
Much of what we know has come from the words of others. Parents, teachers, 
friends and strangers have given us information and some, but not all, of this 
information counts as knowledge. “Testimony” is what epistemologists call these 
“transmissions” of knowledge from person to person. When testimony occurs in 
classrooms it is a form of, or at least a component of, teaching: children learn from 
what their teachers tell them. However, both epistemologically and pedagogically 
testimony is controversial. It is often regarded as a “secondhand” source of 
knowledge and as a “second best” form of learning. 
Theories of human knowledge are central to questions concerning the 
curriculum and pedagogy. In his influential book on curriculum theory, A. V. Kelly 
argues that curriculum design and styles of pedagogy reflect and represent 
particular ideologies: ideologies not only of knowledge but also of humanity and 
society (Kelly, 2009, p. 56). One of these ideologies, he writes, is reflected in the 
“curriculum as content and education as transmission” approach – what is often 
classified as the “traditional”, as opposed to the “progressive” (or “progressivist”) 
and “liberal” tendencies: 
 
The idea of education as transmission or of the curriculum as 
content…is simplistic and unsophisticated because it leaves out of 
the reckoning major dimensions of the curriculum debate. In 
particular, it does not encourage or help us to take any account of 
the children who are the recipients of this content and the objects 
of the process of transmission, or of the impact of that content and 
that process on them, and especially their right to emancipation 
and empowerment. Their task is to learn as effectively as they can 
what is offered to them. If the effect of the process on them is of 
any significance, this model offers us no means of exploring or 
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evaluating that effect, beyond assessing the extent of their 
assimilation of what has been fed to them, any other consequences 
of learning being beyond its scope. (Kelly, 2009, p. 63) 
 
I argue that it is characterizations of the transmission of knowledge such as 
Kelly’s that are simplistic and unsophisticated. The account of the person-to-person 
transmission of knowledge that I offer does not fail to take account of the 
recipients, nor does it characterize them as objects rather than as active subjects and 
participants in an inter-subjective process. What children learn, and how they 
develop as a result of participating in exchanges of knowledge, goes beyond 
learning the factual content of the current exchange, in much the same way as does 
the learning gained from dialogic inquiry or critical reasoning. If we 
mischaracterize the nature of knowledge transmission as a kind of passive 
“feeding”, we are in danger of misrepresenting essential and ineliminable features 
of human language and learning, and therefore of individual “empowerment” and 
of society.  
The repertoire of pedagogic styles employed by teachers, in this country and 
worldwide, is dominated by direct teacher instruction and exposition (Alexander, 
2001). The voice of the teacher is heard much more than the voices of the children, 
and when children’s voices are heard it is very often to display what they have 
learned from the teacher’s words. Sometimes this form of learning is described as 
“memorization” or it is associated with rote learning. Not everyone is unhappy with 
this situation. Memorizing “facts” has its advocates as a form of learning – as, in 
fact, a prerequisite of thinking and reasoning (Peal, 2014; Christodoulou, 2014; 
Willingham, 2009). These advocates appeal to John Hattie’s evidence concerning 
the importance of teacher instruction in accounting for variations in students’ 
achievement (Hattie, 2009; discussed later in  §7.4). But “mainstream” 
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educationalists (what Christodoulou and Peal, and commentators such as Toby 
Young, like to call the “education establishment”: Michael Gove’s notorious 
“Blob”) are said to be in thrall to an alternative theory of education, a “progressive” 
or ‘child-centred” theory that disparages both facts and memory. In fact, so it is 
said, the progressivist approach disparages knowledge and direct teacher 
instruction, promoting instead skills, discovery learning, group work and dialogic 
inquiry. There is some truth in this. There is a tendency for this approach, but also 
for the traditionalists, to misrepresent knowledge and its transmission from person 
to person. 
I do not think we should be happy with a pedagogy that is dominated by 
teacher talk. On the other hand, I do not think we should disparage teacher talk or 
direct instruction for the wrong reasons. On both sides there is a polarization of 
alternatives, a caricature of the other’s position (and possibly of their own) that 
glosses over the epistemological and linguistic processes and practices involved in 
learning from others. For their part, the “progressives”, including sometimes the 
advocates of dialogic pedagogy, disparage learning from direct instruction as 
passive. They reject the epistemological assumptions inherent in the notion of a 
teacher transmitting knowledge to students in a “lecture” or “monological” style. In 
doing so, they sometimes come close to rejecting the validity of epistemological 
concepts such as knowledge and truth, as well as the validity of such speech acts as 
assertion and assurance – presumably because they do not think these can be 
reconciled with dialogistic or constructivist theories of learning. 
I argue that traditionalists who favour direct teacher instruction, on the one 
hand, and progressivists who advocate child-centred and/or dialogic pedagogical 
styles, on the other, misrepresent the speech acts associated with the 
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epistemological concept of testimony. A proper understanding of these speech acts 
has the potential to refresh pedagogical and curricular theorizing and research: a) 
by clarifying the moral and epistemic expectations and responsibilities of teachers 
and students as conveyors and receivers of knowledge, b) by emphasizing the 
importance for teaching and learning of particular kinds of interpersonal trust and 
respect, and c) by enriching our understanding of “student voice” with the notion of 
testimonial justice.  
I believe that philosophers of education and educational researchers of all 
stripes should pay closer attention to the educational, social and ethical importance 
of testimonial speech acts. We are “dependent rational animals” (MacIntyre, 1999). 
We rely on others for a great deal of our knowledge and beliefs, but this reliance 
need not be either passive or irrational. We can, within reason, trust each other for 
the truth, and what makes our trust in the assurances, assertions and tellings of 
others rational (or reasonable) is not that it is grounded in evidence we possess for 
the likely truth of the factual claim, nor in evidence for the trustworthiness or 
reliability of the speaker (or writer) – although these are of course factors that come 
into play in some of our rational deliberations – but, rather, in the normative nature 
of the speech acts involved. It is the intersubjectivity and mutually recognized 
expectations and responsibilities of both speakers and hearers that both constitute 
the testimonial speech acts and legitimate the conveying, comprehending and 
accepting of the testimony. This is what raises, or contributes to raising, what the 
hearer accepts from information to knowledge that adds to the hearer’s coherent 
and consistent understanding of the world. 
I bring together in a dialogic but risky encounter epistemological theories (of 
testimony and coherentism), theories of language-in-use (specifically Austinian 
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pragmatics and Bakhtinian dialogism) and theories of pedagogy. “Risky” because 
there will be some friction and resistance. But the aim, appropriately enough, is 
fruitful dialogue rather than convergence. I hope to persuade the reader that we, as 
educators and educationalists, should take speech acts such as assertion and 
assurance seriously, and not dismiss or ignore them as inherently inferior forms of 
teaching and learning. I do not favour either pole of the traditionalist/progressivist 
dichotomy. Indeed, I regard it as false. I propose an approach that emphasizes the 
intellectually responsible nature of teaching and learning. Students are right, within 
reason, to trust teachers for the truth, but if their teachers do not watch their words, 
or do not speak responsibly and with the appropriate epistemic authority, the bonds 
of mutual trust will sever and the classroom will no longer be an epistemic safe 
haven. (Safe, that is, relative to many other sources of information in children’s 
everyday experience.) 
Trust is a recurring theme. Teachers sometimes support what they tell 
students with evidence, providing them with reasons for accepting the information 
as true. But sometimes no reasons are provided and the students are expected to 
“take it on trust” that what their teacher tells them is true. But why should they? 
There are powerful reasons, both epistemological and pedagogical, why expecting 
students to learn from the testimony of teachers is imprudent and why modes of 
learning and inquiry that seem to demand more active critical thinking and 
judgement should be preferred. I agree that on many occasions other modes of 
teaching and learning should be preferred, but this preference should not be based 
on a misunderstanding of the more direct transmission of knowledge. 
Philosophers find reasons for scepticism concerning sources of knowledge 
such as perception, inference and memory, and testimony especially has provided 
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them with a rich supply. No-one denies that we are reliant on testimony, but why, 
and when, if ever, are we entitled to take on trust information provided by others? 
We will encounter several alternative responses to this question. I argue for a 
modified trust-based theory but also that both trust-based theories and their 
alternatives wrongly conflate different speech acts as the speech act of providing 
testimony. Testimony is an epistemological category, not a viable linguistic 
category. I differentiate, as an example, the speech act of assurance from the speech 
act of assertion and argue that different epistemological and linguistic 
considerations apply in the two cases. In noting that as a promise of truth and 
truthfulness, testimony “always goes hand in hand with at least the possibility of 
fiction, perjury and lie” (2000, p. 27), Derrida states that every testifier posits 
herself as truthful. There are occasions when testimony requests belief by 
foregrounding the speaker’s sincerity and/or trustworthiness rather than the truth of 
what is asserted. I contend that no one epistemological analysis can satisfactorily 
account for the reasonableness, or rationality, of the various ways and contexts in 
which we exchange and acquire information and knowledge. Furthermore, to 
testify is to say something and determining what has been said is often extremely 
challenging.  Accounts of intellectual virtues, critical thinking and sensitivity to 
language usage need to take account of this.  
Austinian pragmatics is useful in considering individual utterances and the 
relations that each kind of speech act implies between the speaker and the audience, 
in terms of their mutual recognition of the expectations and responsibilities on each 
side; but it does not extend to a theory of discourse and for this I turn to a 
Bakhtinian account of speech genres and dialogic encounters. Although trust-based 
theories of testimony are epistemologically promising, I think they give too thin an 
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account of the contextual features involved in communicative encounters compared 
with what we can derive from pragmatics and dialogism. 
Towards the end of the thesis, in the light of the philosophical and linguistic 
approach I have argued for, I revisit the arguments for and against alternative styles 
of pedagogy. I conclude that “teacher talk” that incorporates a degree of felicitous 
testimony and also “student voice” and “dialogue” have to be understood in the 
light of the epistemological commitments and intersubjective trust they implicate 
and anticipate. One of the principal pedagogic responsibilities of teachers is to 
maintain epistemic justice in the classroom by ensuring that all speakers, including 
themselves, are listened and responded to as conscientious knowers and testifiers.  
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Chapter 1: Educational and Epistemological Anxieties 
 
In this chapter I consider anxieties concerning testimony and the rationality or 
legitimacy of claiming to have acquired knowledge from speech acts such as 
telling, assertion and assurance. I start by developing my criticism of 
educationalists who misrepresent the nature of learning from the words of others. I 
examine the position of Guy Claxton, an influential educationalist who comes close 
to discarding any notion of truth and epistemic authority playing a role in the 
transmission of knowledge. I argue that he misrepresents both the nature of 
knowledge and, by ignoring the role of testimony and interpersonal trust in 
classroom talk, the nature of the dialogical pedagogy that he favours. 
In later sections of the chapter I argue that liberal educationalists and 
philosophers, including R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst, and others who have worried 
about the distinction between education and indoctrination, also reveal an anxiety 
about the rationality of students learning from testimony. I argue that these 
anxieties are exaggerated, not least because any account of intellectual autonomy 
has to accommodate itself to our reliance on testimony. I go on to show how reliant 
we are on testimony in general and in the classroom, and to discuss classrooms as 
distinctive epistemic environments. I end the chapter by setting out some of the 
arguments associated with the epistemology of testimony that are to be explored in 
more detail in later chapters.  
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§1.1 Guy Claxton’s Anxieties Concerning Authority and Trust 
 
Even when it is not conflated with rote learning or indoctrination, direct teacher 
instruction (in which I am assuming there is a proportion of testimonial speech 
acts) is sometimes represented as embodying an outdated conception of knowledge 
and of learning. Sometimes it is associated with “nineteenth century pedagogy” or 
with a “monastic” epistemological viewpoint that represents knowledge, in Guy 
Claxton’s words, as  “handed down by unimpeachable Authority…mined and 
purified, once upon a time, by men (mostly) who were much cleverer than both the 
students and the teacher (2008, p. 74). 
Claxton goes on to describe how the teacher’s and the student’s role would fit 
into this conception of knowledge and learning: 
 
The teacher’s job was to understand this knowledge…and explain 
[it] clearly. The students’ job was to understand what they were 
told and remember it. They had done their job well if they could 
recall it, write it down and manipulate it in a limited number of 
prescribed ways…If students dared to ask questions (other than to 
correct their understanding) the Right Answer was repeated and 
they were told they weren’t there to “reinvent the wheel”, and 
anyway there wasn’t time.  (Claxton, 2008, p. 74) 
 
In contrast to this view of knowledge Claxton opposes a pragmatic and dialogical 
view. Knowledge is always “provisional and up for reappraisal. It is made up by 
people to explain puzzling things and to help get things done” (2008, p. 76). He 
cites evidence that students’ personal epistemologies can influence the quality of 
their learning: 
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In one recent experiment, two Greek psychologists checked to see 
if fifteen-year-olds’ attitudes to “knowledge” influenced how they 
went about learning Newton’s Laws of Motion. Somewhat to their 
surprise, they found that the students who saw knowledge as a 
provisional, human construction, constantly open to question and 
change, showed a deeper and more accurate understanding of 
Newton than did their peers who believed that Science was 
Eternal Truth. (Ibid., p. 76) 
 
Claxton draws the conclusion that “training students to think of knowledge as fixed 
makes them less smart – even when they are dealing with something as venerable 
and time-worn as Newton’s Laws”. 
The view that knowledge is not what is true but what works or helps, that it is 
situated and contingent, is associated by Claxton with the advocacy of dialogical 
teaching and collaborative, investigative learning, on the basis that these provide 
the right kind of “epistemic apprenticeship” (ibid., p. 92). In my view, both an 
association of testimonial teaching with the epistemological theory that Claxton 
caricatures, and the association of the pragmatic view with dialogical, collaborative 
and investigative learning, are misrepresentations that reinforce false dichotomies. 
Is there not a paradox in Claxton’s account of the Greek psychologists’ 
findings? They “found that the students who saw knowledge as a provisional, 
human construction, constantly open to challenge and change showed a deeper and 
more accurate understanding of Newton”. But what is accuracy in this context? 
The reason why “knowledge” is constantly open to challenge and change is that we 
are constantly finding that what we thought was knowledge was inaccurate, and if a 
belief is not accurate enough for given purposes, if it is not true enough, it is no 
longer to be counted as knowledge. Claxton makes a distinction between 
“education”, which provides the right kind of epistemic apprenticeship, and 
“schooling”, which passes on a set of fixed beliefs, but he should also make a 
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distinction between “knowledge” in the sense of a socially agreed body of beliefs 
and “knowing” in the sense of a cognitive state that achieves the status of being 
both true and justified or rational. While it may be true that most of the beliefs that 
we hold as individuals are potentially open to challenge, it need not be the case that 
most of the beliefs we are justified or reasonable in holding are untrue. When we 
discover that they are inaccurate, or fundamentally untrue, we discard them, for to 
maintain a belief that we believe to be untrue is irrational. Epistemic terms play a 
role in our attempts to formulate a coherent or harmonious conceptual scheme. We 
cannot eliminate truth and truthfulness from an understanding of rationality any 
more than we can eliminate them from an understanding of what it is to know. But 
a theory that retains the idea of utterances having an appropriate degree of 
accuracy, of being true, must not be conflated, even for rhetorical purposes, with a 
theory that retains a metaphysical notion of (in Claxton’s words) Eternal Truth.  
The Russian philosopher and literary theorist, M. M. Bakhtin (about whom I 
write more in Chapter 6), thought that every utterance makes a claim to justice, 
sincerity, beauty and truthfulness. He recognized, as did Wittgenstein, that the 
concepts of truth and truthfulness apply to utterances and the meaning of any 
utterance is highly contextualized. Knowledge, therefore, is not what is stored in 
books or hard drives: it is exchanged in utterances between individuals. It does not 
exist by itself but always with somebody; it is always personified, authored, 
situated and embodied. It is better to think of it as an activity than as an object, as 
“knowing” rather than as “knowledge”.  We can agree with Claxton that teachers 
should not be thought of as voicing abstract Truths, but that does not entail that 
they do not communicate truths. Communication is always risky, and testimonial 
communication, in which people exchange beliefs and expect to be trusted for the 
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truth, is no exception. How to frame what we want to communicate, how to 
interpret what has been said to us, whether or not to accept it, are risky judgements. 
In subsequent chapters I will make clearer what kind of judgements they are.  
Claxton’s account of knowledge opens the door not only to a form of 
relativism but also to subjectivism. He argues: 
 
[W]e need people who are willing and able to critique, integrate, 
elaborate, challenge and work on and with the knowledge [sic] 
they come across. They need to see themselves less as nervous 
supplicants at the altar of knowledge, and more as confident 
critics and creators. And they need to be skilled at doing it well. 
(2008, p. 77) 
 
This is odd. We critique beliefs, claims, theories, opinions that purport to be 
knowledge. If we are told them by an authoritative source then we may judge them 
to be true on the basis (at least in part) of trusting the source, or we may choose to 
interrogate and challenge them. They become knowledge for us when we accept 
them in an epistemically reasonable or appropriate way. Claxton has left his 
confident, creative critics with no criteria for assessment other than that their 
conclusions “work” or “help”, and therefore with the possibility of claiming that “it 
works for me”.  We should not conflate recognition of the intersubjectivity and 
context-sensitivity of truthful utterances with either relativism or subjectivism 
concerning truth and/or knowledge.   
What lies behind Claxton’s account, presumably, is an ideal of epistemic 
autonomy. But this ideal must accommodate judgements about, and trust in, the 
expertise and authority of others. Autonomy can only be a plausible ideal if it 
permits responsible judgements concerning whether or not others should be trusted 
for the truth. I cannot see why evaluating claims as ones that “work” or do not 
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‘work” discourages epistemic conventionalism or complacency more effectively 
than does evaluating them as truthful and accurate. If we want students to be 
confident critics and creators, we should want them to be good judges of claims to 
truth and of the people who make them, and the way they will achieve this kind of 
judgement is by being exposed to a range of dialogic encounters, including those in 
which the teacher and peers speak from knowledge. In implying a pedagogical 
choice between education as critical, creative, challenging and collaborative, on the 
one hand, and education as treating students as  “nervous supplicants at the altar of 
knowledge”, on the other, Claxton is misrepresenting the practice of learning on the 
basis of trust in teachers and other authoritative informants.  
 
*** 
 
The notion of education as dialogue is appealing. According to Tasos Kazepides, 
“The prerequisites of education are also the prerequisites of dialogue, although here 
the moral and intellectual virtues and the diverse ‘language games’, as Wittgenstein 
called them, take a more prominent place” (Kazepides, 2010, pp. 5 - 6). There is an 
interesting parallel between Wittgenstein’s “language games” and the  “speech 
genres” of Bakhtin, the most influential theorist of dialogism (discussed in Chapter 
6). In affording a key cultural role to dialogue, Bakhtin connects himself with a 
tradition that extends from Plato, through Hegel and Marx, to Buber, Wittgenstein, 
Gadamer, Habermas, Freire, Foucault, Oakeshott and Rorty – all of whom in their 
different ways have seen philosophy, culture and pedagogy as importantly 
dialogical. These writers do not, of course, share a settled understanding of what 
dialogue is. It is especially difficult to construct a general account of dialogical 
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pedagogy. For some dialogue is a moral and political concept, promoting 
egalitarianism, epistemic equality or mutual respect, for others it is a literary 
concept; for some “dialogue” is synonymous with “conversation”, for others it is 
synonymous with “negotiation”. For Bakhtin the concept underlies a substantial 
theory of language, of the social world and, ultimately, of selfhood (Holquist, 
2003).  
What many accounts of dialogical pedagogy, including Claxton’s, seem to 
share is an advocacy of pedagogic practices that shift the focus from instilling in 
students a pre-determined set of beliefs, skills and attitudes to supporting students 
in “finding their voices” and building confidence in challenging and responding to 
others. A dialogical classroom is one in which there will be discussion, 
collaborative investigation and an ethos of democracy, where each student is 
listened to and responded to with respect and where no-one, including the teacher, 
is unchallengeable.  
This is in no way incompatible with what I have to say about testimony and 
trust. In fact, the absence of trust in speakers, including as testifiers, and the 
absence of respect for people who speak with epistemic authoritativeness, would be 
odd in a dialogic classroom. The giving and taking of true beliefs is an essential 
component of any conversation, discussion, collaboration or presentation, whether 
or not it involves the teacher. Testimony is embedded in all kinds of discourse. 
There will be things the teacher says that should provoke a sceptical appraisal or 
challenge, but not everything she tells the students should, or could, be challenged. 
Some information will be essential background information to a claim that does 
merit appraisal or challenge. The same goes, of course, for what a student tells the 
class, group or individual peer. She may, for example, be giving a talk on one of 
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her hobbies or special interests, something about which she is a relative expert. It 
would be an odd dialogic classroom that promoted a default sceptical response to 
this student’s information-giving speech: it would hardly help her to “find her 
voice” and become confident in a range of discourses, speech acts and speech 
genres. 
I argue (in Chapter 6) that one of the features of testimonial speech acts is 
that they anticipate belief, and the concomitant of this is that disbelief can cause 
offence or resentment, although this depends on the precise nature of the speech act 
concerned. Dialogic classrooms that aim to promote mutual trust and respect 
between teachers and students must be classrooms in which individuals trust others 
for the truth without subjecting everything they say to sceptical scrutiny. However, 
this does not mean that evaluative judgement is absent in those cases, for 
reasonable trust in another person is founded on responsible judgement concerning 
the person and the context, and also on judgements concerning the speech acts 
employed. If students did not relate to one another in this way, and respond to 
language with sensitivity, they could never become the confident, self-aware, 
independent thinking, creative critics that Claxton quite rightly wants them to be. 
 
§1.2 Liberal Anxieties Concerning Testimony 
 
As we have seen, there are longstanding anxieties concerning the rationality or 
legitimacy of expecting children to acquire knowledge merely by hearing their 
teachers’ assertions of fact. Many of these anxieties are misplaced, not least 
because the nature of person-to-person knowledge exchange has been 
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misrepresented by educationalists, including those we think of as liberal 
philosophers of education. 
It would certainty be a mistake to associate testimonial teaching with rote 
learning or the cramming of facts into children’s minds in such a way that their 
capacity for independent or critical thinking is weakened. John Stuart Mill, whose 
own early education could be described as an experiment in indoctrination, wrote 
this at the start of his Autobiography: 
 
Most boys or youths who have had much knowledge drilled into 
them, have their mental capacities not strengthened, but overlaid 
by it. They are crammed with mere facts, and with the opinions or 
phrases of other people, and these are accepted as a substitute for 
the power to form opinions of their own; and thus the sons of 
eminent fathers, who have spared no pains in their education, so 
often grow up mere parroters of what they have learnt, incapable 
of using their minds except in the furrows traced for them. 
(Autobiography, Chapter 1) 
 
A hundred years later, Paul Hirst is also concerned about teaching pupils as if they 
were parrots: 
 
What then are we after in teaching a subject? What does learning 
it involve? In all subjects surely, we do not just want the learning 
of a string of propositions. If that were all, we could quickly set 
out what has to be learnt and find by empirical investigation how 
best to teach it. But even when handing on information, we want 
pupils not to become like parrots but to understand the 
information, and, as soon as we say that, difficulties arise as to 
what exactly we mean by this term and how we would know 
pupils had understood what was presented to them. (Hirst in 
Peters, 1967, p. 45) 
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The concern of Mill and Hirst with independent thinking and understanding 
is central to a liberal conception of education. They both imply that giving pupils 
information by merely telling it to them is not a rational way to share knowledge. 
Mill talks about pupils being “crammed with facts” and Hirst talks about them 
“learning a string of propositions” and about teachers “handing on information”. As 
testimony is often represented as a transmission of factual beliefs from the speaker 
to the audience, its epistemic status is clearly relevant to the distinctions Mill and 
Hirst are making. However, there is nothing necessarily parrot-like about the way 
in which knowledge is acquired testimonially from the words of others. If someone 
has learned a “string of propositions” parrot-fashion they have “learned” only in the 
sense of memorizing a number of sentences. Someone who has learned from the 
words of another in the sense that we might call  “testimonial learning” has not just 
memorized sentences but comprehended the utterance and located the information 
within their existing conceptual scheme. He is in a position to convey the 
information to a third person using a different form of words than that used by his 
own informant. It is a different kind of cognitive achievement from that which Mill 
and Hirst have described. 
In relation to the distinction between memorizing a form of words and 
understanding a proposition, Gilbert Ryle says:  
 
If [a pupil] can only echo the syllables that he has heard, he has 
not yet taken in the information meant to be conveyed by them. 
He has not grasped it if he cannot handle it. But if he could not 
even echo things told to him, a fortiori, he could not operate with, 
from or upon their informative content…So we see that even to 
have learned a true proposition is to have learned to do things 
other than repeating the words in which the truth had been 
dictated. (Ryle in Peters, 1967, p. 112) 
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The distinctions that Mill, Hirst and many others imply, between the non-
rational memorization of facts and the rational processes of understanding, begin to 
blur. Such blurry distinctions feature prominently in discussions of pedagogic 
styles.1 Doubts about the epistemological and pedagogical status of testimony is 
apparent in R.S. Peters’ essay “What is an educational process?” in the influential 
book he edited in 1967, The Concept of Education. Peters criticizes progressive 
educators who disparage teachers telling pupils things, and he thinks teachers do 
and should pass on knowledge (in order to teach understanding), but he is critical 
of what he sees as the human tendency uncritically to trust what others tell us. He 
thinks there is no innate tendency to think critically: “Indeed as Bacon argued, it 
goes against the inveterate tendency of the human race, which is to believe what we 
want to believe and to accept on trust things that we are told (Peters, 1967, p. 19). 
These doubts about the rationality of trusting others’ testimony lurk beneath 
the surface of much of the liberal philosophy of education of the 1960s and 1970s. 
On the one hand, children need to be given the knowledge that makes 
understanding and the grasping of principles possible, but on the other hand merely 
accepting what people (even teachers) tell us is viewed with suspicion. Peters could 
be assuming a distinction between justifiedly believing what someone tells us and 
merely trusting her for the truth: an assumption that we have good inductive 
reasons for believing some people in some situations and bad inductive reasons for 
believing others at other times. In the latter case, if we do believe them we would 
be trusting them “uncritically”. But because Peters does not make this explicit, 																																																								
1 In fact, even Ryle, having warned against becoming “unwittingly enslaved by the crude, 
semi-hydraulic idea that in essence to teach is to pump propositions, like ‘Waterloo, 
1815’ in to the pupils’ ears, until they regurgitate them automatically”, does not go on to 
develop an account of testimony that is non-hydraulic, although it would have helped him 
to make the case that teachers can only open gates for children, not herd them through. 	
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there is a degree of hesitancy in his analysis of acceptable and unacceptable 
educational processes. 
Uncertainty concerning the epistemic status of testimony is evident also in 
the Peters-influenced worry about the distinction between education and 
indoctrination. Does the distinction lie in the content of the beliefs the teacher 
wants pupils to accept, or in the pedagogical methods used, or in the teacher’s 
intentions, or in some combination of these possibilities? One significant 
contribution to this debate was The Concept of Indoctrination (1972), edited by I. 
A. Snook. Published in Peters’ International Library of the Philosophy of 
Education series, this included essays by, among others, John Wilson, Antony Flew 
and John White, and reference is made to earlier papers by Peters himself and by R. 
M. Hare.  
By 1972 progressive and child-centred approaches, and publications by Paulo 
Freire and Ivan Illich, had begun to influence educational thinking in the U.K. Most 
of the contributors to Snook’s collection are defending a liberal approach to 
education and none of them views schooling as necessarily oppressive. But they 
accept that there are some pedagogical methods that are closer to indoctrination 
than to education. Education, or, more specifically, schooling, they see as a set of 
practices that leads to the acquisition of significant and valuable skills, knowledge 
and understanding. A distinction that appears in several of the essays is between 
“rational methods of teaching” and “non-rational methods of teaching”. Often it is 
not clear which pedagogical procedures should be allocated to each of these 
categories, nor exactly what the criteria for each would be, but providing reasons 
and evidence for claims, and the opportunity to reflect on the reasons and evidence, 
are generally cited as features of rational teaching procedures. 
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The contributors to Snook’s collection do not discuss testimony explicitly, 
and this contributes to the uncertainty in the way the rational and non-rational 
teaching distinction is drawn. In fact, the epistemology of testimony is highly 
relevant to the education/indoctrination debate because it does seem to involve 
hearers accepting the word of another without any independent rational support. If 
education is distinguished from indoctrination by the degree of control the learner 
exercises over his or her acceptance of ideas, information or beliefs, how can 
expecting children to accept testimony be a respectable, non-indoctrinatory form of 
teaching?  
To the extent that the liberal position advocates teaching that promotes 
independent rational thought and associates this with the use of argument and 
dialogue, the provision of reasons and evidence, opportunities for critical reflection 
and “intelligent inquiry”, it seems that a liberal position should reject testimony 
outright as a rational mode of knowledge acquisition, or at least regard it as 
epistemically inferior. However, this position rests on two weak assumptions: 
firstly, that we can, and ought, in due course free ourselves from the need to trust 
others for the truth; secondly, that engaging in practices such as argument and 
dialogue somehow avoids accepting the word of others on trust. Reliance on 
testimony is an inevitable feature not only of life in general but also of teaching, 
dialogue and argument, and these depend on trust - the mutual trust, for example, 
that participants speak sincerely and with competence, as when they make 
unsupported knowledge claims on the way to an argued conclusion. Its relevance to 
liberal accounts of education and indoctrination provides another reason why the 
epistemic status of testimony and the role of trust in learning from others should be 
of interest to educators and educationalists. 
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*** 
 
It is my contention that it would be a mistake to assume that neither testimony nor 
interpersonal trust has a place in classrooms where dialogue and argument play a 
large part. I contend that they are integral to dialogue, intelligent inquiry and even 
to intellectual autonomy. There is another consideration that supports this 
contention. Responsibility, rationality and autonomy in our doxastic lives is not just 
a question of how we acquire beliefs in the first place: it is also a question of how 
we sustain and maintain our beliefs. An epistemic community that persuaded young 
people with arguments and evidence to believe a certain doctrine or system of 
beliefs but denied them opportunities to revise or reject them upon reflection and in 
the light of experience or subsequent evidence or discussion, would be as guilty of 
indoctrination as an epistemic community that “implanted” the doctrine non-
rationally. So a liberal interest in autonomy and intelligent inquiry has to come to 
terms with the fact that however our beliefs are formed initially there will always 
be a need for responsible epistemic housekeeping. It must take account of the fact 
that people can be persuaded by rational arguments to hold unpleasant, extreme and 
implausible beliefs. How can this be when rational argument depends on good 
reasons and evidence? Will not reason and evidence, properly deployed, reveal 
such doctrines and ideologies to be irrational or incredible? Clearly not, if the 
reasons and evidence come, coherently, from within that system of belief. What 
counts as reasoning and as good evidence is likely to be a fundamental belief from 
deep within the doctrine itself. We might still feel justified in condemning some 
ways of “implanting” religious and political beliefs, on the ground that they do not 
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appeal to any kind of reasons and evidence, but most arguments attempt to 
persuade by citing reasons and evidence that count as such because of values 
intrinsic to the doctrine or ideology. 
Foundationalism concerning beliefs and ways of reasoning leaves us with a 
set of unjustified basic beliefs, so it cannot avoid the problem. An alternative 
approach is to focus on how the beliefs are maintained. People who have been 
taught a coherent system of thought can still reflect critically on the validity of 
particular beliefs within the system and on alternative beliefs from outside the 
system. They will, inevitably, use the critical tools available to them, and their 
background beliefs will bias and prejudice them, but nevertheless what they are 
doing is rational reflection. From an external perspective it might seem that what 
they are doing is merely reinterpreting particular beliefs, making adjustments of 
understanding in order to sustain and reinforce the system of thought. This, surely, 
is exactly what liberal educationalists want to encourage children to do: to reflect 
on particular beliefs and to make adjustments or reinterpretations that make their 
overall “framework of understanding” more coherent. The aims of “critical 
reflection” or “intelligent inquiry” in some ways are quite modest: housekeeping 
rather than reconstruction. 
Liberal educationalists might be happy to concede that their emphasis on 
particular kinds of reasoning and particular notions of good evidence and critical 
reflection represents an adherence to norms from within a particular system of 
thought. In the end, perhaps, it is not the methods of belief acquisition, nor the 
nature of belief maintenance, that distinguishes liberal from non-liberal epistemic 
communities, but the degree of unorthodoxy that is genuinely tolerated. This has 
little to do with debates about rational and non-rational methods of teaching and 
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learning, and much more to do with the advocacy of methods of teaching in which 
differences of belief and understanding are openly explored and discussed. 
Dialogue and argument appear to promote intellectual virtues, such as open-
mindedness and the courage to voice unorthodox ideas, virtues that, as J. S. Mill 
argued in On Liberty, promote a “free trade in ideas”, progress towards truer 
beliefs, a respect for others and a toleration of difference that fosters creativity. If 
high quality talking is fundamental to learning, dialogical classroom practices are 
likely to be effective in nurturing appropriate cognitive and intellectual virtues. But 
this does not justify an assumption that interpersonal trust and the speech acts 
associated with testimony have no place in classrooms where dialogue and 
argument play a large part. I contend that they are not only integral to good 
discussion and argument, but also to the longer-term maintenance of a consistent 
and coherent set of beliefs and preferences, and this must depend to some degree 
on accepting claims that refresh or challenge one’s existing beliefs. 
 
§1.3 Reliance on Testimony Inside and Outside the Classroom 
 
The epistemological problem of testimony embraces the everyday practice of 
telling things to other people and more dramatic forms of “bearing witness” to 
experience. Testimony is an important, an ineliminable, feature of our lives, 
including those parts spent in formal education. We share both important and trivial 
information with friends and relatives, sometimes with complete strangers, and 
sometimes anonymously. In the classroom teachers and pupils exchange 
information in a variety of contexts. Of course teachers should allow children to 
research and to investigate, to discover connections as they go, to forge their own 
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ways of understanding, including by collaborating in groups, but it is often 
overlooked that whatever the classroom activities involve it is likely that the 
students will be receivers and providers of information. The teacher will not always 
be the authoritative source of knowledge: books, other students, family members, 
Internet sites such as Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter, newspapers, TV 
programmes are all sources of testimony. We depend on each other for knowledge, 
and the nature of that dependency goes deep into our social practices and self-
conceptions. This is another reason why philosophers and educationalists should 
take an interest in the epistemology of testimony and the variety of speech acts 
associated with it. 
Our epistemic environment changes all the time as new sources and 
technologies of information provision become available. We should bear in mind 
that a school’s practices occur in a particular socio-historical context. For most of 
history, most people have not learned what they needed to know to function in their 
society in the context of a school classroom, with all that that entails: a specialized 
location, a time-tabled day, learning related to children’s ages, institutional rules, 
and specially trained, professional teachers to provide the prescribed information, 
skills and norms of behaviour. Mass schooling has shifted the frame of reference of 
the concept of learning, and especially of learning in the sense of knowledge 
acquisition. But universal schooling (in the West) arose in the particular socio-
historical context of modernity, in which the processes of industrialization, 
mechanization, intensified capitalism, global markets, the erosion of traditional 
(e.g. religious) authorities played a part, along with the intellectual influence of 
Enlightenment notions of rationality, objectivity and the methodologies of science. 
One of the many implications for learning was the need for a more literate 
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population to acquire more abstract knowledge, the kind that can be obtained from 
the words of others. It took until the twentieth century for the Enlightenment focus 
on autonomy to filter through to educational practice in any substantial way, and it 
took until the latter part of the century for modernity’s increasing instability and 
fragmentation to lead to a state of uncertainty in schools concerning the role of 
teachers and the status of knowledge. Now the “progressive” ideas of Dewey, 
Froebel, Montessori, Piaget, Vygotsky and Bruner are seen as competing with calls 
for a “return to traditional values”. But neither traditionalists nor progressivists 
have fully heeded what writers from various disciplines have argued, that 
communication and, therefore, individual identity, depend on our trust in each other 
as knowers and testifiers. 
In How Conversations Work (1985) Ronald Wardhaugh, a professor of 
linguistics, comments on the ineliminable role of trust in social living. We could 
not cope with life, he says, if we could not trust people not to deceive and harm us. 
Trust makes communication possible, but it must be tempered with caution and 
sound judgement with regard to the multiple possibilities of meaning and intention 
that are inherent in any act of communication. Luckily,  
 
Certain basic principles that prevail in most conversations help 
you to narrow down the possibilities to a manageable set: mutual 
trust, the sincerity of participants, the validity of everyday 
appearances, and “common sense”. A certain scepticism may 
obtain in our views of life and of human motivation, but it must 
have healthy limits. We cannot question and doubt everything or 
suspect every motive and still insist that we be regarded as normal 
people. We must seriously restrict such questioning, doubt, and 
suspicion; they are indicators, or markers, of very special kinds of 
conversation…and such special activities must be clearly 
“framed” in some way to indicate their special character. 
(Wardhaugh, 1985, p. 7) 
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Despite this, trusting others for knowledge continues to be disparaged by 
educationalists. Perhaps for some this is not so much scepticism or cynicism as a 
kind of epistemic risk avoidance, for in trusting others for the truth we expose our 
vulnerability as social beings. Not everything we are told is true and not every 
informant is sincere or competent. Perhaps children need to be protected from their 
own gullibility? If this is our concern, our response should not be to disparage 
learning from others but to think more about how to educate children to make 
sensitive and sophisticated judgements about informants, and this means educating 
them not only about critical thinking but in appropriate ways about language and 
communication. We should not pretend that children can avoid these judgements 
by, for example, always coming to a consensus opinion about what to believe, 
through discussions with peers in the same epistemic position as themselves. I 
argue (in Chapter 5) that the reasonableness of judgements about tellers and 
tellings, as conveyed by contextualized utterances, depends ultimately on the 
reasonableness of our trust in our own doxastic housekeeping, for that is where the 
trail of epistemic and linguistic rationality must end.  
I believe that anxiety about our reliance on others for knowledge rests on 
misunderstandings about language in general and information-giving speech acts in 
particular. The approach I argue for embraces contextualism and an acceptance of 
epistemic trust in others (rather than mere reliance on them), albeit a trust that is 
based ultimately on trust in one’s own judgements. It is not an approach that offers 
guarantees of infallibility, or even reliability: acquiring knowledge from others is 
risky; but it is not so risky as to be irrational. Its riskiness is part of the human 
condition. 
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* * * 
 
Philosophical attention has focused more on perception, inference and memory as 
sources of knowledge than on testimony, but even our perceptual knowledge 
depends in some ways on knowledge we have learned from others – because, for 
example, perception is recognition and categorization as well as sense-experience. 
Take away the knowledge we have acquired from others, rather than witnessed for 
ourselves, and what do we have left? But we know that information we receive 
from others can be false, incomplete, deceitful, misleading and irrelevant, and this 
awareness prompts questions concerning what kind of reasons we need for 
believing what we are told, and about how sceptical we should be about testimonial 
beliefs qualifying as knowledge. As with perceptual beliefs, if we cannot tell the 
true ones from the false ones how can we claim to have acquired knowledge? 
Without good grounds for belief, are not children especially prey to gullibility and 
vulnerable to exploitation? Any acquaintance, relative or teacher can impress us 
with their articulacy, efficiency, confidence and apparent command of 
information…yet misinform us. They can even give us false information that works 
in the sense of getting a job done, such as the job of having something, anything, to 
pass on as relevant information. This happens in school sometimes. Consider the 
difference between the teaching styles of Hector and Irwin in Alan Bennett’s play 
The History Boys. Despite his own genuine interest in history, as a teacher Irwin’s 
focus is on the boys passing the Oxbridge entrance exams, so he encourages them 
to make their answers original and spicy regardless of accuracy and sincerity. For 
Hector sincerity is a sine qua non and a disposition to speak with sincerity (and 
accuracy) is part of the tradition that he seeks to “pass on”. What a teacher like 
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Hector passes on is not just knowledge and understanding (and definitely not 
isolated “gobbets”), but intellectual virtues and integrity. 
Much of the learning we do in school requires us to be able to articulate it, to 
be capable of framing what we know in words to share with others. This is not just 
a question of passing on a parcel of facts. It would be a mechanical process if it 
were. Teaching is most successful when the learner’s interest is aroused, his 
imagination or emotions stirred, and parcels of information cannot do this outside 
of a context that encourages the learner to wonder, question, speculate, 
hypothesize, plan, discuss, experiment, explore. Information needs a context in 
order to be comprehensible before it needs a context in which to be either 
interesting or believable. We need to consider what is achieved in comprehending 
testimonial speech acts as well as how beliefs formed from testimony are justified, 
and we need to consider the relation between these two processes. The nature of 
this relation is one of the reasons why learning from the words of others is not a 
passive process. 
 
§1.4 The Epistemic Environment of the Classroom 
 
A classroom is an epistemic environment in which scepticism and credulity, 
autonomy and trust in the epistemic authority of others, as well as trust in our own 
ability to achieve a consistent and coherent set of beliefs and preferences, are, 
ideally, harmoniously maintained. It should be a (relatively) safe epistemic 
environment, but this does not mean that it is not a challenging environment that 
promotes active thought and understanding. 
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John Passmore differentiates between “picking up” and “studying” as modes 
of acquiring information. “Studying” is systematic and involves skills of listening, 
reading, selection, argument; these are skills, he says, that require formal training. 
“Picking up” is more unreliable but also requires training in order to assess 
reliability and unreliability. Passmore comments on the importance of children 
learning to assess reliability: 
 
[O]nly a foolish teacher will wholly condemn the flood of 
information which will continue to pour in upon his pupils during 
their whole life. Hume sometimes writes as if it would be better 
for people to believe nothing except what they have learnt for 
themselves from experience – in his rather special sense of 
“experience” – but it would be absurd to carry experiential 
puritanism that far. To prepare them to learn from, to cope 
intelligently with, picked-up information, is certainly one of the 
most valuable tasks the teacher can undertake. His problem, as so 
often, is to teach his pupils to be cautious and critical but not 
cynical. And he can best accomplish this by getting them to see 
for themselves the degrees and kinds of unreliability possessed by 
different sources of information. (Passmore, 1980, p. 76) 
 
 
Finding the right balance between scepticism and credulity, avoiding both 
gullibility and cynicism, is certainly a difficult and important task, and sensitivity 
to the different dangers inherent in the various sources of information is something 
a curriculum must encourage. In secondary schools, subjects such as English, 
Media Studies, History, Critical Thinking, Religious Education and Citizenship can 
incorporate a wide range of information sources so that students can discuss and 
assess their relative reliability or trustworthiness. Passmore is no doubt thinking 
especially of the type of learning that benefits from critical thinking skills such as 
inductive and deductive inference. But not all learning from others, including from 
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written sources, requires thinking skills of that kind. Some, perhaps most, involves 
the exercise of reasonable interpersonal trust and linguistic competence rather than 
the inferential assessment of empirical evidence.  
Passmore was writing in 1980, before many of the sources of information 
that make up a contemporary child’s epistemic environment existed. The point he 
makes is to some extent reinforced by the rapid rate of change in the technology of 
communication. It is interesting, however, that when discussing the acquisition of 
information from reading, rather than assimilating this to testimony, he compares it 
with learning by observation and with learning from, through and by experience 
(which he distinguishes from each other). He concludes that it is a unique mode of 
learning. I think it is more likely that the epistemic, linguistic and cognitive issues 
raised by reading as a mode of learning from others are continuous with those 
raised by verbal testimony. Certainly, communication via texts, tweets and 
messaging combines aspects of speech and reading and writing. Electronic 
messages can be almost as instant and as informal as verbal messages can be, as 
casual and as unchecked.  
Children experience a range of complex epistemic environments. A 
classroom is a special one. Unlike much of the information children pick up, what 
they are told in the classroom is directed quite deliberately at them. The repertoire 
of discourses is (or should be) adapted to their capacities and knowledge, and by 
and large the information proffered is manifestly relevant to them, to their studies 
at least, if not to their personal plans and futures. So, although there will be 
information that children pick up casually in school, the comprehension and 
acceptance of much of what they are told will be assisted by its clear contextual 
relevance to the lesson and the curriculum. Sometimes what they are told might tax 
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their interpretative capacities, by making them search harder for relevance, perhaps 
by employing irony or metaphor that delays comprehension or permits a degree of 
personalization or creativity in interpretation.  
Another feature that makes a classroom a special learning environment is its 
relative epistemic safety. This in itself could prompt a suspicion of passive 
learning. The safety comes from the likelihood of the information children are 
given in class being credible or true. Their vulnerability to misinformation (without 
correction) and to lies is relatively restricted. As long as teachers are teaching 
within their areas of expertise, and exercising basic intellectual virtues and 
linguistic sensitivity, the information the children are exposed to will generally be 
relevant and “true enough” (Elgin, 2004) for their purposes. Other sources of 
information in the children’s lives – family, friends, social networks, TV and radio, 
magazines  - are likely to be more variable in epistemic quality and to contain a 
greater proportion of unstable, unchecked, less cautious information.  
But if the classroom is a relatively safe epistemic environment, does that 
mean that the children accept what they are told too readily, too unquestioningly? 
As we shall see in Chapter 3, Sanford Goldberg has argued (2010, 2013) that it is 
only because young children at school are in a safe epistemic environment that they 
can be said to learn from testimony, for they are too “cognitively immature” to 
monitor what they are told for inaccuracy or insincerity. Whether this is so or not, it 
seems safe to say that the younger the children are, the greater their cognitive effort 
spent in comprehension rather than in epistemic vigilance, and the older they are, 
the greater can be the pedagogical emphasis on epistemic vigilance and critical 
assessment of what they are told. This means that although it will still form an 
inevitable part of teacher-pupil communication in older years, testimony can play a 
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reduced role compared with speculation, argument, inference, debate and criticism. 
On the other hand, the more complex the debates and discussions are, the more 
likely it is that they will incorporate the kind of information that has to be accepted 
on trust from one kind of source or another. A senior classroom need not be a less 
safe epistemic environment than a junior one, but it can be a more doxastically 
challenging one, for teachers and students. Whatever the age of the students, the 
teacher need not bear the whole responsibility for safety of the epistemic 
environment if she has prepared her pupils to take responsibility for the accuracy 
and sincerity of the information and beliefs they endorse and communicate. But as 
learning from others is not always of the kind that involves critical assessment, it is 
as important to promote trust and trustworthiness, relevance and appropriateness to 
children of all ages as it is to teach them critical assessment and inferential skills. 
Truth telling is important because it has the capacity to lead us away from 
conventionalism and to take us out of the here and now. Children cannot begin to 
make sense of their world just by acquiring knowledge through skill in inferential 
reasoning. They need a much broader cultural repertoire, different modes of 
thinking, of responding, of generating understanding: narrative, moral, aesthetic, 
practical modes, for example. Learning from the words of others, from informative 
communication, makes demands on us other than our acceptance of the truth of the 
claim being made. It also demands reasonable judgements of relevance, 
trustworthiness, appropriateness, as well as sensitivity to contextual features, and 
any theory of testimony and any account of the associated speech acts and 
discourse, has to take account of these communicative and interpersonal features. 
These interpersonal features are no doubt present in a whole range of speech acts, 
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but when we have seen them at work in testimonial exchanges I think it will be 
easier to see them at work in other kinds of communication and collaboration. 
 
§ 1.5 Testimony, Trust and Comprehension  
 
One way in which epistemological theory can decrease the epistemic load that 
children are expected to bear in acquiring knowledge from the testimony of 
teachers is to take better account of the comprehension of informative 
communications. Much of the cognitive processing that makes the acceptance of a 
piece of testimony rational has already been done in the course of comprehension, 
and this might lead us to wonder whether the fact that one comprehends the 
utterance is a reason for accepting the claim it makes. Furthermore, communication 
and comprehension involve dispositions on the part of speaker and hearer that are 
more usually considered to be epistemic; and these are not always dispositions to 
be cautious, critical or sceptical. Both comprehension and belief depend primarily 
on a disposition to trust the speaker, and this disposition would clearly be irrational 
or unreasonable if speakers were not generally disposed to be trustworthy.  
The communication of information is a social practice with multiple 
functions. For the receiver, the function is to provide him with new information, 
with a claim that he can both comprehend and accept as true. Additionally, the 
communication may help the receiver to make a judgement about the 
communicator, about her competence, appropriateness, sincerity and 
trustworthiness: a judgement that may be useful on future occasions as well as on 
the present one. For the communicator, the function is to have an effect on the 
addressee, to influence his views or to persuade him to accept something she wants 
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him to believe, and this is sometimes as much about herself as it is about the 
content of the information proffered.  
It is conceivable that these functions are governed by a stable social or 
epistemic norm, such as a norm of truthfulness or a principle of cooperation, but 
this cannot be assumed. The interests of the two parties do not necessarily coincide. 
For one thing, it is not always in the communicator’s immediate interest to tell her 
audience the truth. She hopes that her audience will be trusting and the audience 
hopes that she will be trustworthy, but neither a norm of trust, on the part of the 
audience, nor a norm of trustworthiness, on the part of the communicator, can be 
assumed to be a default standard. If this is true of one-to-one, face-to-face 
communications, it is true to at least an equal extent of less direct and more widely 
distributed communications, such as those that are published, broadcast or 
distributed via the Internet. 
We might speculate that satisfactory cooperation between the two parties can 
be justified on the ground that over a period of time cooperation works to the 
benefit of both sides. The idea here would be that although each participant has to 
give up some potential advantages, the losses are minimized so long as non-
cooperators are constrained by the threat of social penalties. However, this assumes 
that each player’s motive is to gain as much advantage as possible, and, therefore, 
that it is in each player’s interest to be seen as cooperating trustworthily but to 
exploit this perception when the opportunity arises. This makes it very hard to see 
how, on any particular occasion, trusting one’s informant could be warranted on 
game theoretic grounds, for informants whose tactics are to appear reliable and 
trustworthy might always be about to exploit their audience’s credulity. The fact (if  
it is a fact) that credulity or trust works out satisfactorily in the majority of cases, is 
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not sufficient for warranting testimonial belief: firstly, because it provides the 
audience with no protection, on particular occasions, from the charge of gullibility 
or epistemic irresponsibility and, secondly, because it contradicts our experience of 
certain classes of communication, where greater epistemic vigilance is quite clearly 
prudent. It may well be that most informative communications are reliable and 
truthful only because most are trivial or straightforward assertions - about where to 
find the station or the keys, who won the match, whether or not it is raining. In 
many cases these are communications that can be corroborated immediately by 
other means, such as seeing for oneself whether or not it is raining. The general 
reliability of communications should not blind us to the potential for error and 
malicious misinformation when it might matter most. 
One response to this situation is to argue, as non-reductionists about 
testimony do, that although we have a default entitlement to believe information we 
are told by others, we have also an epistemic duty to be alert enough to the 
possibility of error and deception to filter out suspect communications. “Filtering” 
here indicates a fairly passive practice. It can be contrasted with the “monitoring” 
that “reductionists” insist on as our epistemic duty, where “monitoring” implies a 
more active assessment of the source and the content of the communication. For 
non-reductionists the filtering process is intended to alert one to potential defeaters 
of belief, whether these are facial indications of insincerity (such as a reluctance to 
make eye contact) or facts that contradict an existing background belief. Our 
response to a defeater alert is not necessarily immediate rejection of the 
information, nor distrust of the speaker; rather, the alert triggers the same process 
of critical reasoning that we employ in other types of communicative situation, 
such as argument. We are now looking for specific reasons to believe the proffered 
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information, articulating to ourselves why we should trust or distrust the informant 
or why we should accept or reject the content: articulations that will render one’s 
response to the communication rational in a way that it would not have been if the 
filtering process had failed and we had relied purely on a general entitlement to 
believe. If we had overlooked the potential defeater, we would have been guilty of 
gullibility, of epistemic irresponsibility. On the other hand, if we employ this 
critical reasoning process when the filtering has not triggered an alarm, we appear 
to be distrusting our informant for no reason, and if we make this distrust known to 
her, she may well feel entitled to take offence or express resentment.  
The reason why we tend to feel resentful when hearers do not simply “take 
our word” is that communication is connected to many of our most sensitive 
reactive attitudes. We expect to be believed when we offer information sincerely, 
and we hope to be believed when we do not, and even when we have given false or 
incomplete information, we can feel resentful when it is ourselves rather than what 
we are saying that is distrusted. Typically, in a testimonial situation, we offer 
ourselves as authorities on the topic in hand. We are claiming to know, not offering 
an opinion or inviting a debate. If we were offering an opinion or speculating we 
would generally indicate that with a phrase such as “I think” or “It could be that...”. 
To assert something or tell someone something is to claim that one knows it to be 
true. In due course I will be examining an argument to the effect that knowledge is 
the norm of assertion, which is to say that one is entitled to assert only what one 
knows to be true, and that receivers who recognise the speech act as an assertion 
are entitled to accept the content as true on the expectation that the speaker speaks 
with appropriate epistemic authority – that is, from knowledge. What goes for the 
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speech act of assertion goes also for closely related speech acts, such as assurance, 
but with some differences in the constitutive expectations and responsibilities. 
The fact that disbelief can trigger negative reactive attitudes lends support to 
the claim that we have a general expectation that we will be believed when we 
testify to knowledge. Non-reductionists have to justify the claim that we have a 
general entitlement to believe information given to us by others, whereas 
reductionists have to justify the claim that testimonial knowledge reduces to a more 
basic kind of knowledge and/or that testimonial warrant for a testimonial belief 
reduces to a more basic kind of warrant. 
To claim that we have a general entitlement to believe what others tell us is to 
claim that testimony is a unique source of knowledge with its own kind of 
justification. According to non-reductionists, being at what Bernard Williams calls 
a “positional disadvantage” in not having direct (e.g. perceptual) access to certain 
information, we are justified in believing what an informant tells us, all things 
being equal, because we have a general entitlement to believe testimony. We have 
this, non-reductionists argue, not on the basis of empirical evidence but on the basis 
of some unique feature of human rationality, cognition or communication. If the 
non-reductionists are right about this, it means that on any particular occasion when 
an informant tells us something, as long as there are no alarm signals that we would 
be epistemically culpable in ignoring, we do not require a particular reason for 
believing what we are told. A default, possibly a priori, reason is provided by the 
nature of human rationality, cognition or communication (according to the 
particular version of non-reductionism adopted). 
I will argue that the reasonable acceptance of any testimonial belief requires a 
particular kind of vigilance and responsibility, or integrity, and I will also argue 
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that the same attribute is required for responsible comprehension. Non-
reductionists are right in claiming that a reason for belief is provided by the nature 
of human cognition and communication. It is provided, in part, by the cognitive 
processes involved in comprehension and in part by the mutually recognized 
expectations and responsibilities that constitute the particular kind of testimonial 
speech act under consideration, although these are clearly linked in that to properly 
comprehend the utterance one has to recognize the speech act and what it entails. 
Comprehension is an achievement, and can fail on particular occasions, so the fact 
that one has comprehended the utterance gives one a (defeasible) reason for 
accepting it.  
Non-reductionists and advocates of trust-based theories argue that the kinds 
of reasoning and vigilance that reductionists claim is necessary for testimonial 
warrant, or justification, impose too great a cognitive and epistemic workload on 
us, on top of the work we have already done in comprehending the utterance, and 
our rational and cognitive processes are such that very often the epistemic 
assessment can take a free ride on the back of the comprehension process. This is 
especially important when we are thinking about the epistemic burden that 
reductionism would otherwise impose on younger children, and, as philosophers 
and educationalists with an interest in the learning of younger children, we should 
consider the developmental as well as the epistemological implications of the 
theories on offer. I contend that children learn the normative expectations and 
responsibilities of information-giving speech acts as they learn to speak.            
It is clearly wrong to think that either all knowledge from testimony reduces 
to inferential knowledge or no knowledge from testimony reduces to inferential 
knowledge. It is important from both an epistemological and an educational point 
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of view to recognize that some of our knowledge from testimony is inferential and 
some is of a more distinctively testimonial or interpersonal kind that is not so 
influenced by traditional critical thinking skills and in which interpersonal trust is 
central. However, to complicate the issue further, comprehension itself typically 
involves inference - as when in order to understand what the speaker is saying by 
her utterance we have to infer the assumptions and commitments she intends to 
implicate - so in this sense inference is involved in coming via testimony to believe 
a proposition, even when it would not be correct to say that the belief itself was 
arrived at inferentially. 
 
*** 
This chapter has provided a preliminary outline of some of the philosophical and 
educational anxieties and challenges associated with testimony. They will be 
explored in more depth and detail in subsequent chapters. In this chapter I have 
been concerned to persuade the reader that testimony is a topic for education 
theorists and philosophers of all persuasions to take seriously. I have argued that 
we do in fact acquire a good deal of our knowledge, both inside and outside the 
classroom, by way of testimony, and that it plays a role in all kinds of discourse 
that are commonly seen as pedagogically preferable to a teaching style dominated 
by teacher talk and direct instruction. Some of the anxieties are based on 
misconceptions and misrepresentations. A proper understanding of the speech acts 
associated with testimony, of their comprehension and of the expectations and 
responsibilities associated with them, will relieve some of the doubts and anxieties. 
However, philosophical anxieties concerning learning by way of testimonial speech 
acts are deep-rooted and although the ubiquity of this form of belief-acquisition is 
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evident, our entitlement to claim the status of knowledge for beliefs acquired in this 
way is not so evident. In the next chapter I provide an historical account of how 
philosophers from Plato to Locke, Hume and Reid have responded to doubts about 
testimony’s epistemic propriety and rationality. This will serve to provide a fuller 
introduction to the philosophical problems before (in Chapters 3 and 4) we delve 
deeper into contemporary debates concerning the justification of beliefs acquired 
by way of testimonial speech acts. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Themes and Debates 
 
This chapter prepares the way for the arguments of subsequent chapters. It surveys 
Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern attitudes to testimony before examining in 
more detail Locke and Hume’s arguments for justified assent to testimony being 
based on inductive inference and the calculation of probabilities. Thomas Reid’s 
non-reductive approach anticipates the modern interest in the intersubjective 
linguistic nature of testimonial knowledge exchange. Authority and autonomy 
emerge as awkward bedfellows in any account of testimony that seeks to provide 
room for both.  
Reid describes testimony as a distinctive kind of speech, in a way that 
resonates with recent trust theories of testimony (discussed in Chapter 4). He seems 
to conceive of the capacity to learn from testimony as what Stephen Darwall and 
Benjamin McMyler have called  “a second-personal epistemic capacity” (Darwall, 
2006; McMyler, 2011). It is epistemically second-personal, and irreducibly social, 
in that the relationship between testifier and audience plays a fundamental role in 
the justification or rationalization of testimonially-acquired beliefs.  
However, such a view raises the possibility that our reliance on testimony is 
incompatible with the goal of epistemic autonomy. It suggests that the epistemic 
responsibility for the belief is at best shared between speaker and audience. How 
can we be epistemically or cognitively autonomous when the responsibility for so 
many of our beliefs is shared with others and when the “operation of the mind” 
concerned could not take place at all without social interaction with other people? 
That is a question I address in Chapter 5. 
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§2.1 Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Attitudes to Testimony 
 
Scepticism concerning knowledge based on testimony appears early in the history 
of philosophy. Plato appears to discount testimony as a source of knowledge on the 
ground that it is not in itself a logos (Theaetetus, 201cd). In other words, the fact 
that someone has testified, made a factual claim, does not in itself provide rational 
grounds for counting the belief thus acquired as knowledge. Here, appearing to 
support the Meno’s recognition of first-hand experience as a bona fide source of 
factual knowledge, Plato compares testimony unfavourably with perception. It 
seems that knowledge is an all-or-nothing matter: there is no question of it having 
any relation to probability. The truth of the belief is insufficient for knowledge; a 
logos is required, and this is not simply a reason but, as McMyler puts it, “a 
systematic explanatory account of the phenomenon in question” (McMyler, 2011, 
p. 17). The knower is required to be able to assemble a proof or explanation: a 
teacher can only help the student see the connections for himself. This means that 
knowing is a kind understanding, but whereas our conception of understanding 
allows for it to be a matter of degree, subject to development and accommodation 
to new experience, for Plato one either knows or does not know, understands or 
does not understand – for example, what a triangle is -  and when one does know or 
understand, it is because one has an “explanation” derived ultimately from clear 
definitional knowledge (knowledge of Forms). 
Philosophers, such as Plato, whose main interest is in distinguishing 
knowledge from what they regard as lower forms of belief, especially those who 
want to set the bar high in terms of certainty and clarity, are always likely to 
disparage testimony as “second-hand”, as “hearsay”, and as the weapon of wily 
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orators or authoritarian pedagogues whose intention is indoctrination rather than 
education. For Plato, there is no way that a hearer’s acceptance of a proposition 
proffered testimonially can acquire the extra ingredient, the “explanation” or 
theoretical rationality. The hearer can acquire a true belief but he cannot understand 
or account for why it is a true belief and therefore his belief cannot amount to 
knowledge. 
Plato would disagree with Edward Craig’s (1990) and Bernard Williams’s 
(2002) claim that the first epistemological question to ask is not What is 
knowledge? but What is a good informant? Williams sees a good informant as 
intellectually virtuous: she is conscientious in being accurate and sincere in what 
she tells us. Craig explains the value of good information: it benefits us by aiding 
our survival. We need to be able to distinguish good information from bad; 
therefore, given that we are not always in a position to judge the quality of the 
information itself, we need to be good at telling good informants from bad. 
However, as the Road to Larissa story in The Meno demonstrates, Plato recognized 
that there is more to being a good informant than providing a true belief. 
The question of the rationality of belief, what provides that additional feature, 
divides into accounts that emphasize reasons that might or might not be known to 
the subject and those that emphasize reasons of which the subject is necessarily 
aware.  The former path leads us towards epistemic externalism, where rationality 
or justification is located in the properties of the content of the testimony and/or of 
the testifier, whether or not the recipient is aware of these. The other path leads 
towards epistemic internalism, where rationality or justification is located in 
qualities displayed by the recipient. Epistemic vigilance and a capacity to trust 
wisely are internalist properties, properties of the recipient, as are intellectual 
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virtues such as open-mindedness. A hybrid account of epistemic rationality or 
justification is also an option, where a combination of externalist and internalist 
properties is required for the recipient’s belief to be deemed rational, warranted or 
justified, and for the belief acquired to amount to knowledge. 
If the internalist’s question, concerning the kind of responsiveness to 
testimony a hearer needs in order to acquire a reasonable or justified belief, is a 
question with obvious relevance for education, we should not forget that speakers 
have requirements and responsibilities, too, and these must be included in any 
account of the epistemic and linguistic responsibilities of teachers, and also of 
epistemic justice in the classroom. 
The earlier mention of virtues hints at another theme that we will encounter 
later. Virtue epistemology, with its emphasis on the character of believers and 
knowers, speakers and audiences, and with it roots in Aristotle’s philosophy, is 
associated especially with the trust-based theories that I will look at in Chapter 5. 
One of the strengths of virtue epistemology is that it allows us to take a 
developmental approach to epistemic rationality: we can become more 
epistemically virtuous; we can learn to be better testifiers and recipients of 
testimony. A developmental approach is important, too, because it acknowledges 
the role of testimony in the formation of other kinds of rationality. What we have 
learned from others is what allows us to recognize what we see and also to reason. 
Whatever we may decide about its legitimacy in certain high-stakes situations, we 
must at least recognize that testimony plays a key role in getting us ready to 
employ our senses as eye-witnesses and to practise inductive reasoning in ways we 
know to be reasonable because we have been told that they are. Without it we could 
not begin to make the explanatory connections that Plato requires for episteme. 
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This line of thought should lead us to agree with Craig and Williams that 
perception and reasoning cannot claim logical or chronological priority over 
testimony. In holding perception and, especially, reasoning to be superior sources 
of belief, Plato ignores the developmental role teaching and testimony have played 
in preparing us to make sound perceptual, deductive and inductive judgements. 
 
*** 
 
In the thirteenth century, Aquinas denied testimonial beliefs the status of 
knowledge but regarded our reliance on testimony as necessary for human society, 
and as a kind of faith, positioned between opinion and knowledge. Some contingent 
facts “remote from our senses” can be ascertained only by reliance on the word of 
others: “Hence it is that in human society faith is necessary in order that one man 
give credence to the words of another, and this is the foundation of justice” 
(Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, qu.III, art. i.3; cited in Coady, 1992, p. 
16). 
So, like Plato, Aquinas does not allow beliefs formed on the basis of 
testimony the status of knowledge, but he differs in according them a significant 
role in a just society. If we want to replace the cognitive attitude of faith that 
Aquinas employs here with a secular concept, surely the kind of attitude that could 
replace it is interpersonal trust, trust in the testifier herself, in her virtues of 
truthfulness and trustworthiness. This is not the trust we show when we trust that 
the plumber (because she is a plumber) will repair our boiler safely, but the kind 
when we trust her to have the virtues or character to fulfil our expectations and her 
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commitments. This is a distinction that will feature again in Chapter 5’s discussion 
of trust-based theories of testimony. 
In effect, as Coady points out (1992, p. 17), Aquinas is providing, in the 
modern epistemological idiom, an internalist account of justified belief. Such 
accounts have been the target of criticism, especially those labelled “intellectualist” 
(which include Descartes’s). Coady detects a tension in Aquinas’s epistemology 
and in other Medieval theories, including St Augustine’s. On the one hand, they 
want knowledge to be a question of rational intuition; on the other hand, they have 
to acknowledge that perception, first-hand experience and testimony can be reliable 
sources of useful true belief. Augustine even admits that in common usage, we can 
be said to know “what we perceive by our bodily senses and what we believe on 
the authority of trustworthy witnesses” (Retractationes, I. xiii. 3; cited in Coady, 
1992, p.19). In common usage, Augustine suggests, the word “know” is benignly 
misapplied, but it is not appropriate when “we keep to the proper acceptation of the 
term” (ibid). In De Trinitate, he states: 
 
Far be it from us […] to deny that we know what we have learned 
by the testimony of others: otherwise we know not that there is an 
ocean; we know not that the lands and cities exist which most 
copious report commends to us; we know not that those men were, 
and their works, which we have learned by reading history; we 
know not the news that is daily brought us from this quarter or 
that, and confirmed by consistent and conspiring evidence. (De 
Trinitate, XV. Xii. 21; cited in Coady, 1992, p. 20) 
 
But Augustine does not supply an account of the qualities that distinguish justified 
or reasonable testimonial belief and Coady suggests that he is assuming a kind of 
intellectual insight. If this is true, it would make his theory either an internalist one 
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or an externalist/reliabilist one, depending on whether the knower is required to be 
aware and in control of how he exercises this insight. 
The internalism/externalism distinction and debate connects with one of the 
key questions that make the epistemology of testimony relevant to education 
theory. In order to acquire knowledge, or at least a reasonable belief, what kind of 
responsiveness to testimony is required of a student? Claxton’s dismissive account 
of truth and knowledge (discussed in Chapter 1) opened the door to relativism and 
subjectivism. What would close that door is clarity about what is to be expected of 
speakers in relation to responsible and rational testimony, and of hearers in relation 
to responsible and rational acceptance of testimony. Forms of contextualism, that 
take account of the characteristics and circumstances of particular encounters, 
discourses or speech situations, are not precluded by a refusal to embrace 
relativism. 
If, as teachers and educationalists, we can become clearer about the epistemic 
and linguistic commitments and responsibilities of speakers and hearers, we can 
begin to think more practically about how to teach children to make sound 
judgements as speakers and hearers in relation to their schooling and to other 
aspects of their lives, including their use of social media. We can become clearer, 
too, about the responsibilities of teachers as guardians of just and safe epistemic 
environments. 
 
*** 
 
In the first half of the seventeenth century Descartes, continuing with the scholastic 
tradition of conferring the status of knowledge only on beliefs that achieved a 
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special clarity, rejected reliance on the expertise and authority of others on the 
ground that opinions differ around the world and seem equally well supported 
within their own terms (Descartes, 1954, p. 19). He regards his own reasoning not 
as a personal or culture-specific mode of thinking but as a universally valid and 
consistent human attribute, a gift (he later suggests) from a non-deceiving divinity. 
He puts his trust in reason but also in his own skill in exercising it, and he trusts his 
strength of will in following his strict methodology for avoiding any unconsidered 
assumptions. It is ironic that at the dawn of the modern era in science and 
mathematics, one of its chief theorists presents knowledge as an individualistic 
achievement. As many writers have pointed out, science is a paradigmatic case of a 
discipline in which practitioners are reliant on the testimony of others. Coady 
provides several examples of scientific collaborators who have had to trust each 
other’s testimony, and comments: 
 
Reliance upon previous experimental work in science can, of 
course, go seriously astray but it seems also to be a condition of 
progress since even where results are theoretically ‘replicable’ it 
would be a practical absurdity for any given worker to replicate all 
the experimental and observational work upon which his own 
investigations depend. Indeed, it would often be literally 
impossible to do so, either because of an inevitable lack of time or 
lack of competence. (Coady, 1992, p. 10) 
 
 
Descartes would not have been impressed by Thomas Reid’s observation that 
even mathematicians nervously await the corroboration of their results by trusted 
colleagues: 
 
Here I ask again, Whether the verdict of his friend, according as it 
has been favourable or unfavourable, will not greatly increase or 
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diminish his confidence in his own judgement? Most certain it 
will and it ought. (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 
VI, ch v.) 
 
The corroboration of one’s judgements by others is no part of Descartes’s 
methodology. Objectivity is achieved by individual reason and its hallmark is 
clarity.2  
What invalidates testimony for Descartes is the fact that reliance on it leaves 
the believer vulnerable to fashion, error and deceit. The foundations of a scientific 
belief system must rest, he insists, on beliefs that are invulnerable to error and even 
to the trickery of a demonic deceiver. It is clear, however, that when he comes to 
derive the self-evident truths that will be his system’s foundations, he has not 
escaped the traditions of Catholic France: these are apparent in his assumptions 
about the res cogitans self and about the nature of God, as well as in his acceptance 
of a particular method of reasoning. To use his own metaphor, he builds his new 
house with at least some of the old materials and not entirely to a new design (see 
Discourse on Method, Part III. 1954, p. 24).3  
 																																																								
2 Reid’s conception of objectivity will be familiar to a modern social or communitarian 
epistemologist, but even Bertrand Russell says ‘I mean here by “objective” not anything 
metaphysical but merely “agreeing with the testimony of others”’ (The Analysis of Matter, 
1927, p. 150. Cited by Coady, 1992, p. 13). Of course, If Descartes’s solitary meditator had 
had some friends, they could have told him when he was hallucinating, dreaming or 
misperceiving – unless, that is, we are prepared to concede to him that his and our 
companions could all be figments of our imaginations and any corroboration by others of 
our judgements could be demonic deceptions; in which case, the language(s) in which the 
meditator thinks and reasons could be, too, and then he is truly trapped in the pit of 
scepticism, for not even the cogito argument will be available to him. 	3	According to Popkin (1997, pp. 180-181), the Cartesian project was stimulated by the 
case of a priest who was tried in 1634 for infecting a convent with evil spirits. This raised 
the question of whether testimony given under oath by demons could be true. As 
Wittgenstein argues in On Certainty (1999), scepticism and knowledge require the 
possibility of both truth and falsity. Descartes’ fear of systematic demonic delusion is 
unfounded. 
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*** 
 
Benjamin McMyler summarizes the position of testimony up to the latter half of 
the seventeenth century as follows: 
 
Learning from testimony was typically conceived as a capacity for 
basing beliefs on theoretical authority. The proper exercise of this 
capacity produced beliefs that amounted to faith or opinion, not 
knowledge, but nevertheless this capacity for basing beliefs on 
testimony was excluded from the category of knowledge, but this 
was because they enjoyed a category of their own, a category that 
was of the utmost importance for the conduct of ordinary life. 
(McMyler, 2011, p. 20) 
 
There is an interesting implication in this: that the concept of learning extended to 
both the acquisition of knowledge and the acquisition of beliefs through faith (or 
trust) in authoritative informants. As the seventeenth century advanced and the ties 
between knowledge and demonstrative reason loosened under the pressure from 
experimental science, testimony began to lose its association with tradition, 
authority and faith, and instead became one of the considerations that made the 
truth of a particular belief more probable. Contingent facts were knowable, and 
what upgraded a belief to knowledge was the kind of evidence that proved it, 
“proof” now beginning to embrace probabilities as well as deductive 
demonstrations. 
Arnauld and Nicole, the Port Royal logicians, writing in 1662, acknowledge 
that one can derive knowledge from authority, albeit of a different “kind” from that 
derived from trust in one’s own capacities of reason and perception. They make 
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significant points about the rationality of forming testimonial beliefs, including that 
circumstances pertaining both to the fact itself and to the person whose testimony is 
being considered are relevant. They further maintain that in many cases, in 
everyday life, we ought to be satisfied with whichever judgement as to truth or 
falsity has the greatest probability. In other words, they are asserting the relevance 
of inductive inference to judgements concerning the probability of a claim being 
true.  
Whereas “probability” had once meant “approvability by authorities” (Coady, 
1992, p. 15. See also Shapin, 1994, p. 198), it was now beginning to incorporate a 
wider range of factors affecting the likelihood of truth. This contributed to the 
casting of doubt on the rationality of testimonial chains that stretch back in time to 
an original reasoner or eye-witness. How did this originator ever earn the approval 
of authorities, and who approved the authorities? By the time Hume was writing a 
century after the Port-Royal logicians, the idea that a person should accept the 
authority of a tradition, especially one that seems to have uncertain origins, without 
conducting his own process of inductive inference, was anathema to many 
philosophers and scientists. But, as we shall see, Thomas Reid countered that 
rejecting all tradition and authority is to go foolishly from one extreme to the other. 
The explanation for why the emergence of a modern concept of probability 
led to a widespread rejection of the rationality of reliance on testimony and 
authority lies with uncertainty concerning the testifier. Very often we have only 
limited evidence that the speaker (or writer) is credible, and what evidence we have 
seems unreliable: testifiers who seemed credible sometimes turn out to have been 
incompetent or deceitful. Such considerations threaten to leave us knowing much 
less than we thought we knew. On the other hand, they motivated a search for other 
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arguments to justify our willingness to accept that testimonially-acquired beliefs 
can amount to knowledge and led to the more optimistic arguments of Thomas 
Reid and his modern non-reductionist counterparts. 
 
§2.2 John Locke: Reluctant Reliance  
 
Reid’s position was that all things being equal we have a general entitlement to 
believe what other people tell us. This is a response to the sceptical approach of his 
fellow British empiricists, John Locke and David Hume. Locke’s view is summed 
up in the following memorable passage: 
 
…I hope it will not be thought arrogance, to say, That, perhaps, 
we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and 
contemplative Knowledge if we sought it in the Fountain, in the 
consideration of things themselves, and made use of our own 
Thoughts than other Men’s to find it: for, I think, we may as 
rationally hope to see with other Men’s Eyes as to know by other 
Men’s Understanding […] The floating of other Men’s Opinions 
in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they 
happen to be true. What in them was Science is in us but 
Opiniatrety. (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. 
Nidditch, 1975, I, iv, p. 101. Italics as printed.) 
 
This expresses Locke’s epistemological individualism, which implies that the ideal 
state is to be epistemically self-reliant rather than to risk acquiring false beliefs 
from others. False beliefs can result not only from the speaker’s incompetence or 
dishonesty, but also from our own misunderstanding of what has been said; and 
Locke emphasizes especially the decreasing probability of truth arising from 
subsequent citations: 
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[N]o Probability can arise higher than its first Original. What has 
no other Evidence than the single Testimony of only one Witness, 
must stand or fall by his only Testimony, whether good, bad, or 
indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, 
one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, 
that it is only the weaker. Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake 
of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, or Caprichios, 
Men’s Minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered), may 
make one Man quote another Man’s Words or Meaning wrong. 
(Locke, 1975: IV, xvi, p. 664) 
 
Here Locke is writing about the kind of truths for which we are entirely dependent 
on testimony. He is directing a broadside against tradition: only claims that are 
confirmable by observation can properly be attested to; otherwise, they are 
speculation or conjecture. (However, he goes on to say that his remarks relate only 
to observable matters of fact and not to truths that are outside the scope of our 
senses.)  
Locke’s main concern is with what he calls “rational and contemplative 
knowledge”: high-stakes, high-probability, non-demonstrative knowledge. He 
advocates “the consideration of things themselves”; we should use our own 
judgement rather than attempt the impossible feat of sharing another person’s 
understanding. In his conception of communication as the attempted transfer of 
what is in one person’s mind to the mind of another person, we see the connection 
between his semantics, his psychological theory and his epistemology. Given these 
connections, it is no surprise that he has a low regard for testimony in cases where 
the stakes are high. But philosophers and educationalists in our own time who do 
not (knowingly) share Locke’s individualism need a different set of reasons from 
Locke’s for continuing to think, as we saw in Chapter 1 some do, that testimonial 
communication is not a shared achievement but a passive transfer of information 
from one mind to another. 
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*** 
 
Chapter xv of Book IV of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is 
entitled “Of Probability”. Locke considers the various forms and degrees of assent 
that we give to propositions that are probably, rather than demonstratively, true. 
These beliefs cannot be entirely certain, although “some of them border so nearly 
upon Certainty that we make no doubt at all about them”. Degrees of assent, Locke 
says, range from full assurance and confidence down to conjecture, doubt and 
distrust. The grounds for a judgement of the probable truth of a proposition 
concerning a contingent matter of fact are, first, “the conformity of any thing with 
our own Knowledge, Observation, and Experience and, secondly, the Testimony of 
others, vouching their Observation and Experience”: 
 
In the Testimony of others is to be considered, 1. The Number. 2. 
The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witnesses. 4. The Design of the 
Author, where it is a Testimony out of the Book cited. 5. The 
Consistency of the Parts, and Circumstances of the Relation. 6. 
Contrary Testimonies. (Ibid., p. 656) 
 
Locke then asserts that to proceed rationally in such cases, where there is no 
infallible intuition to “determine the understanding”, we ought to examine all these 
grounds of probability and “see how they make more or less, for or against any 
probable proposition”, and “upon a due balancing the whole, reject, or receive it, 
with a more or less firm assent, proportionately to the preponderancy of the greater 
grounds of Probability on one side or the other” (ibid). He then gives the example 
of testimony concerning a man walking on ice. This is plausible to a hearer who 
has previously seen it for himself but when the Dutch Ambassador tells the King of 
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Siam how in his country the weather is so cold that water becomes hard enough to 
bear the weight of an elephant, the King replies: “Hitherto I have believed the 
strange Things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair man, but 
now I am sure you lye” (ibid., p. 657). So Locke is suggesting that one can only 
make an assessment on the basis of one’s own experience. Judgements of 
plausibility will vary and it is for each person to judge responsibly, with integrity, 
within the bounds of his own experience, although he is permitted to take into 
account the number and credibility of testimonies that corroborate it. At this point 
he says something that seems strangely contradictory: 
 
There is another [ground], I confess, which though by it self it be 
no true ground of Probability, yet is often made use of for one, by 
which Men most commonly regulate their Assent, and upon which 
they pin their Faith more than any thing else, and, that is, the 
Opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing 
to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much 
more Falsehood and Errour amongst Men, than Truth and 
Knowledge. And if the Opinions and Perswasions of others, 
whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, Men 
have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahumetans in Turkey, 
Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in 
Sweden. (Ibid., p. 657) 
 
The apparent contradiction is resolved when we realize that Locke is making a 
distinction between the testimony of an eye-witness and the opining of others on 
the veracity of the testimony. To receive testimony first-hand, as it were, from an 
original observer, and to make one’s own responsible assessment of it, is one thing; 
to accept opinions on the claims from others who have themselves received them 
from others, or who offer an opinion on the testimony, is simply to accept the 
traditions of the local culture rather than to exercise autonomous judgement. As we 
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have seen, and the next quotation reinforces, Locke thinks that each passing on 
further weakens the credibility of the original report: 
 
[A]ny Testimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth, the 
less force and proof it has. The Being and Existence of the thing it 
self, is what I call the original Truth. A credible Man vouching his 
Knowledge of it is a good proof; but if another equally credible do 
witness it from his Report, the Testimony is weaker: and a third 
that attests the Hear-say of an Hear-say is yet less considerable. So 
that in traditional Truths, each remove weakens the force of the 
proof: and the more hands the Tradition has successively passed 
through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. 
(Ibid, p. 664.)4 
 
Is the distinction a valid one? We are as reliant on the reports of those who 
have themselves received the belief from others as we are on the testimony of first-
hand witnesses. Can we not exercise our judgement in a similar way in both cases, 
taking many of the same considerations into account: the conformity to our existing 
knowledge, the consistency of the parts, the circumstances of the relation, the skill 
or expertise of the speaker, and so on? In both cases, the assessment will be our 
own, autonomous judgement will have been exercised. Locke appears to overstate 
his case. He can plausibly maintain that eye-witness testimony is epistemically 
stronger than subsequent passings-on, but not that the one is a responsible, 
autonomous judgement and the other, necessarily, an unthinking acceptance of 
tradition and authority. In neither case need assent be unreasonable. 
																																																								
4 Locke is generalizing a concern that Laplace had expressed concerning historical 
reports: “The action of time enfeebles then, without ceasing, the probability of the 
historical facts just as it changes the most durable monuments” (Pierre, marquis de 
Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, trans. F.W. Truscott, and F.E. Emory. 
New York, 1951. Quoted by Coady, 1992, p. 199). Shapin (1994, p. 232) notes some 
contrary opinions concerning time, and others concerning the multiplicity of testimonies: 
standing the test of time could be a positive feature and being a commonly held 
(“vulgar”) opinion a negative one. 
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In focusing on the question of rational assent Locke was attending to a 
question that exercised others who were also attempting to come to terms with the 
discovery that there really were more things in heaven and earth than philosophy 
had previously dreamt of. Which reports of natural wonders, from travellers and 
scientists equipped with telescopes and microscopes, were to be believed? Exciting 
as these discoveries must have been, they had the potential to undermine epistemic 
confidence (Shapin, 1994, p. 194). Trust and responsible assent to testimony were 
urgent concerns and Locke’s philosophical, rather than practical, thoughts about 
them in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding were influential. Empirical 
discoveries and the erosion of traditional certainties, along with an expansion of the 
social groups making knowledge claims, meant that “new and modified forms for 
the making and warranting of empirical truth had to be proposed and put in place” 
(Shapin, 1994, p. 195). 5 
In the sixteenth century one response to travellers’ tales had been 
Montaigne’s Pyrrhonism. Montaigne was especially fond of describing the customs 
and beliefs of “strange lands”. In his essay “Of Custom” he says: “Habituation puts 
to sleep the eyes of judgement […] Human reason is a tincture infused in about 
equal strength in all our opinions and ways, whatever their form: infinite in 
substance, infinite in diversity” (2003, p. 96). But Montaigne’s scepticism about 																																																								
5 In Of the Conduct of the Understanding Locke emphasizes the importance of cautious 
and responsible assent, but, oddly, in a book largely devoted to advice on how to be an 
epistemically responsible student, he does not discuss the difficulty of making 
judgements concerning testimony. He has many things to say here (and also in Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education) about developing good habits as a student and thinker, 
but he does not tackle the problem of distinguishing good from bad testifiers. He 
mentions alertness to the “correspondence in things” and to “the agreement and 
disagreement in ideas” (p. 210), and he advises impartiality and caution in all judgments 
of matters of fact, but otherwise he is vague about how the novice can make good 
judgements about whose, or which, reports to trust. 
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the possibility of disinterested judgement was unacceptable to Locke and his 
English contemporaries, such as the founders of the Royal Society (motto: Nullus 
in verba – “On no man’s word”). They needed to extend the scope of trusted 
testimony both socially and geographically; the association of credibility and the 
virtues of truth with gentlemanly manners and reputation required modification. A 
decorous theory would value first-hand, individual experience above authority and 
tradition and would not regard the novelty of a factual claim as a reason for 
disbelief. Individualism had to be balanced by a proper appreciation of the 
testimony of experts who were slaves neither to their preconceptions nor to their 
senses. Credible eye-witness testimony was incorporated into the category of 
“experience”. Although claims had to be greeted with discretion and 
discrimination, and not all reports of natural marvels could be credited, for some 
kinds of knowledge testimony provided the best available warrant and made assent 
rational.6 
Assent to testimony was a matter of rational judgement, of “moral certainty”, 
rather than absolute certainty. This implies personal integrity in making one’s 
beliefs coherent, consistent and reasonable. Such an approach permits the 
integration of epistemic autonomy with trust in the authority and integrity of 
informants.  
Factors that for Locke and others could feature in discriminating judgement 
of testimony included its internal consistency and its consistency with one’s 																																																								
6 Where individual reason or direct observations are unavailable, Robert Boyle admitted, 
“Humane Testimony is of great and almost necessary use in natural Philosophy” (Boyle 
Papers, Vol. 9, f. 25v. Cited by Shapin, 1994, p. 203). For each generation to warrant for 
itself each item of knowledge would be absurd, John Wilkins agreed, and for matters 
transacted before he was born, each man had to rely upon “the credible testimony of 
others…’tis not possible to know them any other way”. If a man believed nothing but 
what he had seen for himself, he would be “an incredulous fool” (Wilkins, Principles and 
Duties of Natural Religion, 1668, p. 124, 230. Cited in Shapin, 1994, p. 204). 
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existing beliefs. Other factors were its plausibility – that is, the likelihood of the 
claim being true – and the number of credible people testifying to it (not in a 
bucket-chain through time but as individual witnesses).7 Ancient historical records 
were more credible if they had been written immediately after the event, because, 
as Robert Hooke said, “of the Frailty of the Memory” (Shapin, 1994, p. 218). The 
“skill” or expertise of the testifier was also a relevant consideration, especially 
when compared with uninstructed sense perception.8  
Anticipating Hume’s argument in “On Miracles”, Locke argues that rational 
assent depends on a proper “balancing” of the grounds of probability (An Essay, Bk 
IV, ch 15, §5. Nidditch, 1975, p. 656). His advice is to assent to testimony from 
people who are disinterested and unbiased, who have a reputation for integrity and 
truth-telling, together with previous points about expertise and unprejudiced 
																																																								7	A recent example of an argument from authority, where the weight of expert of 
opinions is appealed to, appeared in the magazine Prospect in June 2012. Reviewing E. 
O. Wilson’s The Social Conquest of Earth Richard Dawkins takes exception to its 
rejection of evolutionary  “kin selection” theory and its replacement with a revival of 
“group selection” theory. Dawkins justifies his vehemence as follows: “I would not 
venture such strong criticism of a great scientist were I not in good company. The Wilson 
thesis … provoked very strong criticism from more than 140 evolutionary biologists, 
including a majority of the most distinguished workers in the field… These may not all 
be household names but let me assure you they know what they are talking about in the 
relevant fields”. It is worth recalling J. S. Mill’s contention (in On Liberty) that “If all 
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he 
had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”  
 8	As recent writers on expertise, such as Goldman, have observed, the non-expert’s 
identification of genuine experts, and the difficulty of choosing between disagreeing 
experts (as a member of a jury, for example), makes this a tricky criterion to employ. 
Goldman observes that sometimes all we have to go on is the putative expert’s manner 
and confidence in speaking. Some seventeenth century writers, Steven Shapin tells us, 
thought a plain style was best for engendering trust; and some thought an element of 
imperfection in the internal consistency of the ideas bespoke sincerity and the absence of 
collusion (Shapin, 1994, pp. 222 - 233). These are calculating, prudential considerations 
concerning the rhetoric that will win assent rather than epistemic standards applying to 
testifiers and witnesses. 
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perception.9 The evaluation is of reliability, rather than of trustworthiness, and is as 
relevant to impersonal sources of information, such as newspaper reports, as it is to 
an individual informant. The aim of such an evaluation is the avoidance of 
gullibility, but also to make rational, or reasonable, one’s reliance on the source.  
The challenge for any trust-based account of testimony is to show how trust 
in the person testifying (rather than reliance based on inferred reliability) need not 
be blind or irrational. The problem for Locke’s and similar accounts, is that the 
“weighing” of the considerations that contribute to an inference concerning the 
probability of the testimony being true, cannot be independent of the audience’s 
background opinions (concerning, for example, what should count as expertise) or 
of other testimony (concerning, for example, the informant’s reputation or track 
record). For Locke, the harmony of the testimony with one’s existing knowledge 
and firmly held beliefs is just one consideration. For the proponents of trust-based 
theories of testimony, especially those coherentists whose bottom-line is self-trust 
(Lehrer, 1997; Zagzebski, 2012), it is the source of epistemic integrity and 
responsible judgement.  
The difficulty in judging the integrity of one’s own judgement of others, the 
trustworthiness of one’s trusts, is underestimated by Locke. Indeed, he is extremely 
optimistic about the acuity of God-given reason.10 The circularity that threatens to 
undermine trust in our own reasoning is shielded from Locke by his confidence that 
certain intellectual virtues will protect us from false reasoning. Despite all those 
travellers’ reports of cultural diversity, he thinks reason is a natural, universal 																																																								
9 This resembles the mnemonic RAVEN used in A Level Critical Thinking textbooks to 
help students assess the credibility of sources: Reputation, Ability to See, Vested Interests, 
Expertise and Neutrality. In both cases, the advice concerns certain characteristics of the 
source without requiring the assessor to trust or distrust the speaker or writer herself. 
10 See, for example, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, § 3, ed. Grant and Tarcov, pp. 
169 -171. 
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attribute of humankind and that no virtuous individual should have trouble trusting 
it. I will argue that we have as much reason to be as distrustful of our own 
intellectual authority as we do of the testimony and authority of others, and, 
ultimately, the same reasons to be trustful of both (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, 
there are some points of similarity between the self-trust theories that I will be 
discussing and the attitude of prudence and pragmatism that Locke and his 
contemporaries advocated in the management of testimony and its associated risks. 
Noting that the specification of “credible persons” was not systematically spelled 
out, Shapin observes that: 
 
[T]he management of testimony was accomplished by mobilizing 
prudential maxims whose force and reference were well 
understood in the local culture – maxims of wise action whose 
challenge carried with them known costs…What was 
epistemically expected of those assessing philosophical testimony 
was what was morally expected of participants in gentlemanly 
civil conversation: the exercise of decorum, the prudential 
adaptation of mean to ends, displaying due regard to the 
continuance of that conversation as a good in itself. (Shapin, 1994, 
p. 240) 
 
This gentlemanly approach to testimony and to conversation prefigures to an extent 
the Gricean maxims of cooperation and politeness that feature in twentieth century 
pragmatics, and to that extent at least we might say that Locke had some notion of 
the social nature of informative communication and of its participants’ mutually 
recognized responsibilities and expectations. 
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§2.3 Hume on Testimony Concerning Miracles 
 
In moving to Hume’s and Reid’s theories of testimony we are moving towards the 
rival theories that dominated discussion when testimony re-emerged in the early 
1990s, after years of neglect, as a major topic in epistemology. I introduced these in 
§1.5. They are reductionism, which follows Hume in arguing for inferential 
justification for trusting testimony, and non-reductionism, which follows Reid in 
arguing for a default entitlement to trust testimony.11 The modern versions of these 
approaches will be discussed in the next chapter. The main considerations that 
motivate each approach are manifested in their eighteenth century versions. 
Hume’s account appears in his essay “On Miracles” (Section 10 of An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding). Hume acknowledges the prevalence 
and usefulness of testimony and goes on to argue that our “assurance” is derived 
from our observation that testimony tends to be true. He starts with the famous 
statement about the wise man’s proportioning of belief to the evidence, the 
weighing of “experiments” on either side, and the fixing of his judgment where the 
weight of probability lies. “In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, 
where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order 
to know the exact force of the superior evidence” (A Enquiry, §10.4.  Beauchamp, 
1999, p. 170). Despite the reference to the “wise man”, this sounds even more like 
a mathematical calculation than a Lockean prudential “assay”.  
As Hume’s topic is the probability of reports of miracles being true, he is 
especially keen to seem disinterested. In this context, Hume wants to show that 
assenting to testimony concerning the occurrence of miracles is unjustified and 																																																								11	Not	all	writers	agree	that	Hume’s	account	is	reductionist.	See,	for	example,	Pritchard	and	Richmond	(2012)	and	Fogelin	(1990).	
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therefore he needs to make clear what would make (other) testimonially-acquired 
beliefs justified. He says: 
 
It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument 
of this kind is derived from no other principle than our 
observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual 
conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general 
maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, 
and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to 
another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant 
and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make 
an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose 
connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as 
any other. (An Enquiry, 1999, §10.5, p. 170) 
 
What experience teaches us, Hume says, is that human nature tends towards 
trustworthiness: 
 
Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men 
commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were 
they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were 
not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities inherent 
in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in 
human testimony. A man delirious or noted for falsehood and 
villainy has no manner of authority with us. (Ibid., p. 171) 
 
 
It is because we are accustomed to finding conformity between testimony and 
reality that “we place any credit in witnesses and historians” (ibid., p. 172). Hume’s 
approach to testimony mirrors his approach to the laws of nature: we can rely on 
them to the extent that the reliance is backed by experience. Where testimony 
conflicts with our experience of the laws of nature, we have to ask which is more 
probable. How often has the reported phenomenon been observed? If the answer is 
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“never” (which, according to Hume, it is in the case of “miracles” such as a dead 
person coming back to life), crediting the testimony is irrational. 
Hume’s argument illustrates the difficulty of establishing a case for a strict 
form of rational autonomy, for his argument for what distinguishes rational from 
irrational belief in testimony itself relies on testimony. Our personal observations 
of human nature, of the inclination to truth, of probity and tendency to shame when 
detected in falsehood, are too limited to explain our trust in some, and distrust in 
other, kinds of report. It is what we have learned from others, and the conformity of 
that with our own limited experience, that gives us confidence in the conformity of 
testimony with reality. Furthermore, how could we possibly know what in nature 
has never occurred and what occurs frequently unless we accumulated this 
knowledge from the reports of others (and found it conformable with our own 
limited experience)? 
It seems that we must rely on testimony in order to be in a position to form 
the inductive generalizations that might justify a general reliance on testimony; and 
things are no less complicated if we attempt autonomous verification of an 
individual testifier’s credibility. Not only do we not have access to anything like 
the amount of information that could justify our reliance on most testifiers (without 
relying on further testimony), but also the criteria we would use in such an 
assessment would themselves have been learned from others. If we felt that we had 
adopted them for ourselves on the basis of autonomous reflection, this would surely 
be a delusion: we could not filter out from all the knowledge and understanding of 
the world that such reflection would employ what we have not observed for 
ourselves. Our utter reliance on testimony, not least in our acculturation and 
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education, appears to undermine any attempt to establish epistemic autonomy on 
the basis of (non-question-begging) inductive inferences. 
Hume could respond to these criticisms by arguing that the conformity he is 
referring to operates between kinds of reporter and one’s observations of reality 
and reliability, which reduces the experience required for justified assent in 
particular cases. But this does not help, for a) we cannot possibly have had the 
personal experience to know what kinds of reporter are reliable on particular topics 
in particular circumstances without relying on what we have learned from others, 
and b) we cannot (usually) know whether a particular reporter fits a particular 
profile  - has the required kind of expertise, authority or reputation - without 
relying on the testimony of others. Any suggestion that we have all personally 
observed all the relevant correlations would just be implausible.  
It would be even more implausible to suggest that children could have the 
requisite experience to infer the credibility of kinds of reporters (or of kinds of 
report). With children, it is even more evident that their judgements of testimony 
and of testifiers cannot be completely autonomous (which is not to deny that 
children’s judgements concerning testimony can become more autonomous as they 
mature). An important question in the epistemology of testimony is how, at any 
age, our trusting what others tell us can be reconciled with responsible judgement, 
and I contend that in order to answer this we need a different understanding of 
autonomy from Locke’s or Hume’s. 
Coady raises a fundamental objection to Hume’s account of testimony, which 
is that the practice of reporting depends on a certain degree of correlation or 
conformity between reports and reality (1994, pp. 85 – 100). Hume’s idea that we 
place credit in “witnesses and historians” because we find this conformity implies 
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that witnesses and historians could be reporting with zero conformity, but clearly 
such a hopeless social practice could not survive for long. In fact, it is doubtful 
whether any kind of communication could survive in this situation, for all 
communication relies on speakers being generally accurate and sincere in what 
they say. It is not so much that words and phrases could not have stable, learnable 
meanings in the absence of reliable reporting and “the virtues of truth”, as Bernard 
Williams (2002) calls accuracy and sincerity, as that language users could not have 
consistent experience in interpreting each other’s utterances in context. This means 
that generally accurate testimony is a prerequisite of communication. To put it 
another way, most testifiers’ reports are constrained by epistemic standards or 
norms, such as knowledge, truth or justified belief. If testifiers typically asserted 
what they did not know, or what they did not believe to be true, or what they were 
not rationally entitled to believe, there could be no such social practice as testimony 
or assertion, and (plausibly) no verbal communication of any kind.  
This kind of argument has featured in several more recent non-reductionist 
theories of testimony, and we will meet it again in the next chapter.  
 
§2.4 Thomas Reid: Pledging Veracity 
 
Thomas Reid (1710 - 1796) is known as a “commonsense” philosopher and as one 
of the leading philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. His arguments 
concerning testimony are remarkable for their sensitivity to the pragmatics of 
informative linguistic encounters and for his recognition of their essentially social 
nature.  Reid calls speech acts such as testifying, promising, questioning and 
commanding “social operation of the mind” and maintains that they are not 
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reducible to “solitary operations” - that is, to judgments or inferences - because 
they are “original parts of our constitution”. What he means by this is that they are 
expressive of our desires and feelings and are not completely truth-evaluable. 
Questions, commands and promises may have some intellectual content, some 
“assertoric force” and truth-evaluable propositions embedded in them, but they do 
not express propositions. If we think of testimony as constituted by straightforward 
assertions, it would seem wrong to associate it with questions, promises and 
commands, but Reid wants to restrict the scope of the term “testimony” to 
something more like assurances or affirmations than assertions: 
 
Testimony is a social act, and it is essential to it to be expressed by 
words or signs. A tacit testimony is a contradiction: but there is no 
contradiction in a tacit judgement; it is complete without being 
expressed…In testimony a man pledges his veracity for what he 
affirms, so that a false testimony is a lie: but a wrong judgement is 
not a lie; it is only an error. (Essays on the Intellectual Powers, 
Essay VI, ch. 1. Beanblossom and Lehrer (eds.) 1983, p. 252) 
 
Reid is making a distinction between judgement on the one hand, which is truth 
evaluable, and affirmation on the other hand, which is truthfulness evaluable. A 
false judgement is in error; false testimony is a lie. Whether or not Reid is right to 
narrow the reference of “testimony” to such affirmations or assurances (or any 
other speech act in which the speaker is not merely reporting her judgement of a 
contingent matter of fact but vouching for its truth), the distinction is an important 
one, and it is one to which I will return in Chapter 6, where I argue that testimony 
is not a single speech act but encompasses a range of speech acts which anticipate 
distinct responses.  
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Part of what Reid means by calling testimony “a social act” is that there is a 
special intersubjectivity involved. In pledging the truth of that to which she 
testifies, the speaker is vouching for her own sincerity and/or trustworthiness. She 
therefore expects the hearer to believe what she says in a different way from how 
he comes to believe the truth of an asserted judgment. He believes it because he 
believes her - that is, he believes it because she has given him a special kind of 
reason to believe it. It is an interpersonal reason, as it were, concerning her own 
character, rather than an inductive inference concerning the contingent fact itself. 
Whereas “judgement” involves a weighing of evidence a propos the truth of a 
proposition, and need not be communicated, testimony is necessarily a social 
expression of a subjective attitude, conveyed in the mutually recognized 
commitments of particular speech acts.  
Reid is aware of some of the linguistic implications of the distinction, 
including the fact that although the same form of words can express either a 
judgement or testimony, “from the matter and circumstances, we can easily see 
whether a man intends to give his testimony, or barely to express his judgement” 
(ibid., p. 253). In other words, Reid is introducing a form of pragmatics or 
discourse theory into the discussion by recognizing that the meaning and 
implications of an utterance are not encoded in the meanings of the words 
themselves but implicated in the contextual features of the communicative 
exchange. 
Reid’s distinction between testimony and judgement requires some 
evaluation. It seems to be similar to the distinction between fact and theory, which, 
as Coady points out, is a philosophically contested distinction that relies on further 
distinctions, such as those between observation and inference or the sensory and 
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the intellectual (Coady, 1994, p. 59). It certainly seems appropriate to talk of 
“expert testimony” in circumstances where the testifier is not an eye-witness but 
someone whose expertise consists in a certain kind of theoretical competence. The 
fact that she offers her expert opinion or judgement does not preclude the 
possibility of the hearer placing trust in her truthfulness or sincerity rather than 
more directly in the truth or reliability of what she says. But I am not as inclined as 
Coady is to reject Reid’s distinction entirely; or, more precisely, I see the 
distinction as pointing toward a range of speech acts, and I do not see why the word 
“testimony” cannot be used to embrace the whole range, as long as we bear in mind 
that it must also embrace a range of anticipated and appropriate audience 
responses.  
 
*** 
 
Reid’s argument for a default entitlement to accept beliefs on the basis of testimony 
is what defines him, in modern terminology, as a non-reductionist. Reid’s view is 
that we have a natural disposition to form beliefs on the basis of testimony, to 
believe what we are told, to learn from what others tell us. Long before children 
know what a promise is, they rely on testimony and, therefore, on the natural 
veracity of speakers and stability in how language is used (ibid., p. 93). Reid 
invokes God’s purposes in creating humans as social creatures and proposes his 
two principles of testimony. The key passage is worth quoting fully, for its intrinsic 
power and because it raises so many central issues: 
 
The wise and beneficent Author of Nature, who intended that we 
should be social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest 
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and most important part of our knowledge by the information of 
others, hath, for these purposes, implanted in our natures two 
principles that tally with each other. 
The first of these principles is, a propensity to speak truth, and 
to use the signs of language so as to convey our real sentiments 
[…] Another principle implanted in us by the Supreme Being, is a 
disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what 
they tell us. This is the counterpart to the former; and, as that may 
be called the principle of veracity, we shall, for want of a more 
proper name, call this the principle of credulity. It is unlimited in 
children, until they meet with instances of deceit and falsehood; 
and it retains a very considerable degree of strength through life. 
(Ibid., pp. 94 – 95) 
 
It is interesting that Hume and Reid both maintain that people have a 
tendency to tell the truth. For Hume the tendency is linked to shame at being caught 
lying; for Reid it is an innate disposition. God has planted in us dispositions to tell 
the truth and to believe what we are told. Reid’s two principles lead him to espouse 
a theory that critics regard as licensing gullibility. If it is true that we have these 
natural propensities, that in itself does not amount to a general justification of 
assent to testimony, nor does it help us on particular occasions. We know (and Reid 
knows, as his reference to children shows) that we sometimes encounter “instances 
of deceit and falsehood”: so what we require from a theory of testimony is an 
account of justified or reasonable assent on particular occasions. We have to 
interpret Reid as providing the backdrop to the epistemic assessments that are 
required on particular occasions. If it is the case that most people tell the truth – 
and recall that according to Reid if they are testifying they are pledging that they 
know what they say to be true – then, all things being equal, there is a probability 
that on this occasion the testimony will be true. So the principle of credulity does 
not license gullibility at all, for the disposition to believe what we are told is backed 
by the probability of truth on particular occasions, all things being equal.  
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If it were not the case that speakers naturally incline to tell the truth and 
hearers naturally incline to believe rather than to disbelieve, then: 
 
[N]o proposition that is uttered in discourse would be believed, 
until it was examined and tried by reason; and most men would be 
unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth part of what is 
told them. Such distrust and incredulity would deprive us of the 
greatest benefits of society, and place us in a worse condition than 
that of savages. (Ibid., p. 95) 
 
Reid notices a problem for the Humean account of testimony: by making the 
hearer’s justified assent a matter of inductive inference and weighing of 
probabilities, which require considerable experience, it leaves the beliefs formed by 
immature and inexperienced people exposed to the accusation that they are 
epistemically unjustified, for those beliefs cannot have been reliably formed in that 
way. Furthermore, because for Hume the disposition to speak the truth is based on 
the avoidance of shame, children (lacking a tendency to shame) would be as likely 
to lie as to tell the truth, thus putting each other at further epistemic risk. Reid 
avoids these problems by claiming that children’s natural credulity and veracity is 
shared by adults, both groups having an entitlement, ceteris paribus, to believe 
what they are told.  
Reid is also claiming that trusting one another for the truth is a hallmark of a 
civilized community and brings great social benefits, a point that he surely intends 
to apply to children’s trust in adults and in each other. A culture of distrust, on the 
other hand, makes belief impossible, especially for those incapable of inductive 
inference, as he believes children are: 
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Children, on this supposition, would be absolutely incredulous, 
and, therefore, absolutely incapable of instruction: those who had 
little knowledge of human life, and of the manners and characters 
of men, would be in the next degree incredulous: and the most 
credulous men would be those of greatest experience, and of the 
deepest penetration; because, in many cases, they would be able to 
find good reasons for believing testimony, which the weak and the 
ignorant could not discover. (Ibid., p. 96) 
 
This is a very interesting passage. Reid recognizes the significance of 
testimony for education and for social justice. Children need to trust their teachers 
(instructors) in order to learn from them. If children and less educated adults have 
to rely on inference, based on experience, reasoning and existing knowledge, in 
order to learn (to acquire knowledge) from others, they are at a social disadvantage 
compared with well-educated adults. Reid clearly implies that inductive inference 
is one way to acquire knowledge from others. This is important for those occasions 
when things are not equal and the hearer is alerted to the need to assess the 
testimony rather than accept it by default. But his emphasis is different from 
Locke’s and Hume’s in this respect. He mentions “knowledge of human life, and of 
the manners and characters of men”, suggesting that for him the most relevant kind 
of judgement concerns not so much the probability of the fact attested to being true 
but the trustworthiness and/or sincerity of the speaker. This is one factor among 
many for Locke and Hume, but for Reid, with his understanding of testimony as a 
pledge, as a personal assurance of truthfulness, this kind of judgement of character 
has a supporting role within a social practice that is already predisposed to be 
positive and optimistic. Bob Plant (2007, p. 43)) sees “clear resonances” between 
Reid and the Wittgensteinian idea that both knowledge and scepticism function 
against a backdrop of trust (1999, §115, §509)), and also, despite the naturalism, 
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with Derrida’s insistence that there can be neither truth nor society without trust in 
the other (1997; 2000). 
In 1764, two years after the publication of Rousseau’s Émile, which had 
presented a rather different account of natural child development, Reid argues that 
Nature clearly intends children to be guided by the authority and reason of others 
until they have matured sufficiently no longer to need guidance: 
 
The infant by proper nursing, and care, acquires strength to walk 
without support. Reason hath likewise her infancy, when she must 
be carried in arms: then she leans entirely upon authority, by 
natural instinct, as if she was conscious of her own weakness; and, 
without this support, she becomes vertiginous. When brought to 
maturity by proper culture, she begins to feel her own strength, 
and leans less upon the reason of others; she learns to suspect 
testimony in some cases, and to disbelieve it in others; and sets 
bounds to that authority to which she was at first entirely subject. 
But still, to the end of life, she finds a necessity of borrowing light 
from testimony, where she has none within herself, and of leaning, 
in some degree, upon the reason of others, where she is conscious 
of her own imbecility. (Ibid., p. 96) 
 
This remarkable passage anticipates psychologists such as Piaget, Vygotsky and 
Bruner in recognizing that a child is not just a small and ignorant version of an 
adult. A child’s cognition and reason (interestingly feminized) matures under the 
guidance of more knowing others. Unlike Rousseau’s Émile, Reid’s child naturally 
relies at first on authoritative adults but becomes progressively more capable of 
exercising epistemic autonomy, to the extent that she is able to judge for herself 
whom to trust and which testimony to doubt, without ever becoming, or wishing to 
become, wholly self-reliant. Eventually her reliance on testimony and her reliance 
on reason combine to support each other: 
 
	 82	
For, as we find good reason to reject testimony in some cases, so 
in others we find good reason to rely upon it with perfect security, 
in our most important concerns. The character, the number, and 
the disinterestedness of witnesses, the impossibility of collusion, 
and the incredibility of their concurring in their testimony without 
collusion, may give an irresistible strength to testimony, compared 
to which its native and intrinsic authority is very inconsiderable. 
(Ibid., p. 97) 
 
So, a child’s trust in testimony is justified by a default entitlement to assent 
that derives from the innate trustworthiness and trustfulness of human nature, but 
subsequently the older child or young adult will be able to support this natural 
propensity with reasons that can support particular judgments. When such reasons 
are not available, the “native and intrinsic authority”, the default entitlement, is still 
sufficient if “there is nothing in the opposite scale”.  
Reid touches on several of the themes that have been developed by modern 
philosophers and educationalists. He shows an interest in children’s learning from 
others, in children’s cognitive development, but he also shows an awareness of 
testimony (assurance) as a speech act and as a discourse with contextual features, 
of the social and cultural importance of trust in testimony, and of the place of 
character judgments in the social practice of learning from others. He is committed 
to epistemic autonomy, and yet, as we have seen, he maintains that some 
“operations of the mind” are social rather than solitary, distinguishing the capacity 
of learning from testimony from both inference and perception, which are solitary 
“operations of the mind” to which it cannot be reduced. He suggests that it is its 
interpersonal and cooperative nature that makes testimony an irreducibly social 
form of learning. He recognizes, for example, that the second person form of verbs, 
and the second person pronoun you, are “appropriated to the expression of social 
operations of mind, and could never have had a place in language but for this 
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purpose” (Reid, 2002, p. 70). Testimony, like promising, requesting and 
commanding, requires an audience to be addressed by a speaker, and for the 
audience to recognize that it is being addressed in that way – that is, to recognize 
the speech act  - and therefore the entitlements, expectations and responsibilities (of 
both speakers and hearers) that constitute the speech act. 
 
*** 
 
In subsequent chapters I will develop Reid’s insight that our capacity to learn from 
testimony is an irreducibly social, second-personal capacity in which the 
relationship between the speaker and the audience is fundamental, both 
epistemically and linguistically. I will also address the possibility that our reliance 
on testimony is incompatible with an educational goal of epistemic autonomy. If 
the epistemic responsibility for the hearer’s testimonially-acquired belief is at best 
shared between speaker and audience and if the “operation of the mind” involved 
could not take place at all without social interaction with others, what constitutes 
intellectual autonomy?  
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Chapter 3: Recent Debates in the Epistemology of Testimony 
 
We saw in the last chapter that Reid stands out as a philosopher who sees the 
acquisition of knowledge from testimony as an essentially social 
process. Locke and Hume see it as an individualistic achievement on the part of the 
receiver. It is part of my argument that it is indeed a social process and that the 
mutual recognition by speaker and audience of their respective expectations and 
responsibilities is constitutive of the speech act employed. In order to develop this 
argument, and to incorporate it into a broader conception of pedagogic dialogue, I 
need to demonstrate the limitations of alternative accounts of testimony. I will 
begin this demonstration by picking up Reid’s discussion of younger children’s 
capacity for justified testimonial belief and comparing alternative responses (by 
Anthony Quinton and Sanford Goldberg) to the problem Reid raises. I will proceed 
to other themes raised by recent epistemologists in order to argue, in due course, 
that epistemic considerations are intertwined with linguistic considerations: we 
exercise rational responsibility in comprehending or interpreting utterance before 
we exercise it in doxastic assessment. Theories of intellectual autonomy need to 
take account of the implications of this, as do pedagogical and curriculum theories. 
 
§3.1 Quinton and Goldberg: Children Learning From Testimony 
 
In a contribution to an issue of the Journal of the Philosophy of Education in 1972, 
the Oxford philosopher Anthony Quinton acknowledges the social character of 
testimony. Without testimony, Quinton says, we would be epistemic Robinson 
Crusoes. However, children have to rely on a different source of justification for 
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their beliefs from those that adults have access to. Until we are mature enough to 
have acquired the skills of inference we need in order to evaluate sources of 
information, we are simply caused by others to believe certain things. Much of the 
time we cannot even identify the external source of our beliefs, still less critically 
assess them. Quinton seems to echo not only Reid but also the words of St Paul: 
“When I was a child, I talked like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a 
child. When I became a man, I put the ways of childhood behind me” (1 
Corinthians, 13).  
Quinton goes on to ask: “Is the fact of the predominantly and ineliminably 
social character of our knowledge incompatible with the individualistic 
assumptions customarily made by theorists of knowledge?” (p. 205). Quinton 
thinks not. Belief is historically prior to knowledge: “To start with very few of our 
beliefs are justified, at all times many are not and many again are justified only 
precariously and indirectly” (p. 206). Justification is historically secondary to the 
testimonially acquired beliefs but it is logically primary. In due course the 
development of cognitive autonomy allows us to justify, or to make rational, 
beliefs that were previously caused in us by external authorities. In Quinton’s 
words: “We become able to discharge the debts we have incurred, that stock of 
borrowed beliefs which enable us to get started” (p. 207). 
But in contesting Karl Popper’s view (in Conjectures and Refutations, 1963) 
that epistemology should concern itself neither with justification nor the sources of 
knowledge but only with the validity of beliefs and the methods by which they are 
criticized, Quinton is forced to recognize a problem. The feasibility of 
individualistic justification by way of an assessment of the general reliability of the 
testifier is threatened by a prima facie incompatibility between recourse to our 
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“instruments of criticism” and the fact that they themselves are provided by 
authority, through testimony. We acquire them from other people through the 
“observation language” that makes usable perception possible, through the logic we 
use to criticize and develop beliefs, through the methodology that specifies the 
degree of support given to theory by observation. “We can weigh the purported 
pound of sugar only on the scales the grocer himself has provided” (p. 208). 
This moves the problem of justifying the acceptance of testimony to new 
ground and puts in question the genuineness of the cognitive (or intellectual) 
autonomy that is supposed to solve it. If the rationality of our reliance on others 
depends on the rationality of our reliance on our own critical resources, such as our 
inductive reasoning, and they themselves derive from what we have learned from 
others and from our cultural traditions, the justificatory process is circular. 
Quinton argues that the reason why most testimony must in fact be reliable is 
that unless reports were predominantly true, what witnesses say could not be 
understood and thus identified as testimony.12  We understand other people’s 
utterances by becoming aware “of a regular correlation between a given repeated 
pattern of utterance and a repeated kind of observable situation which usually 
accompanies it” (p. 211). From observing the correlation between utterance 
patterns and situation-types, we move on to non-observation statements, 
understanding them in terms of previously understood statements of observation. 
Quinton concludes that “…either a language we do not know is intelligible to us, in 
which case most of what it is used to say must be true, or it is not intelligible to us 
																																																									12 The best-known version of this argument is Donald Davidson’s in Inquiries into Truth 
and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 1984. Coady echoes it in the criticism of 
Hume previously mentioned (p. 72). 
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at all” (p. 211). This applies also within our own language community for when we 
are children we acquire language by imitating the practices we find going on in it.  
Most of the statements we heard as children must have been true (or true enough,) 
or we simply could not have attached meaning to them. Without veracity 
predominating over falsity, there could be no language and therefore no 
community. 
Quinton’s ground for the general acceptance of testimony has direct 
application only to observation statements. In order to extend it further he makes a 
distinction between, on the one hand, non-observational beliefs which are about 
situations that are observable but by the believer unobserved, and, on the other 
hand, beliefs that are logically general or about unobservable theoretical entities. 
The latter are trickier to accommodate within the “predominance of veracity” rule 
than the former. But, Quinton argues, with observation language in place, and with 
a minimal endowment of deductive logic, we have sufficient means for a critical 
assessment of theoretical testimony. With this we can avoid both definitely false 
items of belief and dependence on ungroundable assumptions about the reliability 
of authorities. Were this not the case, our dependence on our parents and others for 
language and critical assessment practices would undermine our acceptance of all 
testimonial beliefs. 
Quinton sees himself as presenting an alternative to the approaches to 
testimony of Locke and Hume, which, as we have seen, justify the acceptance of 
testimony on the basis of inductive generalizations about the likelihood of 
particular speakers or types of speaker, or types of report, being true. In other 
words, they are reductive accounts, reducing the rationality of our reliance on 
testimony to the rationality of our reliance on our own reasoning. The alternative 
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non-reductive view, Reid’s view, of which Quinton’s is a version, argues that, all 
things being equal, we are generally entitled to believe what others tell us. There is 
a default entitlement to believe rather than a default duty to subject every testifier 
and every report to active appraisal. However, Quinton, addressing a readership 
interested in education, is at pains to emphasize in his conclusion that once the 
capacity for the criticism of authorities has been developed, fostered by good 
teaching and justified by the non-reductive a priori arguments concerning language 
and the acceptability of our basic instruments of criticism, cognitive autonomy can 
be achieved. Individuals can then make rational their acceptance of beliefs from 
others by the exercise of their critical reasoning skills.  
Quinton clearly accepts the view that the fostering of intellectual autonomy is 
an important and achievable aim of education. He has argued that our reliance on 
testimony as children is compatible with this aim and that in the course of our 
education we are (or ought to be) relieved of the reliance and allowed to assume 
direct responsibility for all our beliefs.   
I will comment on Quinton’s account after I have outlined Goldberg’s 
argument. This tackles the same problem, and shares some of Quinton’s 
assumptions, but introduces additional considerations. 
 
*** 
 
Goldberg’s (2013) paper also appeared in an issue of the Journal Of Philosophy of 
Education, one devoted to themes in social epistemology13. Goldberg initially 
																																																								13	Between Quinton’s 1972 paper and Goldberg’s 2013 paper few papers in the Journal 
of Philosophy of Education have discussed testimony explicitly, but it lies behind many 
discussions of indoctrination, traditional instruction and religious education.	
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presents the problem of young children’s reliance on the testimony of adults as 
arising from their lack of sufficient cognitive maturity to make autonomous rational 
judgements concerning the reliability of what they are told; therefore (given that we 
accept a version of the Justified True Belief notion of knowledge) young children 
can not learn, in the sense of acquiring knowledge from what adults tell them. This 
is an unacceptable conclusion, so something must be wrong with the problem as it 
is framed. Young children are eliminated from the class of people who can acquire 
knowledge via testimony because the kinds of reasons they have available to them 
are just not sufficient to render their testimonially-acquired beliefs rational – if, that 
is, we insist on a strong (“Cartesian”) notion of intellectual autonomy. Even if 
strong enough reasons were available, it is doubtful whether young children could 
bring them to bear appropriately on the rationality of their own belief. So, as long 
as we think the justificatory reasons have to be available to children, it seems that 
they are not in the right epistemic situation to acquire knowledge via testimony.  
Goldberg has recourse to a version of epistemic externalism in order to 
produce a more acceptable conception of autonomy. Reasons other than those 
available to the child himself can be accepted as contributing to the rationality of 
the acquired belief, and therefore to the belief qualifying for the epistemic status of 
knowledge. We are forced into this acceptance by the fact that it is simply 
implausible and unfair to say that young children cannot learn from what adults tell 
them. Goldberg mentions two external sources of reasons. One is the reliable 
epistemic status of the teacher’s beliefs and testimony and the other is the nature of 
the epistemic or informational environment. Although the child has the potentially 
cognitively unsafe disposition to trust what adults tell him, the school classroom is 
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an environment in which the teacher has good reasons supporting what she teaches 
him and misconceptions and false information are generally corrected. Goldberg 
argues that reasons other than those available to the recipient are always relevant, 
always capable of supporting or undermining any (third-person) claim to the 
recipient’s belief amounting to knowledge. A strong Cartesian or internalist notion 
of autonomy and rationality is wrong in any case, for adults as well as for children.   
So Goldberg’s solution to the problem of the cognitive immaturity of 
children is the reliabilist and externalist one that it is the quality of the teacher’s 
testimony and of the informational environment of the classroom that underwrites 
the child’s claim to knowledge. In fact, Goldberg says, if the child were to aim at 
independence his education would be dramatically hindered: his chances of 
acquiring knowledge independently are lower than his chances of acquiring 
knowledge by reliance on the teacher. 
Adults, too, are always reliant on others, not only for particular bits of 
information, but for the reinforcement of epistemic norms and the “cleaning” of our 
epistemic environments – many of which (including universities, scientific 
associations, journals, press media and publishing) are “epistemically engineered” 
to be self-cleaning. Goldberg observes:  
 
[A] hearer’s reasons for regarding a source as credible do not 
exhaust the considerations that bear on the rationality of her 
acceptance. Rather the context of acceptance is one in which the 
task of monitoring testimony is itself distributed. (Goldberg, 2013, 
p. 181)14 																																																								
14 We might well wonder whether Goldberg is right to be so sanguine about the epistemic 
safety of the classroom. Surely whether or not it is safe depends on several variables, 
including the curriculum and the pedagogical practices employed by the teachers, some 
of which may tend towards indoctrination, some towards a more dialogic openness. 
Goldberg’s epistemological optimism rather begs the questions that educationalists, as 
we saw in Chapter 1, are concerned about.	
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My comparison of Quinton’s and Goldberg’s responses to the situation of 
young children will prefigure the case I will make in due course concerning the 
rationality of acquiring knowledge directly from others’ speech acts. 
 
*** 
 
Quinton refers to the social character of our knowledge, Goldberg to our epistemic 
reliance on others. They are both concerned about how the requirement for beliefs 
to be backed by reasons positions younger children, given that we want to be able 
to say that they can learn from what their teachers tell them. How can they if they 
do not have sufficiently robust reasons? Quinton rejects Popperian pessimism about 
the recipient’s scope for justifying his testimonially acquired belief: he wants to 
retain faith in individual justification, but he accepts that in the case of young 
children the justification is “postponed” until the child has accumulated enough 
knowledge and reasoning ability to justify the beliefs that he has accumulated and 
that are held on trust pro tem. However, the child is not excessively vulnerable 
because, necessarily, true beliefs must predominate over false ones, otherwise 
language learning would not be possible in the first place. Goldberg, on the other 
hand, does not argue for an a priori justification for trusting testimony but for a 
reliabilist point concerning safe epistemic environments, and this also reassures us 
that children can be said to acquire knowledge from adults and are not especially 
vulnerable to mischief or misinformation. Quinton, therefore, retains some 
confidence in an individualistic/internalistic account of epistemic justification, and 
therefore of intellectual autonomy, as he conceives it, whereas Goldberg rejects 
that in favour of an externalist/reliabilist account of justification and of a notion of 
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autonomy that is accepting of our reliance on others. It is worth exploring the 
assumptions in these arguments.  
Quinton and Goldberg both accept that what one acquires from testimony is a 
belief that can only be counted as knowledge, or as rational, if it is backed by 
reasons, either just by reasons available to the recipient (Quinton) and/or by 
external reasons that include those pertaining to the speaker’s belief and to the 
circumstances of the testifying, such as the informational environment (Goldberg). 
They therefore both make knowledge from testimony an indirect process: the 
recipient’s knowledge is mediated not just by the words of the testimony but by a 
belief that needs the  “added extra” of sufficiently robust reasons to support it. An 
alternative view is that knowledge is generally not indirect at all, that we can 
acquire knowledge directly from testimony just as we can from perception. This is 
the view of John McDowell, which I examine in Chapter 4.  
Another assumption that applies to both accounts is that our main interest is 
in what makes a belief acquired from testimony achieve the status of knowledge, 
and they both agree that the belief has to be rational. Whereas Quinton thinks 
rationality is an individual attribute, Goldberg thinks it is a distributed quality, 
shared between participants, speakers and hearers, and the environment. However, 
although they both accept autonomy as an aim of education, they do not directly 
ask when and why is it reasonable to accept what another person tells us. On the 
one hand they seek to locate justification in generic features of testimonial 
practices, and on the other to locate autonomy in a series of individual judgments. 
They are writing for an audience interested in education, and they raise the issue of 
young children’s inability to hold adequate reasons, but their perspective on 
justification and/or rationality is essentially that of epistemologists who are 
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interested in what kinds of reason underwrite the epistemic status of knowledge, 
rather than in what makes the recipient’s acceptance of the testimony reasonable 
and responsible. The implication is that rational acceptance of testimony depends 
on the nature of knowledge, rather than, as Williams (2002) and Craig (1990) 
maintain, in part determining it.  
I think Quinton and Goldberg both underestimate the complexity and variety 
of testimonial contexts. There are for children, as for adults, situations when what 
they are told is not true, or it is incompetently expressed, or it is said teasingly or 
ironically, or it is said with disguised intentions. There can be no automatic 
entitlement to accept what one is told in any epistemic environment. There are 
always judgements to be made, which are our judgements even though the 
cognitive tools we use to make them are socially distributed and policed. 
Furthermore, epistemic judgements have to take their place alongside other kinds 
of judgement. The acquisition of knowledge is not the only consideration, whether 
in the flow of a classroom conversation or of a busy life. The judgements that make 
acceptance, further scrutiny, outright rejection or “let it go” reasonable responses in 
the context of a particular dialogue are complex and the purely epistemic aspects of 
them are intricately mixed with linguistic, ethical and affective aspects. 
Autonomy must largely be a matter of maintenance or housekeeping. We 
comprehend and assess testimony against the backdrop of our existing knowledge 
and assumptions and something that we first accept on trust may subsequently be 
rejected when thought, evidence or further testimony casts doubt on it. We do this 
continuously, a constant monitoring and adjusting of acceptances and preferences, 
with the aim of achieving a satisfactory cohesion or harmony (Lehrer, 1997; 
Zagzebski, 2012). Quinton and Goldberg misrepresent autonomy when they 
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represent it as a series of independent and purely intellectual decisions, rather than 
the exercise of those intellectual virtues that ensure we are worthy of trusting our 
own judgements. (This is the theme of  §5.6.) 
We could concede to Quinton that there is something in the idea that it is 
necessarily the case that most knowledge claims the child encounters are true, 
otherwise he could not learn language. We could concede to Goldberg that if we 
were interested in a third-person assessment of whether a child has acquired 
knowledge from the testimony of his teacher, externalist considerations such as the 
speaker’s reasons and the epistemic environment would be relevant. After all, the 
testimony has in any case to be true, and whatever we may decide to say about 
truth, it is not a subjective feature of the recipient’s mind. But we do not, I think, 
have to concede that a young child has no capacity for making judgements that 
relate to what he is told. He has to comprehend or interpret what the adult says and 
that always entails making judgements that are in part epistemic judgements and in 
part linguistic judgements. Take for instance, what the child achieves when he 
distinguishes leg pulling from genuine telling by interpreting the verbal and non-
verbal clues correctly. Take, also, the child’s ability to distinguish fact from fiction, 
the plausible from the fantastic, when looking at a picture book, willingly 
suspending disbelief in the process. Also as a producer of teasing and fictitious 
utterances, the child makes linguistic choices that have epistemic features. My 
point here is that these abilities are aspects of learning a language, learning to 
comprehend and to produce speech, to exercise expertise in employing and 
recognizing a repertoire of speech types and purposes. Furthermore, the child, like 
the adult, has to be capable of autonomous housekeeping, maintaining a coherent 
and cohesive set of concepts, acceptances and preferences (including by responding 
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to corrections), for not to do so would be to lack the ability to comprehend 
consistently, to achieve successful communication, to make choices and to act with 
any steadiness of character. These are all claims that will be supported by the 
argument of subsequent chapters. 
Of course, children are more prone than adults to errors of various kinds, to 
inconsistency and contradictions, but that is largely because they are relatively 
inexpert at social, including verbal, interactions. They are developing. Quinton and 
Goldberg gesture towards the idea of development, but they tend to see it as purely 
intellectual or cognitive development, as when we improve our critical reasoning 
skills. I think we need to see it as more intimately related to linguistic development 
and to development in social interaction. Linguistic development is not only the 
gradual extension of vocabulary and grammatical competence, but also 
sophistication and sensitivity  - wise judgement, we might say - with regard to 
speech utterances, genres and types of discourse. We have to look much more at 
the nature of the interaction between participants and at the child’s maintenance 
(with adjustments) of his understanding of his world.  We need to locate the 
development of intellectual autonomy within the development and maintenance of 
the child’s overall conceptual scheme, linguistic competence, social interaction 
skills and character. 
 
§3.2  Reductionism and Non-Reductionism 
 
The previous section revisited some of the themes and distinctions that we 
encountered in Chapter 2. Quinton argued for a non-reductionist account of 
testimony, similar to Reid’s, but saw it as a kind of epistemic safety net prior to 
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schools developing the child’s critical thinking skills, which, for Quinton, are 
central to intellectual autonomy. Goldberg presented a form of externalism, 
whereby the rationality of a belief acquired from testimony could be achieved 
(from a third-person perspective) by factors such as the safety of the epistemic 
environment. I argued that these accounts beg the question about autonomy that 
educationalists need to be most interested in: what on particular occasions entitles 
or justifies our acceptance or rejection of what another person tells us? In the rest 
of this chapter I will look more closely at recent versions of reductionism and non-
reductionism and at alternative conceptions of epistemic quality. 
 
*** 
 
Given that we must acquire many (perhaps most) of our beliefs from what others 
tell us, what do we have to be, or do, to make sure that we judge well which to 
accept and which to reject? From a pedagogical point of view, it is important that 
even when a student’s testimonially-acquired belief fails to qualify as knowledge, it 
could still have been acquired reasonably and responsibly. A failure to acquire 
knowledge can nevertheless be a success in terms of exercising or developing 
epistemically and linguistically reliable or virtuous dispositions. 
Reductionists, following in the footsteps of Locke and Hume, see testimonial 
knowledge as a form of inductive knowledge. They argue that without inductive 
inference to warrant his testimonially acquired belief, a hearer is guilty of 
credulousness. Several characteristics of the communication might count as 
providing epistemic support for its acceptance, including contextual features such 
as the speaker’s tone of voice and body language, as well as those connected more 
	 97	
directly with the “propositional content”, such as its consistency with relevant 
beliefs that the hearer already holds, and facts connected to the speaker’s track 
record or reliability. It is not enough to offer a psychological explanation of why 
the hearer believes on the basis of the testimony (the speaker’s voice reminding 
him of a much-loved teacher would not be a relevant reason): the reasons have to 
be epistemically relevant and sound ones; for example, the general reliability of 
people with this speaker’s academic qualifications might be an epistemically 
relevant factor in certain cases. 
One difficulty for the reductive account is that if the justification for 
testimonial beliefs depends on the quality of the believer’s inductive reasoning, it 
faces the hurdle of explaining how, before he can apply inductive generalizations to 
particular cases, the believer can determine the relevant categories of experience. If 
he has evidence of the amateur entomologist’s reliability or reputation as an 
informant on insects, does he have good reason to trust her on all species of animal, 
on other topics in biology, on environmental issues, on science generally? Can he 
infer her general reliability as an informant from her specific reliability on topics of 
a particular type, given that he knows many people are narrow in their range of 
expert knowledge? Surely he needs to know more about the informant before 
making such an inference, and this itself would almost certainly involve relying on 
testimony concerning the informant’s experience and reliability. So now he has 
other testifiers to assess using inductive reasoning.  
Despite these ramifications, we often do rely on support of this kind. We 
research and assess the general credibility of informants, accumulating evidence 
that is itself, if we have to be scrupulous, in need of support. Much of our critical 
thinking is of this kind. But it cannot be the case that testimony in general is 
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warranted either in this way or by extension from sample cases, because the fact 
that we sometimes go to such trouble shows that there is a good chance of the 
assessment being negative. Some informants are unreliable; some testimony is 
false. It is true, of course, that we are aware of the reputations of certain categories 
of people who are considered to be more, or less, reliable as informants in certain 
situations. It might be prudent to be suspicious of the salesman’s testimony 
concerning the car he is selling at a “bargain price”, or the defendant’s uncertainty 
about his whereabouts on the night of the crime. These are situations in which a 
certain degree of scepticism and cross-examination is expected, when evidence 
should be weighed, vested interests and reputations taken into account, norms of 
trust partially or wholly suspended. They are cases of testimony but the particular 
speech acts involved are distinct and the mutually recognized expectations and 
responsibilities define the precise epistemic context. Such occasions are in contrast 
to the occasions when assessment of another person’s credentials as an informant is 
likely to cause resentment. That is surely a sign that there are norms attached to 
some forms of testimony, to some testimonial speech acts, that do not sanction the 
withholding of trust without good reason.  
Reductionism’s problem is that the limited scope of our personal 
observations seems to preclude a purely internalist justification, one based solely 
on the believer’s judgement or mental state. However, a contribution to epistemic 
warrant could derive from testimony of certain types having a probability of truth. 
The problem with this is that typologies are indefinite. Coady argues (1992, p. 84) 
that the likelihood of a piece of testimony being true can vary with how we 
categorize it, and that seems a very insecure basis for a reason based on truth-
probability. Coady’s example is a report of a sick lion at Taronga Park Zoo. If this 
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is an existence report, then I might have good reason to believe it, for I have in my 
experience many instances of existence reports proving reliable; but if it is a 
medical report my belief is on weaker ground because I have personal experience 
of far fewer correlations between medical reports and medical facts. The security of 
the inference I make concerning the reliability of this report will depend on how I 
classify it.  
This problem with type-identities undermines not just testimonial beliefs but 
any beliefs based on inductive inference, and yet these beliefs do play a part in our 
everyday lives and in the exercise of expertise, so perhaps we should be wary of 
being too pessimistic about our ability to select relevant typologies. To avoid 
circularity or infinite regression, generalizations about the credibility of testimonial 
types would have to be autonomous, grounded on personal observations; and in 
particular cases these generalizations would form the basis for individual 
judgements that track the objective probability of truth. We would need, therefore, 
a reliable process for tracking truth-probability. This presents this form of 
reductionism with a problem that also faces reliabilist arguments, such as 
Goldberg’s concerning classrooms as reliably safe epistemic environments. 
Reductionism and reliabilism depend on our ability, as either first-person 
subjects or as third-person observers, to identity reliable belief forming processes; 
but our limited experience of precise types, and reliance therefore on broader types, 
undermines inferences about truth-probability. The broader the types, the more 
difficult it must be to assign the right probability, and the less accurate and 
objective judgements about reliability will be. Reductionism and reliabilism are 
badly undermined if they depend on assumptions about the truth of testimony being 
uniformly probable across quite different types.  
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One response to this difficulty comes from Peter Lipton, an early exponent of 
inference to the best explanation (IBE). He argues that if we can accept that people 
do generally try to tell the truth, we have the basis for an inference on particular 
occasions (all things being equal) that the truth of the information given by the 
speaker is the best explanation of her testimony, and therefore the audience is 
warranted in believing it, just as we are in perception-based IBE cases (Lipton, 
1998). This is made plausible by the fact that (as Locke and Hume recognized) 
there are good practical reasons for telling the truth, such as fear of disapproval, 
sanctions and professional scrutiny, and also by the argument’s advantage over 
other inferential arguments that it does not require such an extensive and varied 
range of evidence and experience to support the inference. Once the general 
tendency to tell the truth has been established, the inference can be applied quite 
broadly. However, the IBE theory faces the objection that whatever the statistical 
probability of truth telling may be, on any particular occasion the possibility of 
dishonesty or error remains. Any statistical probability of truth telling might stem 
from the nature of the tactical games we play with each other, and informants who 
are generally truth tellers might always be looking out for opportunities to score 
well through unanticipated deceit. Such considerations seem to take the 
justification of testimonial beliefs into the realm of game theory, but they surely do 
play some part in our practical reasoning concerning who and what to believe, both 
in general and on particular occasions. It is a compelling objection to IBE that it 
leaves the hearer too much at epistemic or doxastic risk on particular occasions. 
There are a number of argument strategies we can use concerning the risk of 
believing false testimony. To reason from a premise concerning evidence of a 
general disposition to tell the truth is one. To reason from the probability of 
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testimony of particular types being true is another. A third is to rely on our capacity 
for monitoring speakers for reliability or trustworthiness. It would surely be 
irresponsible to ignore whatever sensitivity we have to indications that the speaker 
is insincere or incompetent as an informant. This capacity is not an infallible one, 
for misjudgements are common enough, but perhaps we do possess a reasonably 
reliable capacity for monitoring informants for “defeaters”.  
Defeaters are of two kinds. We are sensitive (to some extent) to 
psychological defeaters such as the speaker’s doubts or discomfort concerning 
what she is saying. If the hearer is aware of these, his acceptance of the speaker’s 
testimony cannot be epistemically warranted, at least not until he has reasoned his 
way to a sound inference from other available evidence (that is, until he has 
defeated the defeater). Secondly, there are what Jennifer Lackey refers to as 
normative defeaters (2008, p. 45). These are doubts or beliefs that the speaker, 
given certain available evidence, should have. “The underlying thought here is that 
certain kinds of experiences, doubts and beliefs contribute epistemically 
unacceptable irrationality to doxastic systems and, accordingly, justification and 
knowledge can be defeated or undermined by their presence” (Lackey, 2006, p. 4. 
See also E. Fricker, 1987 and 1994).  
Whether or not we do in fact have a reliable capacity to monitor speakers for 
these two kinds of defeater is an empirical question; there is also the normative 
question concerning whether or not a speaker’s insecurity about what she is saying 
should undermine the epistemic status of the belief the hearer forms from it. These 
questions have significance for pedagogical and curriculum theory – for example: 
to what extent should students be taught to respond to their doubts about the truth 
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of what they are told? What factors might influence the appropriateness of a 
particular form of response?  
The empirical question is complicated by the fact that the monitoring 
capacity is evidently not always an entirely conscious one. Sometimes I just do not 
believe an informant and it transpires that I was correct not to, but I could not have 
said why I distrusted her or her testimony. But if we assume for the moment that 
there is such a faculty, even if we are not always aware of it, and speculate further 
that it is one that develops with experience, forming part of the cognitive processes 
at work in communication, it would appear to be a faculty that carries a heavy 
epistemic burden. This would be especially so if the claim is that the faculty is 
entirely responsible for guaranteeing that testimonial beliefs are warranted. There 
would be difficult implications for teaching and learning, one being the issue raised 
by Quinton and Goldberg (see §3.1) concerning children whose monitoring 
capacity is undeveloped. Does this mean that they cannot be counted as learning 
(acquiring knowledge) from informants such as parents and teachers? The 
argument here would be that given the lack of a reliable capacity to monitor 
testimony for defeaters, there would be the constant possibility, even a likelihood, 
of these individuals forming beliefs, credulously, from testimony that a more 
mature student would reject. On the assumption that epistemically insecure beliefs 
cannot count as knowledge, the audience could not be said to have learned the 
information, even if it happens to be true. This is counter-intuitive. Quinton argues 
that the non-reductionist’s default entitlement to believe testimony can hold the fort 
whilst children develop the cognitive and epistemic capacities to make more 
autonomous judgements based on inductive inference. But it is not altogether clear 
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why the fort needs to be held, pending the development of autonomous judgments, 
if naïve belief is justified in any case by a default entitlement. 
Given that the capacity for monitoring defeaters is put forward in support of 
reductionist arguments concerning justified uptake, it seems peculiar that it should 
be to some extent an unconscious or intuitive one. It would be difficult to use its 
promptings in an inferential argument unless there was strong evidence in support 
of the reliability of intuitions of this kind, which, considering the kind of evidence 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) provides for the effectiveness of “fast thinking”, there 
might be. But even if intuitive choices in some contexts are as successful as 
reasoned ones, it hardly seems a good basis for a theory that reduces testimonial 
knowledge to inferential knowledge. Intuitions about the competence and sincerity 
of informants would appear to be more at home in non-inferential theories. 
In fact, non-reductionists have argued for a monitoring or “filtering” faculty. 
Testimony, they say, is a distinctive source of knowledge with unique epistemic 
principles and we have “a special presumptive right to trust, not dependent on 
evidence” (E. Fricker 1994, p. 128). The difficulty faced by non-reductionists is to 
avoid a charge of condoning gullibility: this filtering capacity provides, in their 
view, sufficient vigilance. We are warranted in the uptake of testimony if there are 
no undefeated defeaters to interfere with the otherwise very simple epistemic 
process. Once a defeater is “detected” the uptake of the belief must be interrupted. 
A comparison could be made with a computer scan that operates in the background 
but issues an alert when a virus is detected. Although the same empirical doubts 
apply here as with the reductionist monitoring capacity, as non-reductionists do not 
require the belief to be warranted by a process of inferential reasoning, the potential 
unavailability of the filtering process and its alerts for conscious deployment is less 
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of a problem for them, as long as it is sufficiently reliable. In the context of a non-
reductionist default entitlement to believe, individual epistemic warrant amounts to 
the avoidance of irresponsibility in responding to alerts.  
So one way to characterize the difference between reductionism and non-
reductionism is to say that reductionists think that in the context of a high degree of 
probability of any testimony he is offered being true, a student is rationally justified 
in accepting it as long as he is vigilantly on the look-out for defeaters and responds 
appropriately to them, whereas non-reductionists think that in the context of a 
general a priori entitlement to believe testimony, the student needs only to be 
responsible in responding to doubts that actually occur to him.  
It is difficult to disagree about the need for hearers to be alert to indications 
that the speaker might be incompetent or insincere, but I contend that this is not 
principally, or at least not purely, an epistemic requirement; rather, it is a condition 
of the hearer’s comprehension or interpretation of the utterance. It is at least 
plausible that the principal role of any capacity for monitoring or filtering we may 
have is to scan the utterance for the purposes of comprehension or interpretation 
rather than for epistemic uptake. In most cases, the uptake or epistemic acceptance 
can take a free ride on the back of the comprehension process. This contention is 
supported by the fact that alerts in most cases do not initially trigger the suspension 
of belief, but, rather, further attempts to comprehend. In the context of a particular 
type of discourse, such as most pedagogic discourses, if the teacher tells her 
students something that clearly contradicts their existing beliefs or knowledge, the 
expected (normatively entitled) response is not disbelief or epistemic assessment 
but reinterpretation: what does she mean? What is she doing in telling us this? 
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In any case, the monitoring or filtering process can have no role in warranting 
the recipient’s testimonial belief, rather than a role in justifying his acceptance or 
uptake of it. It is a significant fact that another person is involved. The hearer is 
dependent on the speaker for the belief; therefore we have to consider the 
possibility that the epistemic status of the speaker’s belief and testimony is 
significant for the status of the hearer’s belief. If this is a condition for epistemic 
warrant, it is an externalist one: it relates to facts that may well be beyond the 
hearer’s ken, beyond anything that could be detected. This means that regardless of 
the hearer’s reasons for believing the speaker, his belief (if not his uptake of the 
belief) can be considered warranted or justified only if the speaker’s belief or 
communication is reliable. This transfers at least some of the epistemic burden 
from the hearer to the speaker. In relation to schooling, the student acquires his 
knowledge from the teacher and in virtue of the teacher’s reliability in possessing a 
justified belief. If knowledge is “transmitted” from teacher to student, what are the 
teacher’s responsibilities (and expectations) in this process, and would it remove 
the requirement for the student’s uptake to be (first-person) justified? 
I argue that the teacher does share responsibility with the student for the 
student’s belief and that this comes about through their relationship of mutual trust, 
but I also think this applies to the communication itself before it applies 
specifically to the question of epistemic warrant or justification. Comprehension 
and belief are both collaborative achievements and the epistemic status of the belief 
“borrows” qualities from the quality of the speaker’s communication and the 
hearer’s comprehension. This point will be developed in Chapters 5 and 6. But 
before I can support the contention I need to examine some further epistemological 
questions concerning learning from the words of others, and I turn now to an 
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influential argument from Jennifer Lackey (2008). Lackey supports a hybrid 
position and rejects the “transmission of belief” approach in favour of what she 
calls the “statement view”: it is not the quality of the speaker’s belief that the 
hearer inherits but the quality of her words, the testimony itself. This has something 
in common with my argument, but it does not acknowledge the variety of speech 
acts covered by the epistemological category of testimony. This last point is what 
motivates my discussion of Austinian pragmatics and Bakhtinian dialogism in 
Chapter 6. 
 
§3.3 Lackey’s Rejection of the Transmission Thesis 
 
Lackey’s “dualistic” theory of testimony takes something from both the 
reductionist and non-reductionist arguments concerning testimonial warrant. She 
argues that the hearer’s justification for uptake, grounded as it is in limited 
observations of the truth of testimony, must be supplemented by the reliability of 
the testimony itself in order for the belief to be warranted and to acquire the status 
of knowledge. “It takes two to tango”: the speaker and the hearer share the 
responsibility for the hearer’s acquisition of knowledge. The hearer’s responsibility 
is to ensure that his uptake is at least not irrational, as it would be, for instance, if 
he ignored indications of insincerity or weakness in the speaker, whether these 
came from her behaviour or from the content and implications of her testimony, or 
if he ignored an inconsistency with his own existing beliefs. The absence of such 
defeaters gives a positive reason for uptake. So Lackey’s dualism supports a rather 
weak version of the reductionist’s demand for internalist justification for uptake, 
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but it also accepts the non-reductionist’s claim that testimony offers a distinctive 
kind of epistemic warrant and knowledge.  
The distinctiveness comes from the reliability condition on the speaker’s 
communication, which clearly cannot be a feature of other kinds of knowledge. It 
means that we are dependent on other people for testimonial knowledge in more 
than just the sense that we rely on them for information. We rely on them to 
communicate truths reliably. 
So, where teachers are testifying, giving information to students without 
explicit supporting reasons for belief, or providing reasons that are themselves 
examples of testimony, the belief acquired by an individual student is warranted if 
and only if two conditions are satisfied: 1) the requirement that the student forms 
his belief in a rational (or “not irrational”) manner, and 2) the requirement that the 
teacher has communicated the information in an epistemically sound manner. Some 
educationalists seem to reject the idea that students’ learning should be 
epistemically sound, preferring to think of learning as memorization, but it is 
difficult to reconcile this position with an interest in critical thinking skills or with 
a concern about students’ undiscriminating acceptance of information. If 
educationalists and educators are interested in these issues, they need to engage 
with the questions raised by epistemologists such as Lackey. 
What is most notable about Lackey’s dualism is that she rejects the view that 
it is the transmission of knowledge that makes testimony a distinctive source of 
warrant and knowledge. That is, she rejects the view that what gets transmitted is 
the belief itself, along with all its epistemic qualities -  hence, in the best cases, 
knowledge. In some versions of the view that she rejects every link in the 
testimonial chain must hold the justified belief in order for transmission to reach 
	 108	
the latest recipient; in other versions, the chain needs only to have commenced with 
a justified belief or to have featured a justified belief at some point. Versions vary 
also in whether they hold transmission of justified belief to be necessary or 
sufficient for the hearer to acquire knowledge.  
Lackey’s arguments are supported by a consideration of fictitious cases. One 
of these is the Creationist Teacher case, in which the teacher is a devout Christian, 
committed to creationism, who nevertheless teaches the theory of evolution by 
presenting the scientific evidence scrupulously and asserting to her class that 
“modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo erectus” (Lackey, 2008, p. 48). 
Although she herself does not believe what she teaches, the students form a true 
belief from her testimony. She is a reliable testifier but not a reliable believer. Such 
cases show, Lackey claims, that testimony can be reliable even when belief is not 
reliable, and, as it is the truth-reliability of testimony that matters, it cannot be the 
case that the transmission of belief via testimony is either necessary or sufficient 
for testimonial knowledge. That is, it is not the case that: (1) a hearer knows that p 
on the basis of a speaker’s testimony that p if and only if the speaker herself knows 
that p; nor that (2) if a hearer comes to believe that p on the basis of the testimony 
of a speaker who herself knows that p, and he has no undefeated defeaters for 
believing that p, then the hearer knows that p.  
These are the “necessity thesis” and the “sufficiency thesis” and Lackey 
opposes them both. She claims that the sufficiency thesis was accepted by, amongst 
others, J. L. Austin. In his paper “Other Minds” Austen says that “where someone 
has said to me ‘I know,’ I am entitled to say I know too, at second-hand. The right 
to say ‘I know’ is transmissible, in the sort of way that other authority is 
transmissible” (Austen, 1979, p. 100. See also Lackey, 2008, p. 42). Lackey rejects 
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this thesis because it does not require the hearer to have positive reasons for the 
uptake of the speaker’s testimony, which means his belief could be as epistemically 
irrational as is belief in the face of counter-evidence.  
I think Lackey may be misrepresenting Austin here. He is making a point 
about the recipient’s correct interpretation or recognition of the speaker’s speech 
act, which, given that it is an assurance of knowledge, not just an assertion, does 
provide the recipient with a positive reason for trusting the speaker to be speaking 
from knowledge. This distinction will become significant in my argument for a 
theory that recognizes the distinct epistemic implications of different testimonial 
speech acts (see Chapter 6). 
Be that as it may, in order to press her claim that the speaker’s belief is not 
what gets transferred to the hearer, Lackey goes on to describe cases where the 
hearer is said to believe that p on the basis of the speaker’s belief that p, possesses 
no relevant defeaters for believing that p, and yet still has a significantly different 
epistemic relation to p from the speaker. One such case features Compulsively 
Trusting Bill. Bill can never bring himself to distrust Jill’s testimony. So when Jill 
tells him, correctly and with her usual epistemic reliability, that yesterday while on 
a boat trip she saw an orca whale, he believes her. But he would believe her even if 
he had ample evidence to the contrary. So, is Bill justified in believing that there 
was an orca to be seen on Jill’s boat trip? Lackey says the answer should clearly be 
no. Bill’s true belief is irrationally, and therefore unreliably, formed.15  																																																								
15 Recalling Quinton and Goldberg’s questions (in §3.1) about young children’s credulity, 
it would be easy to transfer this example to an educational setting. Of course, we might 
wish to avoid exaggerating the credulity of young children and maintain that, as a matter 
of fact, children do question information that does not fit with their observations and 
conceptions of the world. Lackey herself refers to her three-year-old daughter 
challenging her reassurance that houses without chimneys do not pose a problem for 
Santa Claus as no children live in a chimneyless house (2008, p. 67). 	
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Any of us can be insensitive to the presence of defeaters on occasion, through 
carelessness or bias, but Bill is incapable of sensitivity. He is, Lackey says, “no 
better epistemically than a subject who has been brainwashed or programmed to 
accept any report that Jill makes” (2008, p. 67). The case shows, in Lackey’s view, 
that when a belief with excellent epistemic qualities is conveyed to another person, 
the epistemic qualities do not simply “come along for the ride”. It is not that the 
epistemic qualities are transmitted and then defeated by Bill’s credulousness: his 
incapacity is such that they are not transmitted to him at all. However, for this case 
to yield the conclusion that Lackey wants to draw from it, we surely have to 
assume that Bill’s uncritical acceptance of Jill’s testimony is genuinely uncritical, 
and this would be hard to establish if she has never been unreliable. As Lackey 
seems to be happy with the non-reductionist notion of a capacity for unconsciously 
or passively filtering reports, she needs to rule out the possibility that there are no 
alerts because Jill just is a consistently reliable testifier. There is only a problem if 
Bill definitely would continue to trust Jill if she proved herself to be consistently 
unreliable. Similarly, there is not a problem if young children trust their teacher 
completely unless their trust is consistently abused by the teacher’s insincerity or 
incompetence. What this case shows is that reliability and rationality can come 
apart, but it does not completely support Lackey’s view about what is or is not 
“transmitted”. It is not possible to say that Bill’s trust is unreliable but it is, 
perhaps, possible to say that it is irrational.  
Lackey may be right to say that the hearer needs to have a positive reason for 
thinking that his belief is epistemically sound, but I am not convinced that her cases 
demonstrate that the epistemic status of the speaker’s belief is irrelevant to the 
hearer’s acquisition of knowledge. I think it is still an open question whether a 
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teacher who does not believe what she tells the students, as in the creationist 
teacher’s case, can be regarded as having transmitted knowledge via her words. 
Would a third-party observer who knows about the deceit credit the students with 
knowledge? Of course, teachers do disguise their own beliefs sometimes, and we 
would often consider it responsible of them to do so. I acknowledge, too, that it is 
possible to represent the teacher as reliably teaching a rigorous scientific model of 
inquiry and reasoning, and that this is the core content of her lessons. However, I 
think Lackey’s view needs to be more robustly contextualized. For example, we 
might speculate that speakers must display some kind of sincerity, or some kind of 
epistemic responsibility, the kind depending on the context, including the exact 
nature of her role and purposes as a provider of information to the particular 
audience. The problem with these fictitious cases is that they are designed to test 
our intuitions but they need to be more detailed in order to capture the way in 
which ideas are exchanged in highly contextualized utterances.  
 
*** 
 
Lackey has rejected the proposition that the transmission of the belief from speaker 
to hearer is not sufficient for the hearer’s knowledge, because the epistemic 
qualities of the speaker’s belief do not automatically get carried across with it, and 
therefore the hearer’s uptake is not warranted automatically, but there remains the 
possibility that the transmission of belief is at least necessary. The thesis claims 
that somewhere along the testimonial chain there has to have been a testifier whose 
true belief that p was warranted. 
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It might seem obvious that all prior speakers in the testimonial chain, 
including the most recent one, should have been warranted in their belief that p. 
This is what the necessity thesis should claim, according to Lackey’s interpretation, 
and she employs the creationist teacher again to argue that it is false. The 
creationist teacher’s testimony puts her pupils in a position to know facts about 
evolution even though she does not recognize them as facts herself. She does not 
know them because she does not believe them. The necessity thesis must be false, 
Lackey says, because no one could reasonably claim that the pupils’ learning is 
epistemically unsound. Their belief has not been tainted by her disbelief, nor, we 
might add, undermined by the insincerity with which she has testified.  
Again, I question whether this case achieves what Lackey intends. If it works 
at all, it works against the thesis that the most recent link in a testimonial chain 
must have warranted belief, but it does not work against the thesis that there has to 
have been a warranted belief somewhere in the chain. The necessity thesis is not 
threatened by gaps in the chain of testimonial warrant. Lackey believes that the 
final link, the creationist teacher herself, must be the source of the pupils’ 
knowledge, but, as Paul Faulkner argues (2011, p. 73), the teacher can be the 
source of their belief that p without being the source of their knowledge, even 
though their belief that p qualifies as knowledge. It qualifies as knowledge because 
the teacher’s testimony has “put them in touch” with someone else, a prior speaker, 
who knew that p. If this is correct, testimony is indeed a distinctive source of 
knowledge, for the audience’s testimonial knowledge is necessarily dependent on 
another person’s knowledge; but it is not dependent, necessarily, on the knowledge 
of the person from whom the testimony was received. 
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This would have implications for the epistemology of teaching and learning. 
It would mean, for example, that epistemic warrant could leapfrog epistemically 
unreliable or incompetent teachers and the children could still be said to learn from 
them by acquiring the information from them. We can imagine a case where a 
careless teacher acquires information from an unreliable website, one which has no 
epistemic safeguards in place and which completely fails to differentiate between 
good quality and bad quality information, as does the teacher. On one occasion, 
however, the person who has posted the information that the teacher relies on is 
epistemically sound, so the teacher’s belief is (arguably) warranted; it is also true 
and it is communicated accurately. According to this version of the necessity thesis, 
there is nothing in this situation that prevents the pupils from acquiring knowledge 
from the careless teacher’s testimony. However, a less satisfactory outcome would 
result if the person who posted the information did so mischievously, believing he 
had invented false information when it is in fact true; then, because there is no 
epistemically warranted believer in the testimonial chain, the children have 
acquired a true but unwarranted belief and therefore could be said not to have 
learned (in the factive sense) from the testimony of their teacher. As the children 
would not be able to distinguish the unfavourable epistemic position from the more 
favourable one, the significance of the internalist condition that hearers form their 
beliefs in epistemically responsible ways appears to have been undermined. What 
is the point of their monitoring of their immediate informant for signs of insincerity 
or incompetence if her sincerity and competence are potentially irrelevant? Either 
the immediate testifier must be the one that really matters or the unsatisfactory 
implication concerning the internalist condition shows that the necessity thesis is 
false, as Lackey herself thinks. 
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Another case that leads Lackey to conclude that the necessity thesis is false 
concerns a Consistent Liar. I will simplify this somewhat. A teacher suffers from a 
neurological condition that leads her to believe that dogs are cats and cats are dogs. 
Now, after surgery, whenever she decides to make a statement about what she 
believes are dogs, she says “cats”, so her statements refer to the animals that really 
are cats. So although she believes something different, her statements put her 
audience in a position to learn from her about cats and dogs. Her statements about 
these animals are consistent and reliable, so there is no problem in reductively 
inferring knowledge from her reports. Faulkner argues (2011, p. 74) that this is 
only inconsistent with the transmission thesis (that the epistemic qualities of the 
speaker’s belief are transmitted to the hearer’s testimonially-formed belief) if we 
regard such inferential knowledge as testimonial knowledge. It is acquired from the 
teacher’s words but not from her testimony, Faulkner claims. The fact that the 
teacher’s beliefs about cats and dogs and her statements about them come apart, 
albeit consistently, just shows that her statements cannot be testimonial. They are 
“virtually lies”. This teacher, like the creationist teacher, is not testifying in what is 
the paradigmatic sense of telling her audience what she believes to be the case. 
Faulkner concludes that “…what this case does establish is that the acquisition of 
testimonial knowledge is responsive to defeaters that need not undercut the 
acquisition of inductive knowledge from testimony” (2011, p. 74). Faulkner is 
making a distinction between knowledge acquired by inference from a statement or 
assertion, and knowledge acquired testimonially – that is, from a speaker who 
sincerely tells you what she believes to be true and whose words say what she 
means. This is not a distinction that Lackey recognizes, but it is one that has 
relevance to trust theories of testimony (such as Faulkner’s own) and to my own 
	 115	
argument in Chapter 6. Lackey's view, as we shall see in the next section, is that it 
is the speaker's words rather than her beliefs that are epistemically significant, 
therefore whether or not the speaker conveys a sincere belief is irrelevant, so the 
distinction between testimonial knowledge and inductive knowledge from 
testimony does not arise. My view differs from both Faulkner’s and Lackey’s. It is 
that whether a speaker is offering an assertion or an assurance that such and such is 
the case is governed by what the speaker and the hearer mutually recognize to be 
their respective responsibilities and expectations. Thus, for the hearer even to 
comprehend the assertion or the assurance, is for him to recognize it for the speech 
act that the speaker intends it to be, and it is the nature of the speech act (in the 
context of the particular discourse) that provides the speaker with a positive reason 
to trust what the speaker tells him. This is significantly different from Lackey’s 
statement view.  
 
§3.4 Lackey’s Statement View of Testimony 
 
Having dismissed the transmission view that a speaker’s belief is transmitted to the 
hearer, along with its epistemic properties, Lackey argues that a hearer forms his 
belief on the basis of understanding and accepting the statement the speaker has 
offered: “Statements are not, therefore, merely vehicles for expressing beliefs but, 
rather, they are the central bearers of epistemic significance themselves (2008, p. 
72).  
The consequences of rejecting the transmission view and accepting the 
statement view include the possibility of testimony generating new knowledge 
(which is not an option for the transmission view) and the possibility that the 
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hearer’s belief could fail to be as justified as the speaker’s. Another consequence is 
that the sincerity of the speaker is not essential; only her competence as a testifier is 
essential – that is, her statement must be reliable or truth conducive. A speaker’s 
insincerity and doxastic incompetence would only be relevant if it made the 
testimony itself unreliable.  
In Lackey’s dualistic account the reliability or truth-conduciveness of the 
speaker’s testimony is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the hearer’s 
acquisition of knowledge: it has to be supplemented by conditions that the hearer 
must satisfy. He must come to believe that p on the basis of  “an appropriate 
connection” with the content of the speaker’s statement, and he must have no 
undefeated defeaters for believing that p (2008, p. 75). 
So, Lackey’s view is that we do not learn from the speaker’s beliefs but from 
her words. Therefore, there is no problem associated with the creationist teacher’s 
testimony. The teacher is a reliable and competent testifier; her personal disbelief 
in evolution is not relevant to the students’ beliefs formed on the basis of her 
testimony. Had they known about her creationist beliefs, they might have had a 
psychological defeater, but she does not give them an indication of her epistemic 
discomfort. To Audi’s objection (2006, p. 30) that the teacher suffers from a 
cognitive malfunction that clearly undermines her reliability, Lackey responds 
(correctly, in my view) that it is not necessarily the case that someone who sticks to 
a belief in the face of powerful evidence is cognitively malfunctioning; also any 
malfunctioning relates to the teacher’s belief rather than to her testimony. Her 
statements about evolution are grounded in evidence that she accepts on its own 
terms, but these are not the terms to which she personally subscribes. Audi also 
claims that the teacher has shown a willingness to deceive her students, so on 
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possible future occasions she might deceive them with information that is not only 
false but which she does not believe is supported by evidence. This makes her 
present testimony unstable. To this Lackey replies that if, as is plausible, the 
teacher’s commitment to testifying on the basis of available evidence is highly 
stable, particularly when teaching science, her testimonial practices would be 
sufficiently reliable for the pupils to have acquired knowledge from her.  
In fact, Lackey rejects the idea that the teacher is deceiving her pupils. It is 
difficult to agree with this assessment. She has taught her pupils to form beliefs 
responsibly, on the basis of available evidence, but she has implied that she accepts 
the evidence. This is certainly misleading. If the students get wind of her creationist 
beliefs and realize that the implication was false, they will possess relevant 
psychological defeaters and their (factive) learning will have been undermined, 
even if their ability to pass the exam is unimpaired. So it is not clear either that the 
Creationist Teacher case is successful against the transmission of belief view or 
that it convincingly supports the statement view. In Chapter 6 I will discuss the 
implicatures of speech acts and take a different approach from Lackey’s to the 
significance of the utterance or speech act (rather than the “statement”) itself. 
Lackey rejects objections to the statement view that purport to show that 
testimonial knowledge can be acquired through testimony that is unreliable, 
insensitive and unsafe (2008, pp. 79 – 93). She insists that the content of the 
speaker’s testimony must be epistemically responsible for at least some of the 
epistemic properties of the hearer’s belief. If this were not so, the hearer’s belief 
could be merely triggered by the speaker’s testimony, rather than being 
epistemically based on it. For example, if I glance at my shoes because you tell me 
that my shoelace is undone, my subsequent belief is not a testimonially based one, 
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even though it was triggered by your words. Only testimonially based knowledge is 
relevant to the statement view of testimony. The upshot of Lackey’s argument is 
that epistemic value can come only from the testimony itself and from the 
recipient’s vigilance in comprehension and uptake. If the testimonial statement is 
valueless, the student cannot have learned from it. 
One type of case that might undermine this position involves hearers who 
form high quality beliefs from unreliable testimony by virtue of an instinct for the 
truth. These are not inferential cases involving sensitivity to indications of one kind 
or another, nor examples of non-inferential “filtering”, but cases where the hearer 
has an extraordinary non-inferential sensitivity to truth. Lackey’s response to cases 
of this type is to dismiss them as non-testimonial. Although the hearer’s truth-
locating ability is non-inferential and not based on any kind of perceptual or 
memorial input, and it does require testimony to “trigger it” (Lackey’s phrase), it is 
not based on the content of the speaker’s unreliable statement, and therefore it is 
not a counterexample to the reliable statement view. Lackey clearly sees this type 
of case as being altogether different from the Creationist Teacher case, where she 
judges the teacher’s statement to be reliable. However, in both types of case, the 
hearer’s confidence in the belief he has formed could plausibly be said to come 
from something other than the testimony itself. In the Creationist Teacher case, the 
students’ confidence in the truth of what they are told might come from their trust 
in her or (as in Goldberg’s argument in §3.1) from their trust in the epistemic 
environment of the classroom. Furthermore, the knowledge the students acquire 
from the creationist teacher is surely as dependent on their trust in their own 
cognitive capacities as an intuitive believer’s knowledge would be. The crucial 
epistemic role of self-trust is one of the themes of Chapter 5. I argue there that all 
	 119	
judgments about whom and what to trust rest ultimately on reasonable trust in 
one’s own capacity for maintaining a coherent set of acceptances and preferences.  
Lackey’s statement view has no place for trust: trust is epistemologically 
irrelevant. If knowledge can be acquired from creationist teachers and consistent 
liars, why should trust matter? Whether the students trust the creationist teacher 
makes no difference as long as the testimony is reliable. There is no reason why 
knowledge gained through trust would be epistemically superior to knowledge 
gained from the testimony itself, from a reliable statement.  
Elizabeth Fricker, who endorses a version of the transmission view, rejects 
this dismissal of trust: 
 
When I take another’s word for it that P, I trust her in a way that 
makes my relation to her different from when I treat the fact of her 
apparent confident belief that P as one piece of evidence to be 
weighed with the rest. I take her utterance at face value, as nothing 
less than what it purports to be, an assurance that P, and an 
expression of knowledge. I treat my teller with respect in a way 
that I do not when I treat her expressed belief merely as defeasible 
evidence. One might say that I treat her as an end, not merely as a 
means. (2006b: p. 607)  
 
 
Lackey’s response to this is still to deny that these considerations have any 
epistemic import. Whether I take your word at face value or use your words as 
evidence, whether or not I show you respect by trusting you, matters not at all from 
an epistemological point of view. If the creationist teacher and an evolutionist 
teacher offer statements that are equally reliable, what relevance could there be in 
the fact that one is based on trust and the other is not? “Why does trust in this sense 
carve out a domain that is of any epistemological interest?” (2008: pp. 100 - 101). 
In any case, Lackey continues, why should the creationist teacher’s students not 
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trust her testimony? What she has told them is worthy of being trusted. Her 
doxastic state is irrelevant. In fact, Lackey is perfectly happy to adopt the 
description “knowledge gained through trust in testimony” for her reliable 
statement thesis. A statement’s reliability makes it trustworthy. 
I think what is wrong with Lackey’s response to Elizabeth Fricker is that she 
thinks the alternative view to her own has to relate to the hearer’s trust in the 
speaker’s beliefs. But trusting others for the truth need not equate to trusting their 
beliefs. There is a third alternative, one that makes much better sense of Fricker’s 
point about treating the speaker with respect, as an end and not just as a means. It is 
that the person herself is trusted – trusted, for example, not just to believe reliably 
but also to intend what she says or implicates.  
Although one interpretation of Lackey’s claim that the hearer’s knowledge 
must be based on the speaker’s statement is that it must derive in part from his 
comprehension of her words, this would be a misleading way of expressing an 
important point, for it is not just the speaker’s words that the hearer comprehends 
but her communicative intentions, including the implicatures of the utterance in 
context. The kind of trust required for comprehension already involves an 
interdependence between speaker and hearer that Lackey, in her insistence that the 
creationist teacher’s words are “trustworthy’, does not recognize. The 
interdependence arises from the fact that both parties to the communicative 
exchange trust the other for something. The speaker trusts the hearer to 
comprehend her communicative intentions and the hearer trusts the speaker to have 
the communicative intentions that she implicates herself to have. These points will 
be developed in Chapter 6 when I bring pragmatics and dialogism to bear on the 
question and argue for a variety of testimonial speech acts. 
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Lackey has not made her case for learning from the words, as opposed to the 
beliefs, of the testifier. In part this is because she is too lenient in what she regards 
as reliable testimony; and in part it is because her employment of the term 
“statement” does not allow her to distinguish between speech acts and utterances 
with different commitments and implicatures. She tolerates consistent liars, would-
be liars and non-believers, not because she thinks warranted belief can be 
transmitted from prior speakers but because she does not think their testimony is 
relevantly unreliable. She underestimates the role of personal responsibility and 
consistency in the employment and comprehension of testimonial speech acts. 
 
§3.5 Justification, Warrant, Entitlement 
 
Before proceeding in the next chapter to an examination of a particular version of 
non-reductionism, John McDowell’s, I want to clarify the various ways of referring 
to an acceptable epistemic status. Some writers distinguish the terms “epistemic 
warrant” and “epistemic justification” as follows: when the considerations 
concerning the epistemic status of a belief are externalist ones, lying outside of the 
believer’s judgement, the belief is said to be “warranted”, and where the 
considerations are internalist ones, involving the believer’s own reasons, the belief 
is said to be “justified”. So if the members of a jury believe an expert witness 
because they judge her to be knowledgeable and trustworthy, their belief is justified 
(or not) by internalist considerations. But the beliefs they acquire from her 
testimony might also be considered (on a third-person view) to be warranted by the 
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witness’s track record and reliability, about which the jury members could be 
ignorant.16  
This distinction between justification and warrant is a useful one in that it 
reinforces the idea that what makes the acceptance or uptake of an asserted 
proposition rational or justifiable for the subject is not necessarily the same as what 
would make it warranted from the point of view of a third-party assessment of the 
relevant considerations. I want to develop the topic of the hearer’s belief formation 
and make further distinctions between types of justification and rationality. This 
will help me to make my case concerning the respective responsibilities and 
commitments of speakers and hearers, and, ultimately, my case concerning the 
responsibilities of teachers for ensuring epistemic justice in the classroom. 
Even when we are considering only the hearer’s side of the exchange, there is 
a distinction to be made between what he could cite to justify his testimonially-
acquired belief and what could be cited on his behalf by a philosophical advocate, 
as either generic or specific considerations. The reasons the hearer could advance 
himself might include reasons for trusting the particular speaker, or speakers of that 
kind, on topics of that kind. They might include results of his monitoring of the 
speaker’s verbal delivery or body language; and they might include inferences that 																																																								
16 An indication of the significance of the distinction can be glimpsed from the example 
of the “cognitively immature” young children discussed in §3.1. If the children do not 
have the capacity to make good judgements about the reliability and trustworthiness of 
their informants, the beliefs acquired could be deemed (internalistically) unjustified; 
however, the safety and reliability of their epistemic environments, their classroom, for 
example, are such that they are not exposed to unreliable or dishonest informants, so the 
beliefs they acquire from their informants are (externalistically) warranted, and (if they 
are true) may count as knowledge. If the externalistic warrant is sufficient for knowledge 
then young children can learn (in the factive sense) from teachers whose reliability and 
trustworthiness they are currently incapable of judging responsibly and reliably. This is 
Goldberg’s argument (2013, 2010). Lackey, of course, would reject it on the ground that 
testimonial knowledge is dualistic: the hearer must play his part. Quinton thinks a general 
entitlement to believe will hold the children in good epistemic stead until they have 
developed the cognitive capacities to make autonomous inductive inferences. 	
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draw on his own background beliefs or “common knowledge” beliefs of various 
kinds. I propose to restrict the term “justification” to assessments of first-person 
judgement.  
First person judgements that are justified are also “rational” or “reasonable” 
if they do not permanently disrupt the subject’s epistemic equilibrium. It is 
perfectly reasonable for someone to hold a belief that is justified when a wider 
(third-person) perspective on it might judge it to be unwarranted. But a belief 
cannot be held reasonably if the believer is aware of a conflict with other beliefs 
that he is not prepared to relinquish. A belief that is epistemically irresponsible 
cannot be reasonable. So epistemic justification, reasonableness and responsibility 
go hand-in-hand. Furthermore, first-person justification is a matter of degree in that 
more and better reasons provide stronger justification; and reasons need not be 
limited to the kind of empirical evidence that features in inductive inference. I 
contend that a positive reason for accepting a belief can be derived from the 
testimonial speech act itself. 
In many ordinary circumstances we would struggle to say why we accepted 
someone’s testimony. Perhaps we do not need to justify our belief because what 
made it a testimony that p in the first place was that it successfully connected with 
truth. (We will meet an argument of this kind, from John McDowell, in the next 
chapter.) Either we need a good argument for making a distinction between beliefs 
formed on the basis of testimony and some (or all) other types of belief or we have 
to accept that we are as entitled to believe on the basis of testimony as we are on 
the basis of perception. We can use the term “entitlement” to refer to the kind of 
justification beliefs enjoy as a result of the principles that apply to their source in 
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the cognitive faculties of the believer – whether in introspection, deductive 
reasoning, inductive reasoning, memory, perception or the uptake of testimony.  
This leaves the term “warrant” to apply to the overall epistemic status of the 
belief, which in the case of testimony could include not only the hearer’s end of the 
process but any epistemically relevant features of the speaker’s belief-formation 
and speech act, and also other external factors that could support or undermine the 
testimonial belief, such as the  “informational environment”. Third-person 
assessment of whether a belief is warranted or not must take into account specific 
and local factors such as might produce a true belief that is only luckily or 
accidentally true. These might influence a belief’s overall warrant, but they will not 
necessarily have any influence on the reasonableness, rationality or first person 
justification of the hearer’s uptake of the belief.  
According to the hybrid or dualistic view, we are generally entitled to believe 
something on the basis of a particular source of belief, such as perception, memory 
or testimony, but in particular cases our belief can be unwarranted due to general 
flaws in the belief forming process or to local or particular features of the case; and 
yet we could still be justified and reasonable to some degree in forming the belief. I 
think this coheres with our ordinary ways of thinking about learning from others. 
When we make a mistake and accept as true something that turns out to be false, 
we sometimes plead that we “were not to know”, but we sometimes hold ourselves 
to have been culpable in not taking sufficient account of features of the case that 
should have weighed more heavily with us. Importantly for our understanding of 
intellectual autonomy, this retrospective reasoning and epistemic “housekeeping” is 
something we can get better at by becoming more aware of the relevant features.  
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Deductive and inductive reasoning skills are important aspects of intellectual 
autonomy. For Quinton it is important that students move beyond reliance on a 
general entitlement to believe on the basis of testimony towards greater 
independence. The non-reductionist position is that we are prima facie entitled to 
accept as true any beliefs formed responsibly on the basis of testimony. This means 
we do not need first person reasons for believing. But prima facie entitlement is 
defeasible entitlement, and defeat can come both from reasons available to the 
subject and from factors that are unavailable. Education, acculturation and 
cognitive development make some previously unavailable factors available, and 
then some forms of ignorance and poor reasoning become culpable and 
justification is undermined. There comes a point at which “doxastic equilibrium” 
cannot be used as an excuse for ignorance, gullibility and false belief. 
Strong non-reductionists appear to be offering scant help to the subject who 
has to distinguish sincere from insincere, competent from incompetent, testimony. 
An account is required from non-reductionists concerning the relationship between 
entitlement and reliability, for it seems reasonable to expect epistemic principles to 
deliver beliefs that are reliably connected to truth, to expect a high proportion of 
good quality beliefs to be true. What could motivate an interest in forming beliefs 
conscientiously if they were unreliably connected to truth? So truth-reliability is a 
criterion that we can expect to feature at some point in any account of epistemic 
quality, in testimonial as in other kinds of belief.  
Non-reductionists argue for a conceptual connection between a true state of 
affairs and a reliably formed belief, via the speaker’s act of testifying and the 
hearer’s comprehension. The upshot of such an argument is that, ceteris paribus, if 
a hearer has successfully comprehended the speaker’s informative utterance he has 
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a prima facie but defeasible reason to believe it to be true. A moderate non-
reductionist might claim that there is a generic entitlement to believe, based on 
conceptual connections between truth, testimony and comprehension, but concede 
that it is vulnerable to weakness (unreliability) at any point in the relevant 
processes, not just to psychological and normative defeaters at the hearer’s end. 
What, for her, count as the relevant processes will depend on arguments 
independent of her non-reductionist ones. This makes the milder non-reductionist 
effectively a dualist or hybridist. For her, entitlement is necessary but not sufficient 
for warranted belief. 
A strong reductionist, on the other hand, will not accept the distinction 
between entitlement and justification because for her there is no such thing as 
default or general entitlement to believe a speaker, there is only justification on the 
basis of inferences that draw on other beliefs, beliefs that were formed non-
testimonially. A reductionist can be either a foundationalist or a coherentist about 
what experiences can or cannot justify beliefs, but she will not accept that there is 
any relevant conceptual link between truth and intelligible assertion or 
comprehension, such that intelligibility or comprehension justifies or entitles one to 
believe the proposition attested. She might accept that there is a contingent link, 
and that there are etiological, evolutionary or genealogical explanations for such a 
link, based on accounts of how the reliance on honest and reliable sharing of 
information arose in human societies, such as the genealogical accounts provided 
by Edward Craig (1990) and Bernard Williams (2002), but she cannot accept that 
these links confer any kind of epistemic quality on testimony-based beliefs.   
Although the reductionist will not accept the entitlement/justification 
distinction, she might accept the justification/warrant distinction. In some cases 
	 127	
there is no support available from perceptions, background beliefs, evidence 
concerning the trustworthiness or expertise of the speaker, or from any other 
source. The reductionist then has to choose between being an epistemic Scrooge 
about the scope of testimonially-based justified beliefs and looking for a global 
justification of testimonial beliefs, for an argument that shows not that there is a 
general a priori entitlement to believe testimony but that our reliance on testimony 
is globally warranted by the evidence of its reliability in producing true beliefs. The 
crucial difference between this and entitlement is that there can be only a 
contingent connection between truth and testimony, a de facto reliability that is 
vulnerable to changes in social practices and which in any case needs to be 
localized, or relativized, to particular communities or disciplines, to the standards 
of reliability that each group finds acceptable and to the proportion of competent to 
incompetent assertions present in each group. Whether or not we agree that 
knowledge based on a global inference of this kind yields distinctively testimonial, 
rather than inductive, knowledge, we can all agree that such considerations are 
relevant to both what counts as critical thinking and intellectual autonomy in 
particular communities, and to their development in young people. 
This emphasis on de facto reliability relativized to particular social groups 
and practices, if extended to all sources of belief, lends itself to a form of epistemic 
pragmatism, whereby high quality beliefs are those that aim to fit local standards. 
In some versions, truth itself, along with knowledge, reality and objectivity, are 
ultimately to be defined by community norms.17 But if the non-reductionist’s claim 
is the prima facie, pro tanto entitlement claim that recognizes that it sometimes 
																																																								
17 Michael Welbourne  (1993) and Martin Kusch (2002) are two exponents of this 
“communitarian” version of a socialized epistemology.  
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requires support from other sources to raise entitlement to warrant, she can also 
entertain such de facto considerations as the reliability of particular sources and 
groups as testifiers. 
As Thomas Reid recognized, the epistemology of testimony is always social 
epistemology, for giving and accepting information from other people involves 
practices and norms that are socially acquired. According Robin Dunbar (1996), it 
is central to social bonding. It facilitates the formation of larger social groups by 
allowing us to exchange information about social matters. Burling agrees: “Thanks 
to the eagerness of people to display their knowledge, we are able to learn 
important things from conversation and it is people that we learn most about” 
(Burling 2005, p. 196). What we learn from testimony is not just the factual content 
itself. It is a source of learning about our informants and our community and it 
binds us to others in a network of reciprocal reliance. The best way to describe this 
social relationship is in terms of trust and one way to differentiate reductionism and 
non-reductionism is in terms of whom, what and how the hearer trusts, and of the 
type of trustworthiness expected of the hearer and the speaker.  
In Chapter 5 I argue against the idea that the only rational form of trust is a 
reliance that is supported by inference, but I turn now to John McDowell’s 
particularly powerful version of non-reductionism, which presents testimony as 
paralleling perception and memory as an unmediated source of knowledge. If 
McDowell’s argument fails any argument for non-reductionism is likely to fail, so 
this is an important step in the movement toward an alternative kind of theory.  
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Chapter 4: McDowell on Knowledge from Testimony 
 
In this chapter I present a version of the non-reductionist claim that there is a 
general entitlement to believe testimony due to an a priori conceptual link between 
truth, testimonial speech acts and the hearer’s cognitive achievement of 
comprehension. In Chapter 2 we met Reid’s early version of non-reductionism. 
More recently Donald Davidson and Tyler Burge have advanced sophisticated 
versions, and philosophers such as Michael Dummett (1993) and Peter Strawson 
(1994) have also contributed arguments in support of non-reductionism and general 
entitlement. Coady (1992) developed a version related to Davidson’s 
interpretationism. My focus is the argument developed by John McDowell in his 
1993 essay “Knowledge from Hearsay” (reprinted in McDowell, 1998), and I will 
also discuss David Bakhurst’s (2013) application of McDowell’s account to 
education. I will consider two counterarguments to McDowell’s account. The 
chapter generates further reasons for examining more closely (in subsequent 
chapters) the kind of interpersonal trust involved in the range of speech acts 
associated with testimony - an examination that will lead to my conclusions 
concerning responsible pedagogy and the teacher’s role in ensuring epistemic 
justice in the classroom.   
 
§4.1 McDowell’s Non-Reductionism 
 
McDowell takes from Wilfred Sellars the idea that knowledge is a particular 
“standing in the space of reasons”. This is the space constituted by concepts, the 
realm not only of understanding and justification but of sense experience itself. 
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Whatever we see or hear cannot be an immediate “given” as it is already 
conceptually mediated; otherwise it could not be an item in our experience. 
Whereas most writers on testimony are interested in the topic for the sake of 
justifying our reliance on the word of others, McDowell is motivated by the 
opportunity to undermine a general misconception about epistemic justification, 
namely that “if a satisfactory standing in the space of reasons with regard to a 
proposition is mediated rather than immediate, its standing is constituted by the 
cogency of an argument which is at the subject’s disposal” (1998, p. 415). 
McDowell describes this as a “disastrous” view, not least because it implies that 
there might be immediate standings, since either the justificatory arguments must 
start somewhere with a reason that is immediately “given” or we must embrace 
coherentism, the view (as McDowell conceives it) that only other beliefs can justify 
beliefs. We can take his position to be opposed to reductionism’s view that 
testimonial beliefs are justified by inferential arguments and as an argument in 
support of a general entitlement to believe testimony. 
The epistemic standing of a belief (or “fact”, as McDowell puts it) acquired 
through hearing and comprehending someone’s utterance is a mediated one in the 
sense that we have to have heard and understood the remark. We might assume, 
therefore, that an inferential argument could raise the belief’s epistemic standing to 
one of justification. But this would be a false assumption. When a tourist asks a 
stranger the way to the cathedral there is no argument available to him that could 
be compelling enough to produce a conclusion that amounts to knowledge. 
Premises concerning the informant’s trustworthiness and competence would be 
needed, but they are not available to the tourist. The informant could be lying, 
bluffing, in error. Any body language or vocal signs that the tourist might be able 
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to monitor are not sufficient to support the argument. Even in the most favourable 
case, where evidence about the speaker’s sincerity and competence is available, it 
is still possible that she is speaking in some way untypically.  
Any argument would need to be conclusive, McDowell says, or the 
conclusion could not amount to knowledge. As long as there is a possibility of one 
or more premises being false, the hearer could not claim to know. Knowledge is not 
“some region at the high end of a scale of probabilification by considerations at the 
knower’s disposal” (1998, p. 422). If there was just a 1:100 chance of a roulette 
ball landing on white rather than red, still we could not claim to know that it will 
land on red.  
If we reject the idea of knowledge being mediated by arguments based on 
sound premises, what other option, other than scepticism about mediated 
knowledge, is available? McDowell turns to retained beliefs to find a parallel. I 
believe that at this moment David Cameron is the Prime Minister, but there is the 
possibility that my belief has become false since I last checked the news this 
morning. My belief is sustained by such considerations as an expectation that I 
would have heard, somehow, if Cameron had resigned or been killed. My intuitions 
tell me that this is epistemically acceptable but that if I left too long a period 
between confirmations of this belief – say, by not checking any news for several 
weeks and switching off all forms of communication – I would be guilty of 
doxastic irresponsibility in retaining my belief. So retained beliefs carry a risk, 
even when they are rationally acceptable. The alternative to this position would be 
that our entitlement to belief lapses between confirmations, and therefore that we 
have much less knowledge than we think we have. However conscientious we are 
regarding our retained beliefs there is the constant possibility of their falsification.  
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We cannot apply precisely the same set of considerations to all kinds of 
belief. For example, beliefs about situations that are known to change rapidly 
demand more frequent confirmations and accommodations. If a politician is known 
to be dangerously ill, it would be irrational or unreasonable to claim to know 
several hours after we were last in a position to hear otherwise that she is still alive. 
The possibility of falsity is just too great.  
McDowell’s point in raising retained knowledge as a parallel to testimonial 
knowledge is to demonstrate that no argument for what one has between 
confirmations could be sufficient to serve the purposes of the standard view of 
mediated justification, for no argument could be cogent enough. As with the 
roulette case, although very unlikely, the falsity of the claim remains a possibility. 
But if we are prepared simply to insist that one’s continuing knowledge is itself the 
relevant standing in the space of reasons, the difficulties disappear. An 
epistemically satisfactory position persists between injections of nourishment. Our 
reason for still believing that David Cameron is PM is that we remember he is, and 
remembering, like perception, is an excellent reason for taking it that things are that 
way. It does not need to be supplemented by an argument that at best could yield 
only probability. When we claim to know that Cameron is PM, we are not claiming 
that he is probably PM. Nevertheless, inferential arguments can become relevant: 
we have to be sensitive to the requirements of doxastic responsibility and doubts 
could lead us to deploy evidence to support or discard a belief. Rationality involves 
sensitivity to relevant considerations. The rational force of surrounding 
considerations mediates epistemic satisfactoriness, and someone could not lay 
claim to the standing who was not responsive to reasons, but that is not the same as 
constructing an argument out of them. The reasons that an inductive argument 
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might employ are there, in the background. Our entitlement to knowledge is not 
constructed out of them, but it could be undermined by our insensitivity to them. 
What rational sensitivity enables is the factiveness of beliefs in the space of 
reasons. Language initiates us into this and puts us in possession of the world, 
allowing us to take that-clauses seriously. The factiveness comes not from 
arguments but from doxastic responsibility with regard to how one takes the world 
to be. If I have been told that Cameron is no longer the PM, then I am entitled as a 
rationally responsible person to believe it, indeed to claim to know it, given that my 
surrounding beliefs prevent me from being blindly credulous, though they cannot 
prevent me from sometimes being wrong. Just as one can capture a knower’s 
justification for believing as he does by saying that he sees (or remembers) that 
things are thus and so, so one can capture his knowledge-constituting standing in 
the space of reasons by saying he has heard from someone that things are thus and 
so. 
For McDowell, acquiring knowledge by testimony is “not a mindless 
reception that has nothing to do with rationality” (p. 434). It yields a standing in the 
space of reasons. Doxastic responsibility includes being aware of how knowledge 
can be had from others and of considerations that could undermine it. The hearer’s 
belief formation must be shaped by an appreciation of the risks involved in 
accepting what people say. But positive reasons are not required in order to believe 
that an apparent informant is speaking his mind and is well informed. Here as 
elsewhere it is not doxastically irresponsible to run known risks in taking things to 
be thus and so.  
So the tourist can learn where the cathedral is. If a knowledgeable informant 
gives intelligible expression to her knowledge, she puts it in the public domain 
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where it can be picked up by those who can understand her utterance, as long as the 
opportunity is not closed to them because it would be doxastically irresponsible to 
believe the speaker. If we have been told that Cameron is no longer the PM we are 
entitled as rationally responsible knowers to believe it, indeed to claim to know it, 
given that our surrounding beliefs (including those concerning the credibility of 
particular sources of information) prevent us being blindly credulous and make us 
vigilant in avoiding risks. It is our initiation into a culture (bildung) that makes us 
rational and it is the conscientiousness with which we maintain and monitor our 
rationality that provides the context for our learning on particular occasions.  
McDowell’s account of testimony is richly suggestive. It does not restrict the 
subject’s moves and positions in the space of reasons in the way that Lackey’s 
dualism does. Dualism holds that attributable informational states, and what could 
be inferred from their contents, is part of what constitutes a subject’s epistemic 
standing but does not suffice for knowledge: we need to appeal also to facts in the 
world outside the subject’s moves and positions in the space of reasons in order to 
finish the job of constituting his epistemic standing. For McDowell, the subject’s 
standing is constituted simply by his having heard from his informant that things 
are thus and so, therefore there is no constitutive work to be done by external 
conditions. It is already a standing in the space of reasons in its own right, not a 
position that one can only be in when things are indeed thus and so.  
Dualism’s externalist condition is motivated by the idea that no policy or 
method of having one’s belief formation determined by reasons available to one is 
free from the risk of falsity. Whether what one has is knowledge can be a matter of 
luck, outside the control of reason. First-person justification cannot yield 
knowledge, but we can claim some epistemic credit for it. However, McDowell 
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points out, this view seems to leave us in doubt as to whether we have knowledge 
even in favourable cases. It means that two believers on a par with respect to their 
exercise of reason might differ in whether they know because of factors outside of 
their control. Two children, for example, hearing the same information from 
different teachers in different schools, could enjoy different epistemic standings 
through no fault of their own. Such considerations could lead us to embrace 
outright externalism and abandon the interest that dualists retain in the subject’s 
epistemic or doxastic responsibility. 
McDowell concedes the role of epistemic luck but locates it at an earlier 
stage. We do not have full control even in the space of reasons; we are already at 
risk from an unkind world. Positions such as seeing that… and hearing from 
someone that… are standings in the space of reasons in their own right, even 
though there is an irreducible element of luck in whether one occupies them. Rather 
than think we have to choose between scepticism and dualism, we should just 
admit that epistemic luck lurks even in the space of reasons. 
McDowell’s direct realism reflects Thomas Reid’s ideas to some extent. Here 
is what Reid writes (in 1764) about justifying belief by an argument: 
 
It is evident in the matter of testimony, the balance of human 
judgement is by nature inclined to the side of belief; and turns to 
that side of itself, when there is nothing put into the opposite scale. 
If it were not so, no proposition that is uttered in discourse would 
be believed, until it was examined and tried by reason; and most 
men would be unable to find reasons for believing the thousandth 
part of what is told them. (Reid, 1983, p. 197) 
 
As long as relevant reasons are restricted to those available to the believer, there 
will be no way for an argument to be constructed that yields anything like a 
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compelling case for believing. The restriction leaves only the choice between 
general entitlement and first-person justification by individual inductive argument. 
It excludes justification, or warrant, by third person assessment, such as a 
externalist/reliabilist or hybridist might find acceptable. 
McDowell’s argument is aimed at ruling out an epistemological position that 
allows a belief to be justified and yet false, and which therefore requires a further 
truth conducive condition. McDowell’s reason for adopting this stance is that 
fallible inductive arguments allow the possibility that some factor not cognitively 
accessible to the believer can make the difference between knowledge and 
ignorance. But anyone who is in the epistemic position of “hearing from someone 
that things are thus and so” is not susceptible to this possibility. If you hear that 
things are that way then you learn (in the factive sense) that things are that way. It 
is rational to claim knowledge in these circumstances because just as a perception 
that things are thus and so is inconsistent with things not being that way, so hearing 
that things are thus and so is inconsistent with them not being that way. Seeing that 
p and hearing that p are both experiences that enable “the layout of reality itself to 
exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks” (McDowell, 1994, p 26).  
What we acquire from testimony is not a belief but knowledge, except when 
we have been misled; but when we have been misled we have not seen that p (in 
the case of perception) or heard that p (in the case of testimony): we have only seen 
an appearance that p or heard the speaker say that p. The fact that we can 
sometimes be misled has to be taken account of by doxastically responsible 
subjects and should lead us to exercise vigilance so far as we can; however, it is in 
the nature of experience that it sometimes plays us false through no fault of our 
own. Knowing this is part of what is involved in claiming to know as a result of 
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such experiences as perception and comprehending testimony. A belief is not 
something that has to be justified by an inductive argument in order to attain the 
status of knowledge; rather, a claim to knowledge is something that can be 
undermined by reasons and argument. One is entitled to claim knowledge but a 
challenge to such a claim must be justified. It is only in this way that knowledge is 
a standing that is “mediated” by reasons. 
Still a suspicion remains that McDowell’s account, like Reid’s and other non-
reductionist accounts, leaves the testimonial audience too exposed to error and to 
the charge of credulousness. Has he taken the problem of non-cooperation in 
communication seriously enough? If one cannot tell a case of “hearing that…” 
from one of  “hearing someone say that…” it can only be a matter of luck that one 
acquires knowledge, and if that is so, are not all cases, even favourable ones, 
undermined? McDowell denies this, of course. As David Bakhurst writes, citing 
Sebastian Rödl (2007):   
 
It can be true that when I am mistaken, I do not know that I am. But 
it does not follow that when I am not mistaken, I do not know that I 
am not. As Rödl would put it, knowledge is a self-conscious act; so 
if you know, you know that you know, even though it is sometimes 
true that you think you know when you don’t. (Bakhurst, 2013, p. 
194; Rödl, 2007, p. 158)  
 
Bakhurst also cites Rödl’s comparison of a knower with a juggler.  We do not have 
to deny someone the capacity of knowledge on the ground that they are fallible in 
their knowledge, anymore than we have to deny a juggler the capacity to juggle ten 
balls at once, even though she occasionally drops one. “Possession of the capacity 
is compatible with the possibility of occasional error. Indeed, that’s just what it 
means to say the capacity is fallible” (Bakhurst, 2013, p. 193). Given that defective 
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exercises of a capacity can usually be discriminated from non-defective ones, 
arguments from illusion or deception are unpersuasive. 
But there remains a strong case for demanding something more – especially 
if, as educators, we are concerned above all with young people’s judgements 
concerning what, when and whom to believe. McDowell might argue, as we have 
heard Quinton and Goldberg argue, that we must teach children to be vigilant and 
doxastically responsible, but are we not entitled to demand more from a theory of 
testimony, such as the additional requirements a) that the hearer should have 
positive reasons for belief and/or b) that the whole process of transmission of belief 
and warrant should be truth-reliable? McDowell’s own requirement that the 
speaker should know that to which she is attesting has already introduced a factor 
outside the cognitive control of the hearer. But if we re-enter these hybrid regions 
of positive reasons and reliabilism, we are moving away from McDowell’s non-
reductionism, and we are not yet ready to do that.   
 
§4.2 David Bakhurst and Education 
 
David Bakhurst’s 2013 paper on McDowell’s “Knowledge from Hearsay” was 
published in the same special issue of the Journal of the Philosophy of Education 
as Goldberg’s paper discussed in §3.1, and Bakhurst is keen to relate McDowell’s 
account of testimony to educational matters. He sees it as making several points 
that have special relevance for philosophers of education. The first is that it 
provides an account of fallibility that is more satisfying than the one that generally 
features in philosophy of education. McDowell “sees fallibility as a characteristic 
of people and their powers of knowledge, rather than of knowledge itself” 
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(Bakhurst, 2013, p. 200). Bakhurst cites Harvey Siegel as someone who holds the 
latter view and quotes him as writing that “all knowledge is fallible” (Siegel, 2003, 
p. 308; cited in Bakhurst, 2013, p. 192). This, Bakhurst suggests, is tantamount to 
someone who claims knowledge adding the rider that for all she knows she may be 
wrong. In acknowledging that it is our capacities that are fallible, we draw attention 
to the importance of the development of capacities such as speech comprehension 
and epistemic vigilance. This acknowledgement of the importance of development 
is significant as a satisfactory account of testimony must recognize that children get 
better at making linguistic and epistemic judgments and that this is incorporated 
into our understanding of what it means to learn rationally.  
The second point from McDowell’s account of testimony that Bakhurst 
thinks is of special relevance to the philosophy of education concerns the worry of 
many educationalists that the “transmission” of knowledge by teachers is a passive 
form of learning. Bakhurst points out that for McDowell “acquiring knowledge by 
testimony is not a mindless reception of something that has nothing to do with 
rationality” (McDowell, p. 434). The learner needs concepts, needs to understand. 
This is a key theme of my own argument (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
The third point of relevance to philosophy of education concerns the possible 
conflict between epistemic dependence on others and epistemic autonomy. There is 
no conflict, however, Bakhurst thinks, because McDowell is clear that “active 
empirical thinking takes place under a standing obligation to reflect about the 
credentials of the putatively rational linkages that govern it” (McDowell, 1994, p. 
12; cited by Bakhurst, 2013, p. 195). Attempting to achieve complete epistemic 
independence is impossible, for we will always need to rely on sources of 
information of one kind or another (such as textbooks). Bakhurst provides two 
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reasons why there is no conflict. Firstly, we are always responsible for meeting any 
challenge to our beliefs, no matter how we acquired them. Secondly, we must all 
settle for ourselves the question of what to believe. Each belief one accepts 
becomes a component of a conception of the world, “allegiance to which is partly 
constitutive of one’s identity” (p. 196). We are responsible for keeping our own 
epistemic house in order and there is no reason why we cannot draw on other 
people’s knowledge in doing so. Furthermore, even when I defer to others, I am 
still settling for myself what to think. In fact, “believing someone who knows is a 
perfectly good way to decide what to think….if she can tell me how things are, 
then believing her is a good source of knowledge” (Bakhurst, 2013, p. 196). With 
reference to the metaphor of Neurath’s boat, Bakhurst says: “We should remind 
ourselves that none of us built our boats from scratch. Indeed, we found ourselves 
afloat. And while each of us is responsible for keeping our boat from sinking, we 
may rely on others to furnish us materials and to show us what to do with them” 
(2013, p. 197). Although there are limits to our control of our epistemic fate, there 
is still enough room for us to operate as epistemically autonomous beings, and we 
would have much less autonomy if we lacked the means provided for us by others. 
This is a strong argument for a modified account of autonomy. It recognizes, 
for example, that (as Quinton pointed out) we reason with “materials” we have 
acquired from others. However, I think we need to be careful not to view autonomy 
just from the point of view of intellectual or epistemic autonomy. Bakhurst makes a 
point about how beliefs help to constitute identity and how they need to be part of a 
well-kept, coherent system. This is true, but that system is only a truly coherent one 
if other attitudes about which we deliberate are incorporated: preferences, emotions 
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and desires, for example. I discuss this in detail in the next chapter, in relation to 
Lehrer’s theory of self-trust (§5.6). 
Bakhurst also has some interesting points to make in relation to trust theories 
of testimony, and these points lead him to make a distinction between the kind of 
telling (teaching) that teachers employ in the classroom and genuine testimony. His 
conclusion is that the epistemology of testimony may have less to offer philosophy 
of education than we might have hoped. He draws attention to the distinction 
between believing what someone has said or written and believing the person 
herself. She may have “given her word” or asked the hearer to “trust her for the 
truth” (Anscombe, 1979) rather than simply to have asserted a proposition. This is 
a difference that motivates the trust-based accounts of testimony that we will meet 
in the next chapter, but it is not a distinction that Bakhurst thinks is relevant to the 
justification of testimonial beliefs. His view is that trust of some kind is central to 
the interpersonal relations that mediate communication and the ethics of 
conversation, but that is not epistemic trust. He rejects Anscombe’s view that 
students accept the knowledge they are offered by the teacher because they trust 
her for the truth. The teacher does not speak in her own voice but, as it were, in the 
voice of the subject she is teaching, she “speaks for the subject matter itself” (p. 
198). She is initiating students into the “conversation” of the subject, which is part 
of the “conversation of mankind” (Oakeshott, 2001). The students “look through 
her” to the shared subject of their inquiries; she is a facilitator or conduit.  
On the face of it, this seems too strong a claim. Surely students are expected 
to believe what their teacher tells them? But Bakhurst supports the claim with three 
reasons. Firstly, whereas in testimonial cases the recipient can support his claim to 
knowledge from testimony by citing the speaker’s authority, a student is not 
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expected to cite the teacher as the source of his belief (for example, in an exam). 
Secondly, students are not tested on what they have been told; they are tested on 
their knowledge of the subject matter. Thirdly, Lackey’s creationist teacher is 
redeployed: a teacher can teach the subject matter successfully even if she does not 
personally believe it. If the students knew her true beliefs, they could still rely on 
her for the truth, without trusting her for the truth – that is, she can be reliable 
without being trustworthy in the relevant sense. Bakhurst’s point is that teaching is 
more than telling and learning is more than believing; teaching also includes 
modeling styles of thinking, presenting evidence and arguments. This is what the 
creationist teacher does conscientiously. If a student initially acquires a belief by 
accepting it on the teacher’s authority, it can in some circumstances be the end of 
the matter, but, Bakhurst thinks, it cannot be the end of the matter in an educational 
context. In this sense, Bakhurst admits (p. 199), Siegel might be right to argue that 
we are not truly dependent on testimony in that we can critically evaluate reasons 
and arguments that support the beliefs we have initially acquired testimonially. 
Nevertheless, Bakhurst does not think this yields complete intellectual autonomy 
because (as Quinton pointed out in 1972) we are dependent on the general 
conceptions of our epistemic community that we “pick up”, often without being 
told them explicitly. Young children especially are dependent on the authority of 
their teachers in initiating them into ways of thinking and reasoning, and this 
imposes certain constraints on the notion of epistemic autonomy: 
 
Such initiation aims to equip students so that they are able, in the 
course of time, to subject any part of their world-view to critical 
reflection, but all we can reasonably ask is that they be ready 
critically to reflect on beliefs that have been thrown into 
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reasonable doubt, not that they actually aspire to some kind of 
epistemic independence. (Bakhurst, 2013, p. 199) 
 
I think Bakhurst is right to draw attention to these constraints on the notion of 
autonomy, but, as I have mentioned and will develop in the next chapter, autonomy 
has to be seen as an integration of various considerations, not confined to epistemic 
or intellectual considerations. What matters in the end is that we make wise 
judgments that are optimal in the circumstances. This is why we have to take 
account of the nature of speech acts and discourses, of factors other than truth and 
knowledge, of relationships, purposes and preferences. Bakhurst is clearly aware of 
this insofar as he recognizes that the circumstances surrounding teaching affect the 
nature of the discourse and of the relationship between participants, but his 
description does not take appropriate account of the variety of kinds of testimony in 
classrooms and therefore of the subtlety of the epistemic and linguistic judgements 
that children make as they learn -  and that they can learn to make better. 
What Bakhurst claims is that students do not learn, in the relevant sense, 
from being told things by their teacher, or if they do, that can only be the start of 
the process, for the learning is subsequently reinforced by reasons and critical 
assessment. He implies that this contrasts with simply accepting a belief on the 
basis of someone’s testimony. But does it? 
I do not think it does, for two reasons. Firstly, we can always expect that 
what we have learned via testimony will be reinforced or corroborated 
subsequently, even if that amounts only to not hearing otherwise or to a potential 
defeater not coming to light. If something more substantial emerges which 
reinforces the original testimonial belief, so that it can no longer be counted as a 
testimonial belief, that in no way either invalidates or re-characterizes the original 
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belief. In any case, many of the subsequent reasons and corroborations that a 
teacher offers, or that a student locates, will themselves have a testimonial 
character. For example, if the student finds confirmation of what the teacher has 
told him in a textbook, he is still in a position of reliance or trust, or if the student 
challenges the teacher for evidence and she gives him some supporting 
information, that is still a piece of testimony. Not all reinforcement will be like this, 
but some will be, especially as testimonial exchanges in education include those 
between students who collaborate and swap information. McDowell emphasizes 
that accepting information on the basis of another’s testimony does not free us from 
the responsibility of keeping our epistemic house in order, and that surely includes 
not just doxastic responsibility in being alert to potential defeaters but also looking 
for confirmation when it is optimally responsible to do so. To recognize that one 
should confirm a belief does not necessarily imply that one acknowledges that what 
one has is somehow less than knowledge; only that one is in a circumstance where 
something additional is required for optimal autonomy. 
My second response to Bakhurst’s doubts about the relevance of testimony to 
teaching, and about the role of trust in testimony, concerns the variety of kinds of 
telling in the classroom. Bakhurst adopts the following definition of testimony:  
 
A person, A, gains testimonial knowledge from another person, B, 
just in case (i) B, knowing that p, informs A that p in order that A, 
be believing B, should come to believe that p, and (ii) B thereby 
entitles A to invoke B’s authority to justify p. In short, B gives A 
her word that p and A believes that p on B’s authority. (Bakhurst, 
2013, p. 199) 
 
This seems to me to conflate a number of speech acts, with potentially different 
epistemic and linguistic implications. In Chapter 6 I examine in some detail the 
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distinction between assertion and assurance. The point I make in that chapter 
concerns the difference the specific speech act makes to the hearer’s relationship 
with the content of the testimony. The speech act of assertion directs the hearer to 
the content itself, whereas the speech act of assurance directs the hearer to the 
speaker’s intentions and expectations: she invites the hearer to trust her for the 
truth. This distinction is lost in Bakhurst’s formulation above, where “inform” 
could refer to either assertion or assurance, and, in the summary form, “B gives A 
her word” does seems to imply a direct invitation to trust. It seems that Bakhurst is 
suggesting that teachers do not generally invite students to trust them, so, in my 
terms, he suggests that teachers do not generally offer assurances of the truth of 
what they tell students. I would agree that they do not always do so, and I do not 
think that straightforward assertions are invitations to trust the speaker herself, but: 
a) I disagree with Bakhurst’s narrow definition of testimony, and see it as 
motivated by the notion that testimony is itself a unitary speech act rather than a set 
of speech acts with differing epistemic and linguistic characters; and b) I disagree 
about the extent to which teachers invite students to trust them for the truth and 
about the epistemic relevance of trust. It is wrong, for example, to think about what 
teachers tell students only in terms of specific factual content. To some extent 
Bakhurst recognizes this when he talks about young children being dependent on 
their teachers for concepts, ways of reasoning, conversational and intellectual 
virtues (p. 201). But teachers can also offer assurances when they talk from 
personal experience, when they “bear witness” to the kinds of knowledge that can 
help us to make sense, say, of poems or of relationships in novels and plays, or in 
relation to topics in Citizenship or Religious Education. Furthermore, it is surely 
precisely this kind of “telling” that underpins the more general trusting relationship 
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that Bakhurst acknowledges is significant in the classroom. It is by trusting each 
other as knowers and testifiers that a class is bound together as an epistemic 
community. The importance of students themselves being trusted as knowers and 
testifiers is a theme I take up in Chapter 7. 
It is worth pointing out that Bakhurst’s point about the more complex nature 
of teaching and learning has the potential to undermine his acceptance of 
McDowell’s reliance on the factive entailment of the word “learn” in his account of 
knowledge. To use Bakhurst’s own examples: if Jamie learns from his teacher that 
Jane Austen was the author of six novels and from his biology textbook that the 
structure of DNA is a double-helix, then, according to Bakhurst and McDowell, 
Jamie has acquired knowledge. If there was some error in Jamie’s comprehension, 
or if he was doxastically irresponsible in some way, this not only undermines the 
knowledge ascription but also the appropriateness of cognate terms such as 
“learns”. But Bakhurst also says (p. 199) that when a student acquires a belief by 
accepting his teacher’s word for it, “the student is accepting what she is told rather 
than learning what she is taught”. So it appears that Bakhurst is relying on the 
simple, factive idea of learning in his exposition of McDowell on testimony but 
requiring a richer concept in relation to teaching.  
 
§4.3 Challenging McDowell (1): Gradability and Development 
 
McDowell’s position is interestingly different from that of Tyler Burge. Both allow 
that knowledge is transmitted from speaker to hearer but according to Burge the 
evidential warrant for the speaker’s belief is “inherited” by the hearer as a 
consequence of his entitlement to believe the speaker, and where the warrant is 
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sufficient to support knowledge the hearer can be said to have inherited the 
speaker’s knowledge. According to Faulkner (20011, p. 110), Burge’s account of 
transmission makes his theory of testimonial knowledge and warrant a socially 
externalist account, as the relevant epistemic properties are socially distributed 
rather than properties of the recipient’s mental states alone. For McDowell, 
testimony transmits knowledge because it puts the hearer in the same state as to the 
facts as the speaker, which is either one of knowledge or one of ignorance. Where 
it is one of ignorance, the recipient’s state is unwarranted, even though he may be 
doxastically and rationally irreproachable.  
As I mentioned previously, MacDowell’s account of the transmission of 
knowledge does imply an external dimension to testimonial knowledge: truth. The 
speaker’s evidential warrant or state of informedness, however, does not feature, as 
it is not introspectively available to the hearer. So in holding to the idea that 
testimonial knowledge is an individualistic standing in the space of reasons, 
McDowell downplays the social dimension of testimony. He does not want to 
acknowledge a distinction between warranted belief and knowledge. The hearer 
inherits knowledge or he inherits ignorance from the speaker. McDowell does not 
allow beliefs of indeterminate status, whose epistemic standing might be 
determined by a third-party assessment of factors outside of the hearer’s 
judgement. So it seems that he is taking little account of the fact that testimonial 
knowledge comes about through interpersonal communication, communication that 
sometimes spreads back along a chain of informants who each contribute and re-
combine elements to produce information for which no one person is responsible. 
A number of things can be less than ideal in any episode of informative 
communication, including the clarity of the speaker’s utterance and the hearer’s 
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comprehension of the utterance; and the speaker’s knowledge of the topic on which 
she speaks might be less than secure. There could have been some degradation of 
the content communicated along the way, as in Chinese Whispers. These are social 
facts about the process of communication and the transmission of knowledge that 
McDowell disregards. 
But if we want to allow scope for epistemic assessment that is more gradable 
than McDowell allows, we have to allow assessment of beliefs whose warrant 
supports a knowledge claim to a greater or lesser extent. And once we allow that 
for the hearer’s belief, we have to consider the possibility that his belief is put in 
question by the gradability of the belief the speaker attests. This means that a 
notion of transmission different from McDowell’s emerges, one closer to Burge’s: 
that the hearer inherits from the speaker the evidential warrant for the belief 
attested, the epistemic status of which is an ineliminable element in the overall 
standing of the hearer’s belief, along with the entitlement that is itself defeasible by 
doxastic irresponsibility on his part. If we accept this account of transmission, we 
are left with an account that is neither externalistic in the manner of reliabilism nor 
purely internalistic. What it retains of McDowell’s account is the notion of a 
general entitlement that does not have to be supported by inductive inference, and 
the necessity of the hearer’s rational responsiveness to reasons, of doxastic 
responsibility or vigilance. What is different is that these alone are no longer 
sufficient to ground a claim to knowledge from the testimony. 
Another significant reason to look for alternatives to McDowell’s approach is 
that he does not seem to cater sufficiently for the possibility of cognitive 
development. In his account, a subject is either doxastically responsible or not, 
either rationally mature or not, either in a position to deploy the reasons that might 
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undermine his title to knowledge or not. For example, body language, facial 
gestures and tone of voice are all potential signs of insincerity or incompetence on 
the part of the speaker, to which a hearer should be sensitive. But to hold a child to 
the same standards of sensitivity as an adult seems counter-intuitive. Allowance 
must be made for cognitive development and maturity. McDowell could respond 
that such allowance has already been made in assuming that the hearer has properly 
comprehended the speaker’s utterance. I made a similar point myself (in §3.1) in 
response to Quinton and Goldberg. Comprehension (which depends on sensitivity 
to implicatures, speech acts and genres: see Chapter 6) is certainly one process 
where cognitive maturity plays a part and where achievement can be a matter of 
degree, but it is not the only process. Responsiveness to psychological and 
normative defeaters is surely something one gets better at, and which knowledge 
and experience (and teaching) play a part in developing. A satisfactory account of 
the epistemology of testimony must be appropriately attuned to children’s cognitive 
and linguistic development. 
 
§4.4 Challenging McDowell (2): Positive Reasons and Trust 
 
I want to look now at arguments (in opposition to McDowell, Burge, Reid, and any 
version of the non-reductionist/general entitlement thesis) in favour of the view that 
on any particular occasion hearers need positive reasons for believing the speaker. 
This takes us deeper into McDowell’s reasons for rejecting externalist 
considerations and further towards the trust theories that are the focus of the next 
chapter. I draw here especially upon the work of Paul Faulkner (2011). 
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Testimony involves communicative interactions between two or more people. 
All the participants have their own interests and needs. For example, the tourist 
wants to know where the cathedral is, or which road leads to Larissa, but his 
informant may have no particular interest in giving an accurate response to the 
tourist and may even have reasons for deceiving him, or she may be well motivated 
but not well informed. The tourist’s request is risky and whether he acquires 
knowledge is partly a matter of luck. Even school students, in what is probably a 
reasonably benign epistemic environment, are to some extent vulnerable to deceit 
and error. 
McDowell’s position is that the question of luck does not come in at the point 
where externalists, such as reliabilists, or hybridists who concede the need for an 
externalist element, would bring it in, but at an earlier stage. He denies the need for 
any “externalist admixture” in order to escape Cartesian or sceptical “shrinking 
from what can be known” (McDowell, 1998, p. 440). How can it make sense for 
two people who are equally vigilant and virtuous to face different epistemic 
outcomes, knowledge or ignorance, according whether external factors are or are 
not favourable? 
 
 If two believers are on a par in respect of the excellence of their 
exercises of reason, how can we make sense of the idea that only 
one of them is a knower, on the basis of the thought that, in a region 
we are invited to conceive as outside the reach of reason, things are 
as he takes them to be, whereas the other is not so fortunate? Are 
we really giving any weight to the idea that knowledge has 
something to do with standings in the space of reasons? Would it 
not be more honest to embrace the outright externalism that 
abandons that idea? I doubt that anyone would take the hybrid 
conception seriously if it did not seem to be the only hope of 
keeping the space of reasons relevant while making room for 
knowledge in the problematic areas. (McDowell, 1998, p. 442) 
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McDowell goes on to describe an alternative position. He says the hybrid 
conception makes its concession to luck at the wrong point. If we are prepared to 
abandon the “philosophers’ fantasy” of reason having such absolute control over its 
region that it is secure from risk from an “unkind world”, then: 
 
 [W]e have no reason not to allow that positions like seeing, or 
hearing from someone, that things are thus and so are standings in 
the space of reasons in their own right, even though there is an 
irreducible element of luck, of kindness from the world, in whether 
one occupies them…In trying to avoid the threat of scepticism, the 
hybrid conception makes it hard to see how what it depicts as 
knowledge can deserve that title. (Ibid., p. 442-443) 
 
The world can mislead us, but this element of bad luck enters into the space of 
reasons and determines whether one is occupying the position of one who sees that 
p, or hears from someone that p, or whether they occupy the position of one who 
sees an appearance that such and such is the case, or hears that someone says that 
such and such is the case. It is not that one has a perception or receives testimony 
and then one’s testimonial belief can be infected by elements of luck; rather, the 
world has already imposed itself on experience, which has already infiltrated the 
space of reasons. This means the two believers never were in comparable 
informational states or epistemic positions. 
McDowell thinks the only genuine alternative to this picture is scepticism. 
There cannot be a satisfactory response to the argument from error, to the fact that 
we cannot securely tell good testimony from bad. He rules out the possibility that 
reasons can make an epistemic difference because in the case of the two believers 
who are on a par with respect to the excellence of their reasons there was nothing 
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available to either believer to distinguish the informative case from the other. So if 
we insist on believers needing positive reasons for believing, sceptical doubt will 
always accompany them, for the believer could never rule out the possibility that it 
is an unfavourable case. McDowell’s radical proposal for avoiding the sceptical 
conclusion is that we drop the condition prohibiting question-begging reasons for 
belief. In other words, we should just allow the believer’s reason for belief to be 
that what he gets from his informant is knowledge. For this to be the case, the 
informant must know what she testifies to. The reason for belief is the cognitive 
state the believer is put in by the testimony and this is determined by the nature of 
the testimony. This is indeed question-begging, and it remains the case that the 
cognitive state the believer is in might not be introspectively identifiable by him. 
But any other account of his position would leave him worse off because it would 
leave him in a state of ignorance, for no reasons could rule out the possibility of 
error, deceit or luck. McDowell’s account guarantees that the believer gets 
knowledge from the informant when the informant testifies accurately to something 
that she herself knows.  
What externalists, sceptics and hybridists get wrong, according to McDowell, 
is the nature of the reasons for belief. They look for evidence of competence, 
sincerity and trustworthiness, whereas for McDowell these are rational constraints 
on belief but not the kind of reasons that entitle belief. If what one receives from 
the testifier is knowledge, and knowledge entails belief, then one has a reason to 
believe. There is an a priori link. Therefore, if overall warrant requires that one has 
a reason to believe, then all non-deceptive testimonial cases are warranted. 
Scepticism is thus avoided without help from externalist elements other than that 
entailed by the condition that the testifier is a knower. 
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It seems a truism to say that we are entitled to believe what we know, so it is 
not surprising that McDowell’s account is challenged by Faulkner on the ground 
that we need more substantive reasons for belief, such as would be provided by 
other beliefs we might hold concerning the informant’s communicative intentions 
or her having a reliable track-record. Faulkner employs two arguments in support 
of this challenge. 
McDowell’s argument hinges on the question of the different states his two 
believers are in when they have comprehended the testimony. One is in the state of 
knowing that p and the other is not. What kind of states are these? They are mental 
states, presumably, but they are not introspectively distinguishable. Faulkner points 
out (2011, p. 131) that internalism expects reasons to be available to the subject, 
within his ken, but McDowell is proposing that the subject’s reason for belief is the 
fact that is made manifest to him - an external factor. The experience itself is 
indistinguishable from the non-factual experience, the testimonial equivalent of a 
perceptual illusion, and yet McDowell wants to claim that “the obtaining of the fact 
is precisely not blankly external to his subjectivity” (1982, pp. 390-1). The world 
appearing to be this way is epistemically inconsistent with its being any other way. 
It explains the subject’s belief, and it is this that makes it a satisfactorily 
internalistic phenomenon.  
Faulkner’s point is that there is insufficient phenomenological difference here 
between the “true” and the “false” situation. With perceptual illusions one 
generally has enough phenomenological difference to avoid being deceived for 
long, but in the testimonial equivalent there is no phenomenological difference. We 
can slip a lie in between several truths and our audience has no chance of 
distinguishing the lie phenomenologically (Faulkner, 2011, p. 132). There is 
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nothing to trigger doubt apart from other beliefs, but they do not come into this 
scenario. This means that what McDowell takes to be a trivial reason for belief just 
cannot do the job it is required to do, which is to save us from scepticism about 
knowledge acquired through comprehending testimony. Faulkner concludes that 
non-trivial, more substantial, reasons are required. 
More substantial reasons could include other beliefs, of course: the kind of 
beliefs that reductionists invoke. Reductionists believe that what justifies the 
hearer’s testimonial belief is inductive inference drawn from evidence available to 
him. If we followed this path, we would not yet be straying into the externalist 
regions that McDowell thinks undermine the rationality of believing and knowing, 
but we would certainly be straying away from non-reductionism. However, there 
are alternatives.  
Let us consider the issue from a student’s perspective. A student’s learning 
from the teacher’s testimony is an interactive social event, one feature of which is 
the process involved in the student’s comprehension of the teacher’s utterance. A 
potential problem arises when the teacher is insincere and her communicative 
intention is not to inform but to deceive. This means that when the student 
comprehends her utterance, and believes that he has recovered her communicative 
intentions, he has not done so. If comprehension were the student’s correct 
interpretation of the teacher’s true communicative intentions, we could say that the 
student has failed to comprehend her utterance. Generally we do not say this, 
however. We make a distinction between incorrect comprehension, where the 
student fails to interpret the utterance in the way the teacher intends him to, and 
cases where the student does interpret her utterance in the way the teacher intends 
him to, but he has been deceived by her as to her true intentions. If he realizes that 
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she is deceiving him and successfully interprets her true (deceitful) intentions, then 
we might say he has grasped or comprehended her true intentions. Therefore there 
is a phenomenologically different mental experience involved in comprehending in 
the one case from in the other, for not only is the content of the belief that the 
student ascribes to the teacher different but the attitudes he ascribes to her, and his 
reactive attitudes to her (resentment, for example, rather than gratitude) are 
different. Clearly, it is important that the student has learned to attend to a range of 
rather subtle phenomenological differences. There is a kind of introspective 
vigilance involved. 
We can use these points to build on McDowell’s trivial reason to believe. The 
world can be unkind to us at the point of comprehension. All the contextual factors, 
background beliefs, monitoring of body language, sensitivity to tone of voice and 
to implicatures, including non-literal ones, can fail to prevent the student from 
being deceived by the teacher as to her real intentions. Because of this he can fail to 
realize that he needs to question the utterance further, to deploy inductive reasoning 
on what he has heard and interpreted. But his mental state of feeling that he has 
comprehended the utterance– that is, of feeling that he has recovered the teacher’s 
true communicative intentions – gives him a prima facie entitlement to believe it. It 
is a different state from when he is suspicious about her true intentions, but to be in 
either state is a rational state to be in, for the process of comprehension is a 
practically rational one. The process calls upon the student’s semantic 
understanding, and also upon such pragmatic processes as consistency monitoring, 
contextual awareness, and character judgement. Vigilance is not something that is 
postponed until the utterance has been comprehended. As I have argued previously, 
our first response to a statement that it is inconsistent with existing beliefs is not to 
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disbelieve it but to try to reinterpret what the speaker intends to convey so as to 
make it consistent. This is especially so in an educational context. In this sense 
Reid is right to say that we are by nature inclined to believe, for comprehension 
requires that we be so. If our first instinct were to dismiss any statement that does 
not immediately seem consistent with what we already believe, we would never 
comprehend utterances that are the most useful to us, nor learn anything 
unexpected. Therefore, to reinforce the educational as well as the epistemological 
implication, the interpersonal interaction between the student and the teacher, 
including his interpretation of her intentions, is an essential factor – initially in 
relation to comprehension and subsequently in relation to belief or knowledge 
acquisition.  
If comprehension demands a degree of credulity - which is, nevertheless 
constrained by vigilance - it also demands a kind of rational trust. Not a kind that is 
based on a calculation of interests, but a kind that is a recognition and acceptance 
of our fundamental reliance on, and responsibilities towards, one another.  This is 
more than an epistemological point. Our reliance on others is a condition of our 
personhood and selfhood, of our having a world to inhabit. Near the beginning of 
his essay, McDowell quotes Gadamer: “Language is not just one of man’s 
possessions in the world, but on it depends the fact that man has a world at all” 
(cited by MacDowell, p. 415, fn 3; see Gadamer, 2004, p. 443). To this we can add 
that our possession of language depends on our trusting others for the truth: hence, 
our possession of a world depends also on that.  
The requirement that we are credulous to a degree and the requirement that 
we are trusting are connected, of course, because to be credulous is to trust that the 
speaker is communicating something relevant, intelligible and sincere, that any 
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apparent problems or inconsistency with existing beliefs will evaporate when 
comprehended better or when subsequent utterances have brought more clarity. 
And if we cannot dissociate trust from trustworthiness, as for the hearer to trust the 
speaker is for him to account her trustworthy, we cannot dissociate her 
trustworthiness from her willingness to put her trust in him, for speakers trust 
hearers to take their meanings and intentions appropriately, to not willfully 
misinterpret or misrepresent them, for example. 
So I think that McDowell’s focus on the internal rationality of the hearer 
leads him to overlook the interactive, practical rationality involved in testimony 
and therefore to propose a trivial, question-begging reason for belief  - the 
cognitive state the believer is put in by the testimony, which is determined by the 
nature of the testimony and which might not be introspectively identifiable  -  when 
an alternative is available that is certainly less trivial and less question-begging. 
Feeling that we have comprehended another person’s testimony is a prima facie, 
but defeasible, reason for believing it. But there are other dimensions to 
comprehension that we will need to consider, for what we learn to comprehend are 
not just Lackeyan “statements” but speech acts, and this dimension of 
comprehension takes us further into the nature of the intersubjective trust involved 
in learning from the words of others. The next two chapters will develop this point 
in detail. 
To the argument I have presented we could add additional considerations 
with educational implications: considerations concerning the general reliability of 
comprehension and the general reliability of teachers in communicating sincerely. 
Even if we felt that a non-reductionist prima facie and pro tanto entitlement to 
believe testimony had been established, we might still feel that other considerations 
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are relevant to overall warrant. They could feature in judgements of individual 
teachers and students as testifiers, as comprehenders and as responsible believers. 
In fact, even if the notion of overall warrant were to be rejected, reliability 
considerations could still be relevant to the hearer’s responsiveness to reasons –
relevant not just to his responsiveness to introspectively available alerts but also to 
what he has available to him to trigger alerts.  How well informed the hearer is 
concerning the track record of particular sources of information – different news 
media, say – might be relevant to how doxastically responsible he is. If he is not 
very well informed, perhaps he should have been. This is a curriculum issue: what 
sources of information does a student need to pay attention to and what does he 
need to know about those sources? 
McDowell does not allow reliability considerations a place in testimonial 
warrant, but whether or not we agree with him on that, there is still the question of 
the trustworthiness of the testifier to consider, trustworthiness being a different 
attribute from reliability. Trust on the part of the hearer is the corollary of 
trustworthiness on the part of the speaker. McDowell’s focus is the rationality of 
the hearer’s side of the testimonial exchange, and he does not recognize the 
relevance of reciprocal trust and trustworthiness. He admits that things can go right 
or go wrong in the transfer of knowledge between speaker and hearer, but not that 
the relationship of trust between the participants is relevant to the rationality of the 
hearer’s belief or to the act of testifying. Given our doubts about the cogency of 
McDowell’s arguments, we need to explore more fully whether a student’s trust in 
the trustworthiness of his teacher’s testimony is relevant to the rationality of the 
belief he acquires and therefore to his achievement of knowledge. 
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Chapter 5: Trust, Authority and Autonomy 
 
In the previous chapters I have discussed the reductionist and non-reductionist 
accounts of testimony, McDowell’s being an example of the latter, and looked at 
Jennifer Lackey’s hybrid or dualistic account, which concedes that reductionists are 
right to demand that the hearer has positive reasons for accepting what the speaker 
tells him. I have also attempted to distinguish and to clarify the concepts of 
epistemic warrant, justification and entitlement. I concluded the last chapter by 
supporting Paul Faulkner’s argument against McDowell’s resistance to the 
requirement for positive reasons. Faulkner’s own theory is a version of the trust-
based theories of testimony that are the subject of this chapter. Trust-based theories 
emphasize the intersubjective nature of the employment and comprehension of 
testimonial speech acts, and they take us closer to the position that I will argue for 
in Chapter 6. 
 
 
§5.1 Feminist Epistemology  
 
I have used the term “trust” quite loosely so far. In everyday speech if we say we 
trust someone for the truth we might mean either that we put our trust in the 
speaker herself or in what she says. We might mean merely that we are relying on 
what she says being true. Trust theories of testimony put the emphasis on the 
intersubjective and interdependent nature of communication: the participants trust 
each other. In Learning from Words, Jennifer Lackey identifies Ross (1986), 
Hinchman (2005) and Moran (2005 and 2006) as advocates of this approach. I 
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think the originators also include feminist epistemologists such as Lorraine Code 
(1991), Annette Baier (1985), and Mary Field Belenky (1986), insofar as they share 
a similar conception of the intersubjectivity in knowledge and communication.  
Lorraine Code argues that epistemic paradigms, such as objectivity and 
rational autonomy, lead to a privileging of certain ways of knowing, thereby 
distorting social practices such as parenting and education and producing social 
structures that are unevenly responsive to human interests. In her discussion of 
“second persons” she rejects the idea of people as separate, self-contained, 
mutually opaque and alien. Rejecting individualism but not individuality, she sees 
creativity, uniqueness and accountability as continually reinforced by 
interdependence and an epistemology that acknowledges our mutual dependencies 
as emancipatory. 
Testimony is central to this interdependence. Mutual trust and everyday 
knowledge, exemplified by conversation rather than by scientific knowledge and 
autonomous reason, should be the paradigms. I have argued in the previous chapter 
that epistemologists should take account of cognitive development and of 
children’s developing knowledge and understanding of what to expect from other 
people. Code argues similarly. She represents knowledge claims as communal 
activity, as forms of address, speech acts, moments in a dialogue that assume and 
rely on the participation of other subjects. A knowledge claimant positions herself 
within a set of discursive possibilities that she may accept, criticize, challenge. She 
positions herself in relation to other people, to their responses, criticisms, 
agreements, contributions. Like Bakhtin (see Chapter 6), Code describes even 
apparently solitary thinking as constructed on a conversational model. She echoes 
Hannah Arendt in arguing that thinking is a dialogue between “me and myself”, a 
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friendship rather than a selfhood, and Vygotsky in maintaining that talking with 
others precedes talking with oneself (Vygotsky, 1962; Mercer, 2000).  
Three themes in Code’s work that are especially relevant are: (1) her 
emphasis on the importance of learning how to achieve an appropriate interplay 
between autonomy and solidarity; (2) her analysis of “judicious trust” in relation to 
authority and expertise; and (3) her emphasis on epistemic justice – the need for all 
to be recognized as persons with knowledge to share and for all voices to be heard. 
Knowledge empowers only if it is acknowledged. As Code observes (1991, p. 259), 
the discussion of epistemic justification risks deteriorating into an empty exercise if 
it is not grounded in a broader discussion of the nature of knowledge and, crucially, 
the nature of knowers.  
I support Code’s characterization of humans as conversationalists, discursive 
knowers who need to share what we know and learn new things from each other. 
Given that our practices as conversationalists and sharers of knowledge are 
constrained by epistemic and linguistic norms, these practices could, and should, be 
more central to theories of education, and especially to pedagogic theory and 
practice. Young people cannot thrive on epistemic autonomy alone; they also need 
to be judicious trusters of the epistemic authority of others and the recipients of 
trust as authorities in their own right. This is one of the claims I develop in Chapter 
7, when I relate my account of testimonial speech acts and discourse specifically to 
schooling. 
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§5.2 Assurance and Trust Views of Testimony 
 
Jennifer Lackey argues that trust-based theories of testimony can be either 
epistemologically potent or genuinely interpersonal but cannot be both. Her 
critique focuses on Richard Moran’s “Assurance View” and Edward Hinchman’s 
“Trust View”. Like the feminist accounts, such as Codes’s, these belong to a family 
of views which  a) emphasize the interpersonal relationship between the 
participants, b) locate epistemic value in certain features of the relationship, such as 
trust or assurance, and c) reject any implication that a speaker is a mere “truth 
gauge” whose words are all that counts. This family of views is incompatible with 
both reductionism and non-reductionism, and also with Lackey’s dualism. 
According to Moran, a speaker’s testimony is not to be treated as evidence 
for believing that p. Rather she should be understood as having offered an 
assurance that p is true. Assurances are freely given, so the speaker is freely 
assuming responsibility for the truth of what she asserts, providing the hearer 
thereby with a reason for believing p. What makes it a reason is that it is presented 
as a reason. It has the force of the speaker having given her word. “The epistemic 
value of [the speaker’s] words is something publicly conferred on them by the 
speaker, by presenting his utterance as an assertion” (Moran, 2006, p. 288). The 
speaker offers a kind of guarantee of truth. In Lackey’s view, such a guarantee can 
have only moral value; epistemically it is worthless if the speaker is sincere but 
incompetent or unreliable. When an unreliable speaker assumes responsibility for 
her assertions, it does not make them more truth conducive. Assurance or the 
assumption of responsibility will always be trumped by undefeated defeaters and 
therefore cannot do very much to render the hearer’s belief more rational. In other 
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words, the assurance principle is epistemologically impotent. Lackey’s dualism 
places more “potent conditions” upon both parties. 
In the next chapter I will attempt to delineate different kinds of testimonial 
speech act according to the relationship, responsibilities and expectations 
implicated. Such distinctions are relevant at this point, however, for Lackey refers 
to Hinchman’s distinction between telling someone that p and asserting that p. 
Hinchman (2005) argues that the speaker whose utterance is the speech act of 
telling implicates to the hearer who understands the act that she performs thereby 
an entitlement to believe p. Someone who merely asserts that p implicates only that 
p is true.18 The teller, on the other hand, invites the hearer to trust her and thus 
offers, not to take responsibility for the truth of the utterance, but to share with the 
hearer epistemic responsibility for the hearer’s belief. This view takes account of 
the point I raised in the last chapter: comprehending an utterance must involve 
recognizing the speaker’s communicative intentions, commitments and 
expectations. 
But Hinchman’s view cannot satisfy Lackey or anyone who insists on further 
conditions. Hinchman himself adds the conditions a) that the hearer’s trust must be 
reasonable, not undermined by undefeated defeaters, and b) that the speaker’s 
testimony has to be a reliable guide to the truth. Lackey insists that the addition of 
these conditions threatens to make the trust itself “epistemically superfluous” 
(2008, p. 238). So, Lackey concludes, Moran’s is a genuinely interpersonal but 
																																																								
18 This is not the only implicature, surely, for someone who takes herself to be telling 
another person that p believes that the other person does not already know that p. We 
might say that she believes she is teaching him something. This is not necessarily the 
case with assertion. 	
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epistemologically impotent account, whereas Hinchman’s is more potent but is not 
genuinely interpersonal. 
Consider the case of an eavesdropper who hears some gossip in which one 
person, a shopkeeper, says something true to another person, a customer. Does the 
eavesdropper have an epistemic position inferior to the customer’s? Is the 
shopkeeper entitled to feel slighted if the intended recipient of the gossip, the 
customer, does not believe her testimony, but not if the eavesdropper does not 
believe it? The shopkeeper has not offered an assurance to the eavesdropper, nor 
invited his trust: does this mean that the eavesdropper is not entitled to accept the 
belief on the basis of the shopkeeper’s communicative intention and expectation? 
Lackey’s view is that the epistemic position of the two hearers is the same. If the 
gossip had been false, both would have been misled. She also says that the feelings 
of the participants are beside the point. If a speaker feels slighted by disbelief or the 
hearer feels insulted by being misled, these feelings are epistemically irrelevant. 
She thinks there is nothing necessarily wrong in treating speakers as “truth gauges” 
(2008, p. 249). So, the customer’s and the eavesdropper’s relationship with the 
shopkeeper’s testimony is one of reliance, rather than one of trust. 
My intuitions about the shopkeeper case are different from Lackey’s and I 
think she is mistaken in thinking that the communicative intentions and 
expectations that a speaker implicates to her intended audience, and the feelings or 
reactive attitudes associated with them, are epistemically insignificant. Moreover, I 
contend that trust itself is not a feeling or an emotion but a cognitive attitude that 
can be either rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. I will defend this claim 
in the next section.  
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§5.3 Trusting Persons 
 
We cannot always assess other people’s reliability by reading them like 
thermometers; we often have to trust them for the truth. This is part and parcel of 
living in solidarity as interdependent social beings. Lorraine Code makes use of the 
notion of a second person perspective (§5.1). David Bakhurst (2011) refers to the 
same idea. In presenting his case, based on McDowell, for the irreducibly social 
nature of the conditions for the development of a child’s rational capacity, he 
employs the Aristotelian concept of “second nature”, whereby personhood emerges 
from our animal first nature as a result of social (principally, linguistic) interaction, 
and he also employs the German concept of Bildung (education or upbringing). He 
writes: 
 
The second-person perspective already embodies recognition of 
the subjectivity of the other and, it might be argued, 
simultaneously contains the presentation of self in a way that 
warrants reciprocal recognition from the other person. Implicit in 
addressing another as “you” is the recognition of him or her as a 
rational agent, an inhabitant of the space of reasons. Bildung 
brings this vividly into view, in part because the reciprocal 
recognition of subjectivity contained in the second-person 
perspective is a precondition of the possibility of education, in the 
fullest sense of that word, and in part because at the earliest stages 
of the Bildungsprozess the elders’ commitment to the recognition 
of mutual subjectivity is so obviously an assumption warranted by 
the child’s potentiality rather than his or her capacity. At this 
stage, the child is addressed as a “you” so that he or she might 
become an “I” that can return the compliment. (2011, p. 63) 
 
 
This recalls comments Thomas Reid made on the second-personal relationship (see 
§2.4). Reid recognized that it is its interpersonal and cooperative nature that makes 
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testimony an irreducibly social form of learning. He notes that the second person 
form of verbs, and the second person pronoun you, are “appropriated to the 
expression of social operations of mind, and could never have had a place in 
language but for this purpose” (Reid, 2002, p. 70). As with promising, requesting, 
commanding and apologizing, testimonial speech acts require an audience to be 
addressed by a speaker, and for the audience to recognize that it is being addressed 
in a particular way – that is, to recognize the speech act and the kind of response 
appropriate to that speech act. A plausible interpretation of Reid (one that 
repositions somewhat him in relation to non-reductionism) is that he thinks of 
learning from testimony as what Stephen Darwall (2006) and Benjamin McMyler 
(2011) have called  “a second-personal epistemic capacity”. It is epistemically 
second-personal, and irreducibly social, in that the relationship between testifier 
and audience plays a fundamental role in the justification or rationalization of 
testimonially-acquired beliefs. It is a view that suggests the incompatibility of our 
reliance on testimony with an insistence on a traditional notion of epistemic (or 
rational, intellectual or cognitive) autonomy. It suggests, contra McDowell, that the 
epistemic responsibility for the belief is shared between speaker and audience.  
McMyler argues that when a speaker tells another person something she is 
already recognizing his personhood or humanity, and he, in comprehending her 
utterance, recognizing it for the speech act that it is and responding appropriately, 
is recognizing hers - a reciprocity that establishes them in a second-personal 
relationship. This description applies not only to testimony cases but also to cases 
involving such speech acts as promises and commands. In a second-personal 
communicative relationship the speaker presents herself either as an authority or as 
in authority and the hearer recognizes that and judges the speaker on that basis to 
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be worthy of his trust. It would be irrational or unreasonable of a hearer to place his 
trust in a testifier if he doubts her status as an authority on the issue at hand. In 
trusting her for the truth he is not merely relying on her because he has no 
alternative. Rather, he is according her an epistemic status that is central to the 
rationality of his trust in her. The belief he acquires from her words is a second-
hand one, not because of the role inference has played in its acquisition, nor 
because the acquisition has been mediated by his comprehension, but because he 
has deferred to her as someone who knows what he does not know and he is 
acquiring the belief directly from her. It is this second-handedness that raises 
questions concerning the hearer’s rational or epistemic responsibility for her belief, 
and therefore the doubts about autonomy. We might be reminded here of Plato’s 
Divided Line in The Republic, where second-hand opinions are placed at the 
bottom of the epistemic hierarchy. In order to present a case for promoting these 
“shadows” to a higher epistemic standing, we need to think of trust as an evaluable 
cognitive attitude, rather than as  a feeling or emotional attitude (which is what 
Lackey implies it is). 
How can we characterize interpersonal trust as an evaluable cognitive 
attitude? Russell Hardin’s “encapsulated trust” model (Hardin, 2006, pp. 18-23), 
applied to testimony, suggests that if you trust me for the truth then you do so 
because you believe my interests “encapsulate” your interests, that it is in both our 
interests to maintain a relationship.  My recognition (or belief) that you are 
depending on me for the truth, and my giving you the truth out of goodwill towards 
you, is matched by your recognition of my goodwill and also of my authority as 
someone who is knowledgeable on this topic; and your goodwill towards me is 
demonstrated by your acceptance of what I say. Either of us can be wrong in our 
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judgments, and either can end up feeling injured: in my case, if I am not believed, 
and, in your case, if I mislead you. Trust has correlative “reactive attitudes” 
(Strawson, 1974). 
It is important to make a clear distinction between trusting the other person 
herself and trusting (or relying on) her role in the situation. McMyler (2011, pp. 
115-121) distinguishes between trusting someone to do something and trusting that 
they will do something. The former is more direct, more second-personal. In the 
former the trusted and trusting persons are “located in an interpersonal space 
characterized by reciprocal normative relations” (ibid). The truster recognizes the 
trusted as having a certain competence and authority; she is responsible for doing 
what he trusts her to do; and if she does not do it he will be entitled to adopt 
second-personal reactive attitudes, such as resentment, towards her. This does not 
apply to “trusting that…” cases. If the audience trusts that the speaker will speak 
truly, he is not, in Hardin’s words, encapsulating his interests in hers in the way 
that he is when he trusts her to speak truly. Both are judgements of a kind, but one 
is a judgement concerning what may be relied upon and the other is a judgement 
about the relationship.19  
The essential point in trust-based theories of testimony is that to recognize 
the speech act as testimonial is to recognize that the speaker is inviting your trust. 
There are risks, of course. You are vulnerable to the limitations of her goodwill, 
and you may well feel betrayed or resentful if she lets you down, which is not so 																																																								
19 Paul Faulkner’s parallel distinction is between predictive trust, where one is depending 
on an expected outcome, and affective trust, where one is expecting the other person to 
see things as one does oneself and to act accordingly (Faulkner, 2011, pp. 144-150). The 
latter is a normative expectation concerning the trusted’s motivations and resulting in 
certain reactive attitudes if disappointed. Martin Hollis’ s distinction, in Trust Within 
Reason (1998), is between trust based on an expectation that the other will do something, 
and trust based on the belief in a mutual recognition that she should (p. 11). Whether 
these different kinds of trust are ultimately both normative and predictive is one of 
Hollis’s main themes. 
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with more impersonal kinds of evidence, but the fact of her testifying amounts to a 
genuinely epistemic reason for your belief. It is evidence of the speaker’s 
willingness to enter into a particular kind of relationship with you.  
For McMyler, the speaker’s trustworthiness provides merely a background 
condition for the audience’s belief (2011, pp. 136-137): evidence for her 
trustworthiness is much like evidence for her reliability or for any other 
characteristic, and a belief in her trustworthiness is likewise much like other beliefs 
about her. But in trusting her to speak truly one believes that she is speaking truly, 
and this is grounded not in the hearer’s judgement of her trustworthiness but in the 
fact that the relationship is based on authority and responsibility. It is an irreducibly 
second-personal reciprocal relationship in which epistemic responsibility is shared. 
McMyler does not want to make trustworthiness too epistemically weighty, 
otherwise it will be required to do so much of the epistemic work that the theory 
will become a form of reductionism, so he keeps trustworthiness in the background, 
a necessary but far from sufficient condition. This is a reasonable position: we 
cannot trust someone we have reason to believe is untrustworthy, but whether we 
actually do put our trust in her if we judge her to be trustworthy is a further step. 
What motivates that extra step, the trust itself, is the recognition of the intentions, 
expectations, and commitments implicated in the speech act.  
McMyler’s use of the term “trustworthy” might be questioned on the ground 
that it hardly distinguishes trustworthiness from reliability or dependability. Also, a 
doubt remains about the compatibility of this notion of trust in testimony with the 
educational aim of fostering epistemic (or rational or cognitive) autonomy. As 
Stephen Darwall puts it, it seems to deny the believer the opportunity to “come to 
his own conclusion” about the proposition involved (Darwall, 2006, p. 5). But this 
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doubt can be dismissed. If the hearer has to judge whether he can trust, and, 
further, whether to trust, the point is less undermining of autonomy as these are 
evaluable judgements. We can make them well or badly, and we can get better at 
making them, not least by getting better at appreciating what is implicated in 
different kinds of speech acts, and by becoming more sensitive to the contextual 
features of particular utterances. So, although responsibility for his belief is shared 
with the speaker, the hearer’s judgements and understanding are his own. 
Furthermore, someone who trusts a speaker for the truth has not relinquished all 
responsibility. If the speaker is not available to meet any challenges, the hearer can 
conduct an inferential assessment, if evidence is available, or give up the belief. He 
is still responsible for meeting any challenge concerning the way in which he 
formed his belief. This could involve him in defending his acceptance of the 
speaker’s trustworthiness and/or in defending his interpretation of the speaker’s 
utterance or speech act. Where the speaker is available to meet any challenges, the 
hearer is entitled to defer them to her (she has implicated her acceptance of this 
commitment) and he is then in a position to assess her response.  
As will become clear in due course, these points relate especially to the 
speech act of assurance, which I see as one of the principal members of the range 
of testimonial speech acts. It is the speech act that McMyler and other trust 
theorists seem to have in mind. Following Moran, McMyler uses Paul Grice’s 
distinction between allowing someone to know something and telling it to him 
(Moran, 2006, pp. 284-286; Grice, 1957, in Strawson, 1967, pp. 45-46). Grice 
compares allowing someone to know something to showing him a photograph, and 
he compares telling it to him to drawing a picture for him. The teller intends the 
audience to recognize her intention to assume responsibility for the belief. She is 
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offering a guarantee of the statement’s truth and assuring the audience that she will 
be responsible for any challenges. She expects the audience to accept that as a 
reason for belief. To tell someone something is to perform a speech act that 
conveys, as promising does, an assurance of accountability, an assumption of 
epistemic responsibility. In acknowledging this, the hearer gains a positive reason 
to trust the speaker - and thereby a belief that is, certeris paribus, reasonably held. 
The epistemic burden placed on the speech act (of assurance) and its 
illocutionary features prompts the question of whether we can acquire a justified 
belief from a speaker whose speech act is faked – from an insincere testifier, for 
example. McMyler remarks: 
 
Insincere testimony is testimony in which a speaker merely 
purports to assume the epistemic responsibilities involved in 
testifying, and according to the second-personal model testimonial 
knowledge cannot be acquired through the purported assumption 
of such responsibilities. (McMyler, 2011, p. 103) 
 
The issue at stake is whether the speaker’s assumption of responsibility is 
“psychological” or illocutionary. If the latter – that is, if the speaker’s obligations 
derive solely from the nature of the speech act – it would appear that an insincere 
testifier has the same epistemic responsibilities as the sincere testifier: she must 
respond to any challenges, for she has performed the same act as the sincere 
speaker, conveying the same expectations and commitments. In rejecting the 
possibility of acquiring testimonial knowledge from an insincere speaker, McMyler 
rejects the illocutionary view. If, on the other hand, the assumption of 
responsibility is more directly psychological, the speaker’s intentions or motivation 
become all-important for the epistemic status of the hearer’s belief and to his 
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entitlement to defer challenges to her. In this case McMyler’s second-personal view 
begins to look less like a trust account and more like a version of either 
reductionism or dualism, in which evidence of the speaker’s state of mind, her 
sincerity or reliability, is a positive requirement rather than just a background 
condition.  
In fact McMyler does eventually accept that the speaker must actually be 
“competent and reliable” (p. 162). It is not sufficient that she is judged to be so by 
the hearer and that this judgment operates as a background condition. Presumably 
McMyler wants to rule out the possibility of knowledge being acquired from 
speakers who are unreliably in touch with the truth. He presents his theory as a 
species of non-reductionism (with positive reasons deriving from the nature of the 
speech acts) but by suggesting that both favourable external factors and internal 
judgements are required for epistemic warrant he seems to have made the second 
personal account into a hybrid. A hybrid account that includes a general entitlement 
based on contingent factors, such as the norms associated with particular speech 
acts, rather than on conceptual preconditions, raises the possibility of alternative 
contingent factors that produce, or contribute to, a general entitlement.  
Paul Faulkner (2011) has an alternative contingent factor. He argues that as 
encultured speakers and hearers we have internalized the social norm “tell the truth 
informatively”. From a subjective perspective, the hearer has the resources (if 
called upon) to reason as follows: The speaker can tell I need information, she will 
have internalized the norm that she ought to tell the truth and so will recognize that 
she has a reason to tell the truth; therefore, she will tell the truth. I will trust her to 
tell the truth. This kind of trust, Faulkner says, is a normative expectation, a 
presumption rather than a prediction. It is also probabilistic; trust is always risky.  
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The problem with this account is that it is not clear that trust is required at all. 
As Lackey argued concerning Moran and Hinchman’s assurance and trust 
accounts, the epistemic work seems to be done elsewhere, in this case by the way 
speakers are reliable in obeying the social norm to tell the truth informatively. In 
other words, a reliabilist account of testimony can be built on the contingent fact of 
obedience to social norms. The intersubjective ingredient of trust is redundant. If I 
need a reason for trusting this particular speaker, I have one without the need to 
presume the reciprocal trust relationship. I just need to have no reason to distrust 
her. 
Trust theories such as Faulkner’s and McMyler’s are significant in inviting us 
to probe more deeply the nature of testimonial speech acts, but they are wrong to 
put all the testimonial eggs in one basket – that is, in the speech act of assurance 
and its specific set of commitments and expectations. Nevertheless, our interest as 
educationalists should certainly embrace speech acts, such as assurance, that are 
most closely associated with interpersonal trust, as well as those that require 
alternative kinds of reasoning and justification. Nor should a focus on trust exhaust 
our interest in the nature of informative speech acts in the context of pedagogic 
discourses. These points are developed in the final two chapters. If as 
educationalists we are interested in the distinctions between different kinds of 
testimonial speech acts, we must also be interested in developing children’s ability 
to distinguish them and make appropriate judgments in response to them. 
We have still to determine whether trust theorists are correct in arguing that 
testimonial knowledge cannot be acquired when social norms associated with a 
testifier’s sincerity and reliability are broken, and the speech act does not implicate 
what the hearer reasonably interprets it to implicate. We would not defer challenges 
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to an insincere testifier if we knew or suspected that she was insincere, for then we 
would have a psychological defeater in any case and could not think her 
trustworthy, but is the epistemic status of the belief we have acquired necessarily 
affected if we do not know that her utterance is insincere? This is the issue Lackey 
raised with the Creationist Teacher case. That case is complicated by the fact that 
the teacher is sincere and conscientious in some ways (professionally, perhaps). 
The motivations and pedagogical intentions of teachers and other speakers are 
often highly complicated in this way, so if we want to avoid scepticism, the kinds 
of psychological fact that are relevant to the rationality of the hearer’s 
understanding and belief must be at the very least limited. Lackey and McDowell 
both deny their relevance completely (when they are undetectable by the audience). 
It is possible that Lackey’s dualism has the right epistemological structure 
after all; but I think it provides an incomplete account of the linguistics or 
pragmatics of testimonial exchanges. Her view is that the hearer inherits the 
epistemic properties of the statement. My view is closer to the idea that the hearer 
inherits the epistemic properties of the utterance. This is a significant distinction 
and it is central to my thesis. It means that the important judgements that the hearer 
makes are in the first place, as the second-personal model suggests, interpretative 
and contextualized. To develop this point I need to examine in more detail the 
discourse features, or pragmatics, of testimonial utterances. The speaker’s 
communicative intention is relevant because the hearer cannot fully comprehend 
the utterance without recovering this, even if he does not have to recover every 
detail of her motivation or pedagogic intention. In Chapter 6 I will discuss in more 
detail the pragmatics and “dialogics” of speech utterances. Two key questions to be 
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asked there are: What is it to say something? and What is it to grasp what has been 
said?  
 
*** 
 
In conceding the need for some kind of hybrid account of the epistemology of 
testimony, we are rejecting a purely reliabilist account, one that rules internalist 
considerations to be at best supplementary. We are rejecting, too, a theory solely 
based on intersubjective trust. Instead, we are accepting the necessity of both 
“objective” warrant and “subjective” justification. The subjective or internalist 
element is the rationality or reasonableness of the way in which the hearer 
interprets and judges the speaker’s utterance. This is significant, from an 
educational perspective, because it reinforces the belief in the importance of 
students becoming increasingly epistemically responsible in how they interpret and 
accept what they are told. The judgements involved in the interpretative aspect and 
in the conscientiousness, vigilance or responsibility the hearer employs in how he 
trusts the speaker to be saying what she believes to be true, integrate the 
epistemological and the linguistic. They are also deeply connected with the 
question of why it is sometimes rational to trust another person more than oneself – 
and therefore with issues relating to epistemic authority and the limits of 
autonomy. 
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§5.4  Linda Zagzebski: Why Trust Someone Else More Than I Trust Myself? 
 
Philosophers writing about testimony often seem to rely on trivial examples, such 
as McDowell’s tourist asking for directions, and untypical cases, such as Lackey’s 
Compulsively Believing Bill. It is important to remember that there are serious 
issues at stake and that the arguments have far-reaching implications about how to 
conduct our lives and how to thrive as social beings. Implications for education 
include those pertaining to epistemic justice in the classroom. These are 
implications that are suppressed when education debates operate with crude notions 
of pedagogy and the transmission of knowledge. The arguments concerning self-
trust that I look at in this section reinforce this point. If they are correct, not only 
are we justified in accepting beliefs on the basis of our trust in authoritative 
individuals, we are epistemically or doxastically irresponsible if we do not trust 
them. 
Linda Zagzebski’s and Keith Lehrer’s arguments concerning authority, self-
trust and autonomy, discussed in the next three sections, are persuasive in 
suggesting that the only feasible account of autonomy is one that makes us 
responsible for the conscientious way in which we maintain the systems of beliefs 
and preferences that form the rational backdrop to our decisions to place trust in the 
authority of others rather than to rely on our own resources. But we will see that 
from both an epistemological and an educational perspective these accounts give 
rise to a doubt about whether they provide hearers with sufficient motivation to 
understand for themselves, to educate themselves in order to achieve the expertise 
or authority that the teachers (and others) they choose to trust already have. 
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Meeting this challenge will lead us, in the next chapter, to examine more closely 
the nature of dialogue and the kinds of discourse in which knowledge is shared.  
 
*** 
 
Testimony is a special case of accepting a belief on the basis of another person’s 
authority. It appears, therefore, as we have seen previously, to conflict with rational 
autonomy. The apparent conflict applies also to non-testimonial situations in which 
one acquires a belief by accepting the epistemic authority of another person. 
Testimonial cases are those where the authority tells the audience something 
verbally. Other ways of finding out what another person believes include observing 
her behaviour and following her lead, acquiring thereby her belief about the proper 
way to do something or the right way to get to a particular place. The essential 
difference here is between accepting the belief on the basis of irreducibly first-
personal reasons and accepting the belief for third-personal reasons, such as 
reasons derived from inductive inference. 
The claim that acquiring beliefs on the authority of others clashes with 
autonomy depends upon the assumption that epistemic self-reliance is both a 
feasible and a superior means of acquiring beliefs. Whether self-reliance is a 
superior means of acquiring true beliefs is an empirical question, and, crucially, in 
particular cases it will depend on the believer’s cognitive faculties and 
conscientiousness. If this were the only issue, evidence of the superior success of 
testimony in a particular domain of knowledge would make epistemic self-reliance 
in that domain indefensible. If other people are very frequently in a better position 
to acquire true beliefs in that domain than oneself, the scope for successful 
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epistemic self-reliance would be restricted (assuming the more authoritative people 
are prepared to share their knowledge). 
However, the truth of beliefs is not the only issue when we want to acquire 
knowledge. From a third-person perspective, the perspective of objective warrant, 
beliefs need to be backed by evidence, not all of which need be available to the 
believer. From a first-person perspective, the believer has to have good reasons for 
accepting the belief. If good first-personal reasons are those available only to the 
believer it would seem that from a first-person perspective the justification, 
rationality or reasonableness of one’s beliefs is a matter purely for oneself, and 
self-reliance or autonomy, therefore, would appear to be purely a first-personal, 
individual achievement. But this view is undermined by any account of testimony 
that sees the acquisition of knowledge by the receiver as an intersubjective, shared 
achievement. 
For some philosophers and educationalists, conscious perhaps of how 
vulnerable we are when we rely on others for knowledge, the ideal state of affairs 
for an individual is never having to accept beliefs from another person without 
justifying them independently for oneself. Why should we trust other people’s 
intellects more than we trust our own, or trust their conscientiousness, accuracy or 
integrity more than our own? There seems to be something very fundamental about 
trusting one’s own intellectual faculties: fundamental to many intellectual 
traditions, if not to human nature. Could it be so fundamental that no argument for 
trusting others could defeat it? Where would an acceptance that self-trust is a 
bedrock belief take us? Might it be possible to reconcile this with some degree of 
reliance on, or trust in, the authority of others? 
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Linda Zagzebski (2012) argues that such reconciliation is indeed possible. 
Rationality, she says, is a pre-reflective capacity for resolving doxastic 
dissonances, thereby producing “harmony” in the soul. The “rational self” only 
exercises its executive function when the adjustment is not automatic and a 
judgement has to be made. A self-conscious being has an executive function in 
virtue of being a self, and in this sense it has authority over itself. The desire for 
true beliefs is a pre-reflective one, and most beliefs arrive without our exercising 
our reflective capacities; therefore we must either have a degree of trust in our pre-
reflective capacities or accept that most of our beliefs are fundamentally 
ungrounded. Zagzebski claims that we do in fact have a basic trust in their reliably 
satisfying our desire for true beliefs. This self-trust entails trusting aspects of our 
environment, too, and an awareness of our vulnerability to epistemic harm. 
Keith Lehrer (1997) claims there is no non-circular way of telling that our 
belief forming capacities are reliable as a whole. Richard Foley (2001) also 
recognizes that, given the failure of foundationalism and the lack of sound 
responses to scepticism, we can have no absolute assurance that our beliefs are 
true. We have to retreat to a position of self-trust and to practices of self-criticism, 
self-reflection, conscientiousness. William Alston (1986, 2005) argues that all 
sources of belief (perception, for example) are ultimately grounded on themselves 
and are therefore circular. We are “driven back” to a reliance on self-trust – that is, 
trust in our own cognitive faculties and judgments. This might be thought to lead to 
scepticism, but Zagzebski argues that self-trust precedes scepticism; it is “pre-
reflective”. When we confront circularity and become reflective, only trust ends the 
process of reflection. It is bedrock. 
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Being self-reflective, Zagzebski says, means avoiding doxastic dissonance. 
Even if we had non-circular reasons for relying on our senses and cognitive 
capacities, we would still have to trust that there was a connection between them 
and truth. All reasons, of whatever kind, require us to have a basic trust in their 
connection with truth. We have to trust our self-reflection and use our faculties to 
the best of our abilities. Epistemic conscientiousness is the self-conscious 
equivalent of what we do pre-reflectively. We trust that it is an improvement and 
that there is a connection between conscientious self-reflection and succeeding. 
Conscientiousness comes in degrees of awareness and self-monitoring. We can get 
better at it, for example, by paying closer heed to evidence. Evidence is what we 
trust to be indicative of truth. Intellectual virtues arise out of conscientiousness but 
we would not value them if we did not already trust our cognitive and sensory 
faculties to be generally trustworthy. 
Trusting our faculties conscientiously, Zagzebski writes, just is rationality. 
Trust in one’s faculties is always more basic than reasons or evidence. 
Conscientious self-reflection plays the key role: surviving it is the only test we have 
of truth. Self-trust is a key reason for belief, because if a reason for belief is 
something in virtue of which it is rational to believe that p, then it is in virtue of 
self-trust that I conscientiously believe that my reasons to believe that p are truth-
indicative. Either self-trust is a reason or there are no reasons. 
So where does this leave the reasonableness of acquiring beliefs from others? 
Zagzebski refers to someone who holds extreme epistemic self-reliance to be the 
ideal as an “epistemic egoist” (2012, pp. 52 – 55). Such a person can only accept 
beliefs acquired from others if he is convinced by evidence or reasons available to 
his evaluation. He is prepared, therefore, to miss out on acquiring some true beliefs, 
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but he feels that the beliefs he has acquired are secure ones, posing less of a risk 
than accepting them on trust from others would pose. He would have to concede, 
surely, that he has acquired the language and reasoning skills he requires for his 
evaluation from others (pre-reflectively), but he can go on to argue (similarly to 
Quinton’s argument – see §3.1) that having acquired them he can now use them 
reflectively and self-reliantly. As we begin to ride freely around the doxastic 
countryside, we have to cope without the training wheels we needed to steady 
ourselves and get started. 
So thinks the epistemic egoist, but in Zagzebski’s view this position is 
incoherent. If there are no non-circular arguments for self-trust, there are none for 
trusting oneself more than others, and therefore no reason to believe that another 
person’s intellectual capacities differs substantially (in reliability, for example) 
from one’s own. Given the principle that like cases should be treated alike, which, 
she claims, is available to us a priori, our default position with regard to the 
intellectual capacities of other people should be one of trust, for consistency 
requires a presumption in favour of people who have the same faculties as oneself. 
We should believe that others are generally trustworthy, feel trusting of their 
faculties and treat them as trustworthy. Therefore, their testimony that p counts 
positively in my deliberations about whether p. Extreme epistemic egoism must be 
rejected. Furthermore, just as we have self-reflective self-trust when we are 
exercising our faculties conscientiously, and this allows us to distinguish between 
cases, so we acquire beliefs about particular persons, and we can place particular 
trust in people whose own conscientiousness we discover when we are being 
especially conscientious. The prima facie trust I owe to others is raised to a more 
secure epistemic level when I conscientiously judge that the other person’s belief 
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will have been formed conscientiously. Zagzebski writes: “The general principle is 
that insofar as I trust myself in virtue of having certain properties, I owe the same 
trust to others whose possession of those properties is something I discover when I 
am behaving in a way I trust” (2012, p. 57). 
We could choose to ignore these considerations and to stick to our guns about 
being self-reliant, but this would be a foolhardy piece of stubbornness if our aim is 
to have true beliefs. If others are to be taken as epistemically trustworthy, and if 
they are frequently better placed than we are to acquire true beliefs, only an 
insistence on being self-reliant or autonomous for its own sake, whatever the 
consequences for the accuracy of our beliefs, could make it reasonable, and even 
then, surely, at the expense of a degree of epistemic consistency or “doxastic 
harmony”. 
Zagzebski concedes, nevertheless, that in one sense epistemic egoism is 
unavoidable, for these considerations concerning the trustworthiness of others stem 
from one’s own conscientious reflection and observation. One’s trust in oneself is 
more basic than one’s trust in particular others. I can think of myself as 
untrustworthy in respect of particular domains of knowledge, but it is not open to 
me to think of myself as generally untrustworthy. This is not the case in respect of 
other individuals: there is no inconsistency in a judgement that another person is 
generally unreliable epistemically or doxastically. 
Trust in oneself and in others counts as a reason for belief, for it is required in 
making the connection between what I am doing when I deploy my cognitive 
capacities conscientiously and success in reaching the truth. This goes both for 
reasons that consist of shareable factual evidence and for first-person reasons, 
including emotions and experiences that are available only to me. Trust is first-
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personal because only I can determine the similarity of other persons to me. 
Therefore, third-personal factual evidence can neither exhaust the evidence for a 
particular belief nor be the most basic reason for believing it. The most basic is my 
trust in my own deliberations.  
Given this, if I conscientiously trust you, the fact that you believe p can be a 
reason for me to believe p. If only factual evidence were relevant to the 
reasonableness of the belief I have acquired from you, the mere fact that you 
believe it could not be a factor for me, just as the fact that I believe that p cannot 
add to my reasons for believing p, but my trusting your epistemic 
conscientiousness means that the fact that you believe p can be decisive for me. 
Whether it should be will depend on several factors, one of which is whether I 
recognize your authority in this particular domain - that is, whether I believe that 
trusting you for a belief on the question is more likely to get me to the truth than 
relying on my own capacities is, even if it is a question on which I have opinions 
and some background knowledge. Furthermore, if the fact that you believe that p 
can be a reason for my accepting that belief from you, the fact that many people 
have (independently) accepted the belief from you can further strengthen my belief. 
This is not a case of it not being possible for so many people to be wrong, for 
clearly the belief could be wrong however many people believe it, nor of a 
“wisdom of the crowd” phenomenon (Surowiecki, 2004), but of my having a 
defeasible reason to trust people who are trusted by people I trust, and therefore 
there can be additional epistemic security (reasonableness) in numbers. When we 
disagree with someone we trust and admire, or whose authority we recognize, we 
are obliged to reflect further. This additional degree of conscientiousness is 
demanded by our desire to resolve the dissonance caused by the conflict between 
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our trust in our own beliefs and capacities and our trust in our trust in certain other 
persons. 
My summary of Zagzebski’s argument so far might suggest that we have to 
relinquish autonomy as a desirable aim, and that we are forced in some way to 
accept beliefs from authoritative others. But this is not the case. If we exercise a 
reflective control over our beliefs as a whole and the norms we adopt in forming 
them, we sustain the only kind of autonomy that is available to us. If our norms 
allow us to take beliefs from certain others more or less on command, then we can 
(and do) do this. This is what it means to recognize others as epistemic authorities. 
Their beliefs, often conveyed via testimony, have a “pre-emptive power” for us in 
the domains of knowledge in which we recognize their authority (Zagzebski, 2012, 
p.113 – 116). 
We have moved on from the position where another person’s belief merely 
counts in favour of my adoption of the same belief to the position that the other 
person’s belief should pre-empt other considerations. Recognizing the other 
person’s epistemic authority means that we ought to allow her to represent us 
epistemically. So, what is Zagzebski’s argument for pre-emption? Why should I, as 
a conscientiously self-reflective believer, treat another person’s beliefs (within the 
relevant domain) as having a pre-emptive power over my own, even regardless of 
their content? Adapting Joseph Raz’s justification thesis for political authority (in 
The Morality of Freedom, 1988), Zagzebski argues that the authority of another 
person’s belief is justified by my conscientious judgement that I am more likely to 
form a belief that survives my conscientious self-reflection if I believe what the 
authority believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself. The point of 
epistemic authority is to help me to believe conscientiously.  
	 185	
We are discussing the question of taking a belief on authority, not (yet) the 
question of testimony. If I come to trust another person’s way of forming a belief 
whether p, I have a reason to take her belief on authority. If I already have a belief 
on the matter it may affect my judgement whether taking a belief on authority will 
survive my conscientious self-reflection better than forming a belief on my own. 
Zagzebski’s principle is: trust your conscientious judgement about what will 
survive conscientious self-reflection. An epistemically conscientious person who 
adopts beliefs that are likely to survive conscientious self-reflection is more likely 
to adopt beliefs from others that do not conflict with his existing ones, or which are 
independent or inconsequential for him, but sometimes he will allow the authority’s 
conflicting belief to have more than prima facie credibility for him, and allow their 
pre-emptive power to override other considerations and existing beliefs. 
Zagzebski recognizes the emotional dimension of our epistemic lives. We 
sometimes react to what others tell us by feeling that it is ridiculous, or by feeling 
indignant that anyone could expect us to believe such a thing. Many emotions, she 
says, can withstand conscientious reflection. We simply have to trust them, in 
conjunction with our other faculties, or we are forced into moral and epistemic 
scepticism. A conscientious person who trusts her decision to act in a certain way, 
needs to trust the emotions that form part of the basis for the decision. If the 
emotion is not appropriate, that must be established by the failure of the emotion to 
satisfy the demands of conscientious self-reflection.  
The emotion that plays the key role in Zagzebski’s argument is admiration. 
To find someone admirable in particular respects is to find her worth imitating in 
these respects, and to trust such a judgement is to believe that the person is worth 
imitating. So to find someone epistemically admirable, either in a particular domain 
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or more generally, is to believe either that you should imitate her beliefs or that 
insofar as you trust your feeling of admiration you have a prima facie reason for 
trusting her beliefs over your own beliefs. If we trust our feelings of admiration 
then we are committed to trusting those we admire. We may well choose to imitate 
their intellectual virtues, and so boost our own moral and intellectual development, 
but Zagzebski’s claim is stronger than this: we also have a prima facie, defeasible 
reason to imitate their beliefs. This does not mean that we do not deserve credit for 
the true beliefs we acquire, for trusting the right people for the truth is a meritorious 
achievement (ibid., p.118). Furthermore, trust in our feelings of admiration 
commits us to trusting the emotions of others whom we trust and admire, and 
therefore to trusting those whom they admire. This greatly expands the scope of our 
epistemic trust and therefore of our reasonable beliefs. Applying this reasoning to 
testimony means that beliefs acquired at the end of long testimonial chains are 
perfectly reasonable as long as one conscientiously believes that the person one has 
trusted for the belief would not herself have accepted it unconscientiously from 
someone she did not trust to have herself have acquired it conscientiously, and so 
on along the chain.  
 
§5.5 Zagzebski on Testimony 
 
I have referred at various points to the range of speech acts that I consider to be 
testimonial in character. A key feature of Zagzebski’s account, and one with 
important educational implications, is that it emphasizes the hearer’s achievement 
in judging the pragmatics of apparently informative utterances. Less attractive in 
my view is the way Zagzebski confines testimony to a particular kind of speech act, 
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thus lessening the hearer’s achievement. It is important to recognize that the 
account of testimony that is motivated by Zagzebski’s argument concerning trust 
and authority is not one that includes assertion as a testimonial speech act. 
Accepting a belief that p on the basis of another person’s assertion that p is one 
way of finding out what the speaker’s belief is; but equally we might find that out 
by overhearing her assertion that p, and we might take that assertion to be 
authoritative, in much the same way as might find her confident striding towards 
the right platform at the railway station authoritative and so follow her. The 
assertion, like the behaviour, is taken as evidence for the belief. For Zagzebski, 
testimony differs from assertion in that A telling B that p is an invitation from A to 
B to trust A for the truth – and perhaps an expectation that B will trust A for the 
truth. A intends B to trust her for the truth and assumes responsibility for the belief 
itself and for B’s acceptance of it. There is therefore an interpersonal “contract” 
established between the testifier and the audience (whether the audience is an 
individual in face-to-face communication with the testifier or a community of 
believers distanced from her in time or space). 
As we have seen, Moran’s assurance model of testimony and McMyler’s 
second-person trust account make similar points. They see the fact that the testifier 
intends the audience to trust her for the truth as essential to the nature of the 
relationship and to the audience’s reasons for accepting the belief. Therefore, the 
audience has a right to defer subsequent challenges to the testifier and also to feel 
aggrieved, indignant, resentful or betrayed if the belief turns out to be false, 
especially if the testifier is revealed to have been unconscientious in some way, or 
insincere. If testimony were a kind of evidence, reactive attitudes such as 
resentment would not be appropriate. There is an implicit moral commitment, 
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similar to a promise, that the testifier makes when she tells the audience that p and 
invites, or expects, their trust. A crucial difference from Lackey’s account is that 
for Zagzebski there is no possibility of a testifier simply being a source of 
evidence, as a clock or thermometer is; rather, the testifier is someone who invites, 
and to whom the recipient extends, trust. In some cases, for example where the 
social context is not appropriate to trust, the audience might refuse to trust and 
therefore treat the testimony as evidence in an attempt to infer its reliability; but in 
favourable contexts the audience has a reason to believe a speaker whom he 
conscientiously trusts to be epistemically conscientious and sincere. Trust in the 
testifier’s sincerity is as important as trust in her conscientiousness. The two are 
distinguishable, for we could quite easily consider someone to be epistemically 
conscientious, trust them to hold accurate beliefs, but doubt their sincerity as 
testifiers. 
As in other trust-based accounts of testimony, in Zagzebski’s account the 
expectations the speaker has of the hearer are relevant: she expects him to trust her 
for the truth. If this is refused, the testifier is entitled to feel aggrieved or resentful 
towards the hearer. For example, if she knows that the hearer generally believes her 
to be trustworthy, she is entitled to feel resentful that on this occasion, when in her 
judgement the context is appropriate for trust, the hearer withholds trust. The fact 
that we do sometimes feel resentment in such circumstances, suggests that we 
expect the default response of audiences to whom we conscientiously testify to be 
trusting belief. The exchange of information is not the only purpose served by these 
trusting relationships between testifiers and audiences, for clearly they are social 
bonds and importantly constitutive not only of epistemic communities but also of 
communities more generally. 
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So what is it that makes the audience’s belief a justified or reasonable belief? 
He is not treating the testimony as evidence of the truth of the proposition 
expressed, not inferring its accuracy or reliability, but, rather, basing his trust on an 
irreducibly first-person, deliberative reason, one that can be a reason for him alone 
– that is, his judgement concerning the trustworthiness of the testifier as both a 
believer and a testifer. In trusting the testifier for the truth, the audience is making 
the judgement that he is more likely to get a true belief, or a belief that will 
withstand his conscientious self-reflection, if he believes what she says, than if he 
relies only on his own cognitive resources.  
Informative utterances come in many forms. They are not always testimonial 
in Zagzebski’s rather narrow sense, nor are they always intended to be sincere or 
literal. They may be, for example, ironic, although in my view this need not 
preclude their being testimonial. The hearer has to make a judgement about the 
speaker’s reasons for saying what she says, about her communicative intentions. It 
is for this reason that the boundary between comprehension and belief is blurred. 
Judgements based on trust enter at the comprehension stage, before the question of 
reasons for belief arises, for the hearer has to trust his own judgement concerning 
the speaker’s trustworthiness in communicating what she intends to communicate, 
and to trust his judgement concerning the nature of the speech act.  
With regard to the debate concerning the relative weight of internalist and 
externalist justification or warrant, we are able to conclude, according to 
Zagzebski, that third-person warrant for the authority of testimony follows from the 
first-person judgement. The fact (rather than my conscientious judgement) that I 
am more likely to get a belief that will survive my conscientious self-reflection, or 
satisfy my desire to get true beliefs, if I believe what the authority tells me rather 
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than if I try to figure out by myself what to believe, means that I can justify to 
others, and they can justify to me, that I should accept a belief on authority with 
only third person reasons. So, for Zagzebski, as for Faulkner, objective warrant and 
subjective justification are achieved by the same set of considerations viewed from 
different perspectives.  
It is the risk of deceit and manipulation that makes the acquisition of beliefs 
via testimony the object of scepticism, but instead of setting the justificatory and/or 
evidential bar impossibly high, we can try to understand better the nature of 
trustworthy authority. This is an important task not only for epistemology but also 
for political philosophy, for there are implications for social cooperation and social 
justice, and for philosophy of education. Zagzebski comments: 
 
Epistemic authority is important in teaching and training, as well 
as in enterprises that involve cooperative effort. The person in 
authority and the persons who are subject to the authority count on 
each other to do their part in a communal undertaking that 
includes authoritative testimony as a necessary component. The 
strength of the authority and its depth in the lives of the subjects 
vary enormously from one community to another because of the 
nature of the goals that hold the community together and the 
degree of trust between the members. I think these differences can 
affect the way authority is justified in a community. (Zagzebski, 
2012, p.144) 
 
The educational and social justice implications of our trust in testimony are 
socially and pedagogically significant, but they are also controversial, especially if 
we accept the full implications of Zagzebski’s arguments concerning the authority 
of the traditional beliefs (including religious beliefs) of one’s community. 
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§5.6 Reflective Judgement and Self-Trust 
 
In this section I return to the idea of “conscientious self-reflection”. It carries a 
good deal of the burden of Zagzebski’s argument and it is closely related to the 
idea of epistemic vigilance that has cropped up in at various points. But Zagzebski 
does not develop it in detail. She claims that first person judgments that are 
rational, reasonable, justified or virtuous have been constrained by a cognitive 
capacity for self-reflection that scanned them for coherence and consistency. But 
coherency and consistency with what exactly?  With each other, perhaps? What are 
the relevant constituents of our subjective lives?  
Keith Lehrer does analyze in detail what is involved in trusting the reflective 
evaluation of one's beliefs and, importantly, desires. His coherentism resonates 
with Zagzebski's notion of harmony and dissonance - that is, the psychic states 
associated with a sense that one's “acceptances and preferences” either are or are 
not fully coherent and self-supporting. The following exposition of Lehrer’s 
explanation of reasonable self-trust may seem a diversion from our focus on 
testimony and education, but it is important for my argument. The rationality or 
reasonableness of an acceptance of a belief on the basis of our trust in a speaker’s 
authority depends on the reasonableness of one’s trust in the trustworthiness of 
one’s own judgements. If I find myself trustworthy in my evaluations then I must 
find myself trustworthy in my evaluation of the trustworthiness of others for me, 
and if these others are trustworthy for me, then I am trustworthy and reasonable in 
accepting or preferring what they accept or prefer.  
Lehrer likens reflective judgement to acceptance of a belief one holds. But if 
one holds a belief, surely it has already been accepted? For Lehrer the distinction 
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between belief and acceptance is a function of our capacity for what he calls 
"metamental ascent". We can continue to hold a belief even after we find that it has 
no basis, but if we do we have not accepted it. To accept a belief is to believe it on 
the basis of indications that it is true. Acceptance is a second-order psychic state. 
What Lehrer calls “belief” is our characteristic attitude towards information from 
our senses and from other people: typically, we receive the information and believe 
it. It is then available for evaluation.  
Acceptance is paralleled in the conative domain by preference. When we 
reflect on a desire, and evaluate it positively, it becomes a preference. Acceptance 
and preference go beyond mere belief and desire because they are concerned with 
what is worth accepting and worth preferring. These judgements, intellectual and 
practical, need not be the result of deliberation or ratiocination, but it is when they 
are that they are most worthy of our trust. When we justify a belief, what we are 
justifying, ultimately, is the trust we place in our own capacity for second-order 
deliberative judgements. 
What makes these second-order judgements (acceptances and preferences) 
reasonable? First-person appeals seem doomed to circularity, for they are bound to 
justify acceptances and preferences by reference to acceptances and preferences 
concerning starting points. For Lehrer, as for Zagzebski and for Richard Foley 
(2001), self-trust is the starting point. This is the only alternative to scepticism. 
Lehrer agrees with Thomas Reid that Humean reductionism leads to scepticism 
because inductive inferences are ultimately ungrounded. Scepticism can be 
avoided, however, for if we are worthy of our trust concerning our acceptances and 
preferences then we can find arguments for their reasonableness. Self-trust 
exorcises scepticism if our deliberations tell us that sceptical doubts are less worthy 
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of our trust than such simple beliefs as that I exist or that I am holding up my hand. 
Such beliefs are exemplary rather than foundational: they show us a path of 
reasonable belief. If I am worthy of my trust in my acceptance of such propositions, 
and my aim is to accept what is true, then I am surely reasonable to trust my 
acceptance and therefore reasonable to accept the proposition. 
But how can I justify the claim that I am worthy of my trust in my 
acceptances? Any argument advanced in support of that premise would rely on my 
trustworthiness concerning its own premises, and thus lead to a regress. To avoid 
this, Lehrer applies the original argument to the trustworthiness premise (1997, pp. 
9-11). The “keystone” claim, that I am worthy of my trust in what I accept, applies 
to the acceptance of this claim itself. What makes it a keystone rather than a 
foundation stone, Lehrer says, is that other things I accept support and confirm it. 
Just as a keystone supports other stones, and yet is held in place by them, so the 
premise that I am worthy of my trust in what I accept both supports other claims 
and is supported by them. This in itself might not be sufficient to justify a high 
stakes knowledge claim, but, Lehrer insists, having taken this modest step towards 
reason we can proceed further, in the first place to towards claims concerning my 
preferences. These depend on the acceptance argument because of the need to 
accept the truth of the premise that I am worthy of my trust concerning what I 
prefer. 
My acceptance that I am worthy of my trust is backed by all my efforts 
concerning my acceptances and preferences. I am concerned in evaluating my 
desires and beliefs to ensure that I am worthy of my self-trust: to be so is one of my 
strongest preferences. Thus my trustworthiness depends on a loop, whereby the 
reasonableness of my preferences depends on the reasonableness of my 
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acceptances (specifically, the truth of the premise that I am worthy of my trust 
concerning what I prefer), and the reasonableness of my acceptances concerning 
my worthiness depends on my having a preference for being worthy of my trust 
concerning what I accept and what I prefer. In Lehrer's words: “My preference and 
acceptance concerning my trustworthiness in what I accept and prefer form a loop 
which is the keystone supporting the structure of reasonable acceptance and 
preference within my evaluation system” (Lehrer, 1997, p. 15). 
Lehrer confronts the objection that though I may in general be worthy of my 
trust in my preferences and acceptances, sometimes I am not: sometimes I am too 
ignorant or unfamiliar with the domain to do anything other than abstain from 
forming any acceptances or preferences. So how do I know when I know enough to 
evaluate in a trustworthy way, and how, when I know I am often tempted to form 
beliefs and preferences about things I know little about, can I have enough 
confidence in my practices of self-restraint? I may have made misjudgements 
concerning the domains in which I am worthy of my trust concerning what I 
accept. If I cannot be sure about this, all my worthiness is undermined.  
Lehrer responds to this by arguing that I remain my own best guide, despite 
my errors in particular cases, so long as I remain trustworthy in how I reason and 
reflect. Reasoning is to acceptance and preference as inference is to belief and 
desire: it is a higher order capacity deployed in evaluation. It is part of the loop - in 
fact, it is the knot that ties the loop:  
 
It is the knot that solves the general problem of induction...Induction 
is reasonable if I am worthy of my trust in how I reason. The 
problem of the choice of rules and principles remains, but unless I 
am worthy of my trust in how I reason, my efforts to defend 
reasoning will fail. (Ibid., p. 20)  
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I must be worthy of my trust in how I reason in order to sustain the reasoning that 
led me to the conclusion that I am worthy of my trust in what I accept and prefer. 
The argument for the reasonableness of my trust in my reasoning parallels those for 
the reasonableness of my trust in my acceptances and preferences. With that in 
place, we close the keystone loop whereby each component - acceptance, 
preference and reasoning - support each other. 
Lehrer’s argument is not intended to be a proof. If it were, it would be guilty 
of assuming what it sets out to prove, the reasonableness of accepting that we are 
trustworthy. Rather, it is intended as an explanation. The reality of our 
trustworthiness explains the reasonableness of accepting that we are trustworthy. 
Explanations that end with a loop leave nothing unexplained; the alternative is an 
explanation that is simply a dead end. 
Lehrer’s explanation of our evaluative system, incorporating desires and 
emotions as well as beliefs, provides us with a reason for trusting our own 
judgments as recipients of testimony. Unless my evaluative system works well, I 
cannot be worthy of self-trust. The trustworthiness of our self-reflective acceptance 
of what we believe on the basis of being told it by another person provides a basis 
for justification and knowledge.  
Lehrer's is a coherence theory, a theory without first premises. Personally 
justified acceptance is acceptance that coheres with an evaluation system that 
includes preferences, and personally justified preference is preference that coheres 
with an evaluation system that includes acceptances. My evaluation system must 
take account of my states of preference and acceptance and not just of the content 
of the acceptances and preferences. Coherence yields reasonable acceptance, not 
knowledge. Knowledge requires external constraints, such as truth, that coherence 
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and personal justification do not require. What coheres within my personal 
evaluation system is the whole range of justified acceptances, from moral beliefs to 
perceptual beliefs, but still the truth of the beliefs is required for them to count as 
knowledge. On the other hand, no further justification is required beyond personal 
justification.  
Lehrer’s notion of comparative reasonableness necessarily remains vague. He 
can provide only a relativistic explanation in terms of one's preferences concerning 
the relative importance of, for example, truth and explanatory power. He prioritizes 
truth as his personal fundamental objective of acceptance but implies that other 
priorities could also be reasonable. Once again, preferences and acceptances are 
mutually supporting, for one's preferences concerning intellectual objectives will 
influence one's preferences concerning competing propositions. One's worthiness 
of self-trust concerning preferences is an essential component of the system, as is 
the worthiness of self-trust concerning one's acceptance of preferences. Whether 
one is worthy of self-trust depends ultimately on one's success in achieving one's 
intellectual objectives, such as truth.  
Lehrer's keystone loop not only makes self-trust and all that follows from it 
reasonable, it also makes it justified, for there is no alternative to it. If I judge 
myself to be untrustworthy in my acceptances and preferences, then I have to judge 
myself to be trustworthy in respect of that judgement at least, a judgement which 
itself will depend on the whole mutually supporting structure of my evaluation 
system. The distinction between reasonable acceptance and justified acceptance is 
that although an acceptance might be reasonable it is not necessarily immune from 
objections, from competitors. Such an acceptance cannot have the justification that 
is necessary for knowledge, even if it is true. To revert to Zagzebski's 
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characterization, conscientious self-reflection on reasonable but unjustified belief 
would lead the subject to be aware of its status and so more cautious in the way she 
expressed her belief. She could not, for example, express the contested belief as 
testimony, for to offer testimony is to take responsibility for its status as a justified 
true belief. She could express the belief more responsibly as a hypothesis, opinion 
or speculation. 
For Lehrer, it is undefeated justified acceptance that amounts to knowledge 
and undefeated justified preference that amounts to wisdom. The transformation is 
effected by the defeat of sceptical doubts. Such doubts must themselves by subject 
to the subject's evaluation system if they are to be considered reasonable, and the 
subject must defeat them in order for her original acceptance or preference to be 
personally justified. If the doubt wins, the error defeats the justification. My 
acceptances include one concerning the merit of being trustworthy in what I accept 
as true and so I prefer to be trustworthy in what I accept. Justified preference rests 
on acceptance of my trustworthiness in what I prefer and justified acceptance rests 
on my preference for being trustworthy. Thus the keystone loop ties knowledge and 
wisdom together (Lehrer, 1997, pp. 43-50).  
To be worthy of my trust in my preferences, acceptances and reasoning, I 
must also be worthy of trust in my way of changing them when it is appropriate to 
do so, in order for it to be reasonable for me to accept corrections I make to my 
method of reasoning. I must find both my ends and my methods of pursuing them 
worthy of trust; however, we are all fallible and vulnerable to deception and error. 
Reasonableness and trustworthiness can come apart. A false assumption of 
trustworthiness blocks justification, and therefore knowledge and wisdom.  
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Knowledge requires that the things I think are worth accepting really are 
worth accepting, but there is no natural feature that necessitates that I am 
trustworthy in what I accept, and there is no natural feature in what I accept that 
makes it worthy of acceptance. All the relevant features are epistemic features. Any 
naturalistically backed success in acquiring true beliefs could be accidental or 
lucky, and therefore would not be worthy of acceptance. Lehrer observes: “Nature 
tells us what will be, but about what is worthy of being, she is silent as a stone” 
(ibid., p. 73).  
Autonomous choice is at the centre of Lehrer’s keystone loop (p. 103). 
Taking us from beliefs and desires to acceptances and preferences, metamental 
ascent enables us to re-spin our web of evaluation, to resolve conflicts among our 
beliefs and desires by a process of higher order evaluation. It aims at coherence, or 
in Zagzebski’s terms, harmony. When conflict arises between higher order 
strategies, it is autonomous choice that resolves them. It frees us from our first 
order conflicts, by choosing between the options that higher order evaluation has 
made available to us. Unless I am the author of my acceptances and preferences I 
cannot be worthy of my trust. If I am not autonomous how can I begin the sequence 
of self-trust, and if I do not trust myself how can I be worthy of my trust? 
Autonomous acts and beliefs are those we prefer and accept as a result of a process 
of higher order evaluation, and we escape thereby from bondage to first order 
promptings.  
So, the rationality or reasonableness of an acceptance of a belief on the basis 
of our trust in a speaker’s authority depends on the reasonableness of one’s trust in 
the trustworthiness of one’s own judgements. If I find myself trustworthy in my 
evaluations then I must find myself trustworthy in my evaluation of the 
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trustworthiness of others for me, and if these others are trustworthy for me, then I 
am trustworthy in accepting or preferring what they accept or prefer. This has 
ramifications throughout my evaluative system. My positive evaluation of the 
trustworthiness of others can lead to a change in what I accept and prefer and can 
make me more trustworthy, both for myself and for others. If others evaluate my 
trustworthiness positively and change their acceptances and preferences as a result, 
this can produce a change in their trustworthiness for themselves and for me. I will 
weight the trustworthiness of myself and others differently for different subjects 
and domains and this will help me to resolve conflicts when trusted persons, 
including myself, disagree. My preferences become more worthy of my trust as the 
result of my aggregating the preferences of others in terms of my evaluation of 
their trustworthiness. If I am a member of a group of people who have all increased 
their trustworthiness as I have, conflicts of acceptances and preferences are likely 
to decrease and knowledge and wisdom will become increasingly likely. We will 
be constantly updating our mutual evaluations of each other’s trustworthiness and 
therefore of our acceptances and preferences. In effect, a group averaging will 
produce a consensual measure of the trustworthiness of each member. If all 
members of the group are connected by positive respect and trust, given a 
reasonable degree of constancy in our evaluations, our aggregations will converge 
on consensus concerning preferences and acceptances.  
When educationalists have talked or written about the importance of 
autonomy, self-reflection, intellectual virtues and critical thinking, they have 
seldom tracked back to the source of the kind of independence they think students 
should aspire to. That source is the students’ judgements about their own 
conscientiousness and integrity in maintaining and refreshing a coherent set of 
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beliefs and desires, preferences and acceptances, including their judgments 
concerning the epistemic authority of others and their decisions to trust them for 
the truth rather than to rely on their own resources. In this context, the 
traditionalist/progressivist binary has little epistemological traction.  
 
§ 5.7 Beliefs on Authority 
 
In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785/1983) Thomas Reid argued 
that a balance has to be struck between accepting beliefs on authority and rejecting 
authority for the sake of autonomy. He wrote: 
  
 Here, perhaps, it will be said, What has authority to do in matters 
of opinion? Is truth to be determined by most votes? Or is 
authority to be again raised out of its grave to tyrannise over 
mankind? I am aware that, in this age, an advocate for authority 
has a very unfavourable plea; but I wish to give no more to 
authority than is its due. Most justly do we honour the names of 
those benefactors to mankind who have contributed more or less 
to break the yoke of that authority which deprives men of the 
natural, the unalienable right of judging for themselves; but, while 
we indulge a just animosity against this authority, and against all 
who would subject us to its tyranny, let us remember how 
common the folly is, of going from one faulty extreme into the 
opposite. (1983, p. 262) 
 
Lehrer and Zagzebski do not want to deprive us of the right of judging for 
ourselves. Indeed, their argument is that judging for ourselves is unavoidable, even 
though the judgement might be to accept the authority of a person who is better 
placed for knowledge than we are. 
Lehrer’s coherentist account of reasonable and justified belief through trust in 
one’s own capacity for conscientious self-reflection, and consequent trust in the 
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beliefs of others whom one conscientiously trusts, complements Zagzebski’s 
argument that the conscientiously self-reflective person is committed to belief on 
authority. Not to accept beliefs on the authority of people we trust causes 
“dissonance” and incoherence. It would be inconsistent with our own self-trust. If 
what we want is true beliefs and we trust our faculties to judge well when others 
are in a better position to know than we are, it would be irresponsible and 
unreasonable not to accept their authority on the matter at hand. If what they say 
conflicts with beliefs we already hold we have to resolve the conflict. For Lehrer, 
in situations where alternatives are evenly balanced, this resolution comes down to 
an exercise of autonomous preference. For Zagzebski, an individual should accept 
the word of the authority if he conscientiously judges that he is more likely to form 
a belief that survives his conscientious self-reflection if he believes what she 
believes (or testifies to) than if he tries to figure it out for himself. In the case of 
testimony, there is the additional issue of the possibility of the speaker’s inaccuracy 
or insincerity. But, again, trust in one’s own capacities and motivations as a 
testifier, and the recognition that other people are relevantly similar to oneself, 
makes reasonable and responsible one’s trust in others as testifiers.  
There are several points at which we might wish to take issue with Lehrer or 
Zagzebski. For example, the conclusion Zagzebski draws concerning the 
acceptance of beliefs on the basis of the authority of one’s community, including 
moral and religious beliefs expressed in holy scriptures (to which Reid alludes), is 
clearly controversial. For Zagzebski and Lehrer, autonomy is exercised in making 
judgements about what and whom it is best to trust for the truth, for the sake of 
maintaining doxastic harmony or epistemic coherence. But does this provide 
sufficient motivation to understand for ourselves, to educate ourselves in order to 
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achieve the expertise or authority that the trusted other already has? Is not doxastic 
harmony most easily achieved by the doxastically complacent? To meet this 
challenge we need to be sure that such complacency would be inconsistent with 
genuine conscientiousness and integrity in keeping one’s intellectual house in 
order. The challenge highlights the importance of dialogue with others, dialogue 
that provides the epistemic tension or resistance that provokes us to undertake 
conscientious self-reflection. To use a term from architecture and structural 
engineering, dialogue with others creates the necessary tensegrity.20 
In the next chapter I explore some of the questions about dialogue and the 
pragmatics of speech that have arisen in the context of the theories discussed in the 
last two chapters. These may seem like questions for linguistics and the philosophy 
of language rather than for epistemology, but the speech acts that constitute 
testimony are located within discourses or speech genres of various kinds, and are 
partly constituted by their contexts. The linguistic and the epistemological are 
intertwined and there are important implications in this for education. 
 
																																																								
20 This is a  “portmanteau” term, combining “tension” and “integrity”, and is 
applied to self-sustaining structures. 
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Chapter 6: Varieties of Testimony: Pragmatics and Dialogism 
 
In this chapter I argue that theories of testimony have tended to conflate different 
speech acts and have therefore failed to do justice to the richness of the process by 
which we share knowledge. This conflation applies to the trust theories as well as 
to the reductionist, non-reductionist and hybrid theories. I will concentrate on the 
distinction between assertions and assurances, but these are not the only relevant 
speech acts. A confession, for example, is also a specific testimonial speech act: its 
purposes and ramifications are distinctive. We have not comprehended a 
confession if we have not recognized its pragmatic implicatures. 
This chapter takes us, firstly, into the realms of pragmatics, the branch of 
linguistics that is especially concerned with contexts of utterance. Pragmatics is 
relevant to the epistemology of testimony, and to questions of trust and authority 
more generally, in two ways. The first connects with the work of J. L. Austin (and 
later John Searle) on speech acts. The second concerns the work of Paul Grice and 
others on the distinction between implicatures and explicatures – that is, the 
distinction between what is encoded in the semantics of the sentence and what is 
communicated contextually in the saying. In later sections of the chapter I connect 
speech acts with Bakhtin’s notion of speech genres in order to extend the 
discussion of testimonial utterances to more extended classroom dialogues or 
conversations. 
Speech act theory helps us to identify different kinds of telling and to 
recognize that all successful communication entails the hearer responding 
appropriately to the specific speech act. It helps us to appreciate how closely linked 
comprehension and epistemic response are: considerations that are generally 
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viewed as epistemic, such as the hearer's assessment of the sincerity or 
trustworthiness of the speaker, enter first at the point of comprehension. Another 
way in which they interconnect is in the roles played in both by background 
knowledge, contextual features and inferences. For example, in both cases 
judgements concerning the speaker's intentions are relevant. 
If I am correct in arguing that a variety of speech acts populate the 
epistemological category of testimony, and if the epistemic considerations 
concerning the normative commitments undertaken by the participants vary 
accordingly, it would seem that a search for a unitary account of the justification of 
testimonial belief is misguided. This is an important point in relation to the 
pedagogical and curricular implications that I discuss in the next chapter. 
Austin, like Wittgenstein, thought that philosophers had exaggerated the 
propositional, or descriptive, aspects of statements and neglected the uses to which 
they are put in ordinary speech.21 Since Austin’s  death, in 1961, other philosophers 
have developed this focus on the pragmatics of speech utterances and the social or 
interpersonal aspects of communication. I have already mentioned Searle and 
Grice; another is Robert Brandom, who sees the speech act of assertion as the one 
against which other illocutionary acts must be understood. However, in relation to 
testimony, I will be arguing for a distinction between the speech acts of assertion 
and assurance, and urging the special significance of the speech act of assurance. 
What makes these testimonial speech acts is that in transmitting information from 
speaker to audience they both invite trust, although the nature of the trust and the 
																																																								21	A related point can be made concerning accounts of children’s language 
learning, their “learning to mean”. Michael Halliday emphasizes the semiotic 
functions of the earliest protolinguistic expressions and sees use, and 
subsequently more complex and abstract functions, as critical in the transition 
to adult language (Halliday, 2003).	
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implicated commitments in is different each type of speech act.  
 
§6.1 Speech Acts 
 
Having argued in the first part of How To Do Things With Words (1962) for a sharp 
distinction between constative (declarative) utterances, that can be true or false, and 
performative utterances, such as promising, Austin came to realize that the 
distinction is imprecise. A promise can be infelicitous if, for example, the speaker 
is insincere, but it cannot be true or false. A declarative utterance, on the other 
hand, is either true or false; but Austin came to see that it too can be infelicitous if 
the speaker is insincere. Furthermore, declaratives can be used in practice to 
suggest promises and orders: for example, “I will do the washing up later”. This 
introduces Austin’s distinction between a) the locutionary act, the speaking of the 
sentence, b) the illocutionary act, which is an act with a certain force or purpose, 
such as asserting, promising or ordering, and c) the perlocutionary consequence of 
the illocutionary act, its effect on the audience. 
Asserting a proposition is certainly a way of making a knowledge claim. If a 
speaker asserts “David Cameron attended a dinner last night at Eton College” she is 
making a claim that is truth-assessable (although, as we shall see later, the context 
or situation of utterance has to be taken into account in order to make judgements 
of truth and falsity). Austin came to see that all speech acts convey commitments 
and expectations. In an assertion the speaker implies (or implicates, to use Grice’s 
terminology) that she not only knows this proposition to be true but also intends 
her audience to expect it to be true.  
	 206	
This basic idea can be elaborated in a number of different ways. For example, 
for Searle (1969) an assertion is characterized by the fact that the speaker 
undertakes that the proposition expressed represents an actual state of affairs. For 
Grice (1989), the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s attitudes and intentions is 
also necessary. In asserting that p the speaker intends the hearer to take her 
utterance both as a reason to believe that she believes that p and as a reason to 
believe it himself. The hearer’s belief (or non-belief) that p is the perlocutionary 
effect of the speech act, but it is not constitutive of it, whereas his recognition of 
the speaker’s attitudes and intentions is constitutive of the speech act. Sperber and 
Wilson (1986) emphasize the informative function of assertion. Although assertions 
can fail to be informative, the audience’s recognition of the informative intention is 
important. Alston (2000) states that the speaker takes responsibility only for the 
proposition made explicit by the utterance; other propositions may be implicit in 
the utterance but the speaker is not responsible for them.  
Robert Brandom (2000) argues that a speaker who asserts that p undertakes a 
responsibility to justify the assertion if challenged. The speaker assumes an 
authority, the right to pass on to the hearer the entitlements of the assertion. She 
could justify the assertion by reference to a perceptual experience, by offering 
further assertions as reasons, or by deferring to a previous asserter who passed his 
commitments on to her. Assertions therefore can both require reasons and be 
reasons in support of other assertions. When we offer a second assertion as a reason 
that supports our first assertion we endorse the inferential relation between the two, 
and a hearer who accepts the reasons endorses both the inference and our 
entitlement. The propositional content of the assertion is best characterized as the 
relation of compatibility between commitments, rather than in terms of truth 
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conditions. Judgements of truth are themselves best assessed in terms of inferential 
commitments and entitlements. Unlike other philosophers I have mentioned, such 
as Sperber and Wilson, Brandom does not employ psychological attitudes, such as 
intentions and beliefs, in his account of assertion. Rather, assertion is described as 
taking place “in the context of a set of social practices with the structure of (in 
Sellars’s phrase) a game of giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom, 2000, p. 
189).  
The important point for us at this point is that these philosophers have sought 
to describe assertion in terms of the commitments undertaken by speakers and 
assumed or passed on to hearers. For assurance to be a speech act distinct from 
assertion it will have to be distinguished by a different set of commitments and 
expectations. These differences will be discussed in §6.4. 
 
§6.2 Saying Something 
 
What is it to say something? This is an important question in the context of a 
discussion of testimony because it subsumes the question: What is it to tell 
someone something? Paul Grice makes a distinction between what the speaker 
literally says in the utterance and what she intends to communicate by using just 
those words in that situation. In distinguishing between explicatures and 
implicatures, he draws attention to the contextual features of the communication 
and to certain conversational conventions or principles. We are ignoring the 
contextual implicatures of the utterance - that is, what the speaker implicates but 
does not explicitly state - if we assume that what a speaker says is determined by 
just the conventional or encoded meaning of the grammatical sentence, plus such 
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contextual features as help to fix reference and to disambiguate. The fact that the 
same form of words, the same grammatical sentence, can convey different 
meanings in different circumstances demonstrates the significance of 
implicatures.22 
Grice’s implicatures are governed by his famous conversational maxims: 
 
1. Quantity: make your contribution as informative as is required for 
the current purposes of the exchange; do not make them more 
informative than is required. 
2. Quality: try to make your contribution one that is true; do not say 
what you believe to be false, not say that for which you lack 
adequate evidence. 
3. Relation: be relevant. 
4. Manner: Be perspicacious; avoid obscurity and ambiguity, be brief 
and orderly; frame what you say in the form most suitable for an 
appropriate reply. 
 
In Studies in the Way of Words (1989) Grice argues that these maxims are 
derived from principles governing rational cooperative behaviour. They are 
intended to help us to define and interpret conversational implicatures, therefore 
they play a part in determining the audience’s interpretation of the speaker’s 
																																																								22	I do not engage directly with the debate concerning the relative importance of semantic 
or “encoded” features, on the one hand, and pragmatic or contextual features, on the 
other. Integrationists, such as Roy Harris and Michael Toolan, who argue that all 
meaning is pragmatic, outflank semantic minimalists, such as Robyn Carston. However, I 
acknowledge that my argument draws heavily on the contribution of pragmatic elements. 	
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meaning, of what she intends to communicate above and beyond the literal or 
encoded meaning of the sentences she has spoken.  
Reference has been made in previous chapters to the trustworthiness and 
sincerity of the speaker, but to what does “sincerity” refer? If it is to what the 
speaker has said, rather than to her beliefs, then getting clearer about what it is to 
say something will help us to be clearer about what we mean when we describe a 
speaker as sincere or insincere. For example, can we talk about what is said, and 
about sincerity, without considering the speaker’s intentions?  
Jennifer Mather Saul (2012) discusses Bill Clinton’s famous denial (in a 
television interview) of an “improper relationship” with Jennifer Lewinski. 
Clinton’s exact words were: “There is no improper relationship”. What has he said? 
What has he told the audience? To anticipate a later argument, there is nothing 
passive about an alert audience’s interpretation of such an assurance. If “meaning” 
is “what is said”, and if this is simply a matter of what is encoded in the words and 
syntax, then Clinton has not told a lie, nor even said anything misleading. It was 
probably true when he uttered the words (in the present tense) that there was no 
improper relationship. But surely he has intended either (or both) to mislead by 
allowing the audience to think he is denying that there ever had been an improper 
relationship or to implicate that, as a trained lawyer and a wily politician, he is not 
going to be trapped into either an outright lie or a confession. So what has he told 
us? We have to interpret. We have to process his remark with the help of our 
accumulated knowledge and experience of communication and people. This is not a 
passive process, if we are paying attention. To “pay attention” we have to deploy 
our understanding of conversational conventions of the kind discussed by Grice.  
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Grice says of assertion that the speaker’s intention is that the hearer should 
think that she, the speaker, believes something. The speaker wants the hearer to 
know that she believes and is committed to the proposition expressed. Writers such 
as Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and Robyn Carston (2002) argue that Grice’s 
account does not completely capture the nature of assertion because it does not take 
into account how underdetermined by the syntax the proposition itself is.  The 
proposition is not simply encoded in the grammatical sentence. It can be recovered 
only from an interpretation of the utterance by the hearer, who needs to take further 
contextual features and shared background assumptions into account. This suggests 
that assertions are more fundamental than beliefs and they are essentially 
interpersonal. Similarly to Brandom, Dummett (1991, 1993) argues that the notion 
of belief relies on the notion of truth, which itself relies on the practice of “treating 
as true”, and this includes demonstrating a grasp of the practical and inferential 
consequences of maintaining the proposition, a practice exemplified by assertion: 
assertion is the practice by which we show that we grasp and accept many of the 
practical and inferential consequences of a belief.  
Whether assertion is cognitively more fundamental than belief is a different 
question from whether it is conceptually more fundamental. According to Mark 
Jary (2010, p. 36), “There is no conflict between the view that the notion of 
assertion is conceptually prior to the notion of belief, and the view that assertoric 
utterances derive their content from the beliefs they express”. He goes on to 
suggest, nevertheless, that in practice we come to understand the notions of truth 
and falsity that underlie a conception of belief, by acquiring a competence in 
assertion. This suggests that linguistic competence contributes to a grasp of 
epistemic concepts. This competence would have to relate to both sides of 
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communication, the speaker’s and the hearer’s sides, and this has clear implications 
for the range of experiences that children need to have in order to grasp the 
epistemic concepts and to assume epistemic responsibilities. In the next chapter I 
argue that children need experience of speaking as knowers and as testifiers, of 
being trusted as epistemic authorities, and that this goes beyond having a right to “a 
voice”. 
The issue of the priority of assertion and belief reflects the division between 
conceptual explanations that look for conditions, norms or criteria, and empirical or 
psychological explanations that seek to explain specifically human, or cultural, 
practices, as with Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory. It is a distinction that is 
relevant to testimony, and to all aspects of social epistemology, for to explain the 
conceptual or normative conditions for particular social practices is different from 
analyzing them as they occur in particular cultures.  
Where do trust theories of testimony fit into this? I think they are best seen as 
describing cultural practices with specific epistemic and linguistic norms, and as 
supporting a belief-based or intention-based approach. Zagzebski’s and Lehrer’s 
versions of coherentism do suggest a culturally-specific set of practices concerning 
testimony, trust and authority. This is not to preclude the possibility that practices 
based on trust are prerequisites of society and communication, nor to deny that the 
rewards and hazards of trust help to define the general human condition. 
 
§6.3 Interpreting Speech Acts 
 
The implication of Gricean accounts is that assertion is a source of information 
about the speaker’s beliefs and intentions rather than a source of information about 
	 212	
the world. This is close, therefore, to those accounts of testimony that a) associate 
testimony with assertion and b) argue that we infer facts about the world indirectly 
by inferring facts about the reliability or trustworthiness of the speaker’s belief. For 
Grice assertion is invited belief attribution. This suggests that once we have 
acquired the information that S believes that p, we have a separate process to go 
through in order to acquire the knowledge that p. One alternative to this is the non-
reductionist view that comprehension is an a priori reason for acceptance; another 
is Sperber and Wilson’s theory,  in which belief attribution is replaced by the 
attribution of the overt intention on the speaker’s part to let the hearer know the 
information. But Sperber and Wilson’s account has a problem reconciling a 
conventional understanding of assertion with the idea that the transfer of 
information about the world is secondary to information about the speaker’s state 
of mind. Comprehending and epistemic response seem to be more closely 
connected in the case of some speech acts than is the case with assertion. In 
comprehending a promise, for example, one understands and forms a belief that S 
is promising p, but with assertion the receiver seems to be responsible for the 
further step of accepting the content for himself. 
Let us look again at the question of the demands on young children’s 
cognitive capacities. For McDowell the ability of assertions to represent reality 
must come before their ability to express beliefs, both conceptually and in terms of 
the child’s cognitive development (McDowell, 1980/1998, p. 48. See also Jary, 
2010, p. 43). In order for children to interpret utterances with assertoric force as 
expressing the speaker’s beliefs, they need to be capable of making judgements 
about plausibility, reliability, sincerity and trustworthiness, and capable of 
sometimes withholding judgement. They need to be able to recognize their 
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teacher’s intention to persuade or to speculate rather than to inform, and to 
recognize the invitation to connect the new information with previous information. 
All this is very demanding. However, given the wide range of utterances with 
assertoric force that a child encounters in the course of a school day, the degree of 
linguistic sensitivity required is already hugely demanding. The need to interpret 
utterances cannot be avoided, even if the requirement to evaluate beliefs can be. 
This means that children who have not yet acquired skill and sensitivity in 
interpreting utterances - inevitably complicated by a range of contextual features -  
are especially vulnerable to error, even when they inhabit relatively safe epistemic 
environments such as school classrooms.  
So either way there seem to be considerable cognitive demands on children, 
whether we favour a Gricean belief-attribution account, a Sperber and Wilson 
intention-attribution account or (given that utterances need interpretation) 
McDowellian directness. Mark Jary proposes a hybrid approach whereby although 
complex intentions are made manifest in acts of assertion, a representation of the 
intentions does not necessarily play a part in interpretation: children do not 
necessarily have to recognize the communicative intention, but for adults and older 
children they can play a part when something goes wrong in the basic interpretive 
process: 
 
 [N]ovice competence in assertion, of the sort developed by young 
children, is indeed a form of perception by proxy in which 
comprehension and acceptance coincide. The onset of the ability 
to attribute beliefs allows the child to conceptualize assertions as 
expressions of belief, and as attempts to cause beliefs. This is the 
ability to attribute Gricean-style intentions to communicators. 
However, this new insight does not result in the wholesale 
rejection of the interpretive procedures that have served the child 
well up to that point. Rather, these are augmented by the child’s 
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new capacities, and these are brought to bear on the interpretive 
process only when needed, such as when the speaker is judged to 
be incompetent, unreliable or untrustworthy, or when, for 
example, the nature of the interaction makes it obvious that the 
speaker is not intending to inform, but to persuade, as in academic 
discourse. (Jary, 2010, p. 45) 
 
So, for the most part, children and adults can accept the information in the process 
of comprehending the utterance. It is only when something other than 
straightforward information-giving is suggested by the nature of the interaction that 
we need to employ, if we can, the belief-evaluating capacities that we have 
acquired through experience and cognitive development. This involves us in 
adopting a “meta-communicative” stance. 
Jary’s account, like Quinton’s and Goldberg’s that we met in Chapter 3, 
underestimates the cognitive and linguistic achievement involved in interpreting 
the utterance in the first place, which must rely to some extent on the ability to 
distinguish between different kinds of information-giving speech act. Any account 
of epistemic justification in relation to testimony has to have something more to 
say than this about naïve and straightforward cases, where no suspicions have been 
aroused. The assumption in Jary’s account (and also in Sperber and Wilson’s) is 
that only assertion aims at the transfer of knowledge from speaker to audience. Can 
it really be the case that it is only when viewed from a meta-communicative stance 
that knowledge transfer is taken as belief-expression, and therefore only then that 
questions of epistemic justification and truth arise? If so, the “meta-communicative 
stance” is one that we adopt regularly rather than exceptionally, for we would be 
adopting it whenever we assess testimony for credibility and consistency, and 
testifiers for expertise, reliability, sincerity or trustworthiness. It is more likely that 
a greater degree of (interconnected) linguistic and epistemic sophistication is 
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required for successful communication from the start and that this includes the 
ability to recognize, and respond differentially to, a variety of information-giving 
speech acts. Linguistic and epistemic judgement develops in tandem. 
Jary’s separation of comprehension and acceptance is too extreme. 
Credibility, consistency, reliability, sincerity and trustworthiness must feature in 
responsible comprehension or interpretation. How can we detect when something 
has gone wrong unless we are already filtering utterances in some way for 
epistemic danger signs? Epistemologists insist on this in relation to testimony, as 
we have seen, but all communicative utterances, not just direct assertions, demand 
some kind of filtering, for most will have a degree of assertoric force, explicit or 
implicit propositions that are truth-apt. Jary underestimates, as we have seen others 
do, the cognitive and linguistic demands on listeners of any age who comprehend 
and learn from what others say to them. 
To see this more clearly, consider the relationship between what is asserted in 
an utterance and the main point of the sentence spoken. We would normally expect 
the main point to be what is being asserted, and for this to be conveyed by the 
syntax, in the main clause:  
 
a) On Monday Richard spent the whole day at Lords. 
 
But we can see that even in a fairly straightforward example such as this, the 
context could override the syntax and separate the point of the utterance from the 
syntactic main point. This would be the case, for example, if the speaker and the 
hearer are colleagues of Richard, or his bosses, and they know that on Monday 
Richard had phoned in sick, so the information that it was on Monday that Richard 
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spent the day watching a cricket match is not an additional piece of information but 
integral to the message. If we now add words and phrases such as “apparently” or 
“Rosemary suspects” we can see that, again, the actual point of the utterance needs 
further interpretation. 
 
(b) Apparently, on Monday Richard spent the whole day at Lords. 
 
(c) Rosemary suspects that Richard spent the whole day at Lords on       
Monday. 
 
(d) On Monday Richard spent the whole day, Rosemary suspects, at Lords. 
 
In all these examples the hearer is expected to recognize that the speaker is 
distancing himself, to a degree, from the (putative) main point and shifts what he 
accepts responsibility for – that is, the assertoric point that he could be challenged 
on. Also, in (d), the repositioning of the subordinate clause “Rosemary suspects” 
changes the main point, even though syntactically the main clause stays the same. 
Nevertheless, the point of the utterance, the reason why the speaker has chosen at 
this moment to tell the hearer this information, and what she expects him to 
recognize as the relevance of what she is saying to their conversation, could stay 
the same in (d) as in (a), (b), and (c), depending on contextual features such as who 
Rosemary is, her relationship to Richard, their shared background knowledge of 
Richard’s requests for leave, his past record of reliability and honesty and any 
previous conversations they may have had about him. 
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What this shows is that the interpretation of even quite mundane statements 
makes considerable cognitive, linguistic and epistemic demands on the hearer, and 
these are interconnected in complex ways. For example, the hearer may have been 
sceptical about the evidence for (a) but not for (c) because of what he knows about 
Rosemary, Richard and the speaker, but in order for this epistemic difference to 
register with him he has to be sensitive to the linguistic differences. There is 
complexity, too, in the way the illocutionary point of the utterance, the implicature, 
coincides with the main point or assertion of the sentence, is subordinate to it, 
overrides it, or reconfigures it. The information conveyed by the implicature 
sometimes undermines the information contained in what is, grammatically, the 
main point or assertion. All these considerations further add to my claim about the 
complexity involved in interpreting what someone is (really) saying and therefore 
to the complexity in accepting some or all of the information directly stated and 
indirectly implicated. 
For Sperber and Wilson the complexity involved in communication is 
lessened by the fact that we are programmed to minimize (or optimize) processing 
effort. Every utterance conveys a presumption of its own relevance. Interpretation 
involves inferring how the presumption is to be fulfilled – that is, interpretation (or 
comprehension) requires us to recognize what the point of the utterance is. 
Identifying its relevance, in context, allows us to maximize effect while minimizing 
cognitive effort. We select the optimal “assumption” (or proposition) from all the 
possible assumptions the context and the grammatical sentence allow. Some of the 
effects are grammatical entailments; others involve the triggering of background 
assumptions (information recovered from memory) and contextual inferences. 
Verbal utterances allow for phonology, intonation and rhythm, to make a difference 
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to the hearer’s interpretation, shifting the point from what might otherwise seem 
like a syntactically straightforward main point and assertion.  
A teacher will very often give young children information in utterances that 
are formed from straightforward, simple declarative sentences, which linguistically 
mark the main point and what is being asserted. We can think of this as the default 
mode of testifying, of telling. But even in these cases interpretation is complicated 
by context, differences in background knowledge and assumptions, linguistic 
sensitivity and experience, including the capacity to infer syntactic and semantic 
entailments. A neglected aspect of the hearer’s linguistic (and therefore epistemic) 
sensitivity is his capacity to recognize different speech acts. I do not mean, of 
course, that he needs to be able to name the speech acts, only that he is tacitly 
aware of the different commitments and expectations implicated by them. The 
speech acts most relevant to testimony and the epistemic and pedagogical issues 
connected with it, are assertion and assurance.  
 
§6.4 Assurance and Assertion Revisited 
 
Is testimony a speech act in its own right or are there a number of speech acts that 
fall under that epistemological title? If the latter, and speakers and hearers are 
subject to different normative commitments and expectations when information is 
exchanged via different speech acts, in what ways will we have to adapt the 
approach to epistemic justification I outlined in the last chapter? Furthermore, with 
regard to classroom dialogue and learning, how significant are the differences 
between speech acts? In this section I examine assertion and assurance from the 
perspective of Austinian pragmatics, but this does not fully incorporate all the 
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features of speech that affect what is conveyed from speaker to hearer, so in the 
next section I outline how Bakhtin’s broader dialogistic approach can contribute to 
an understanding of informative classroom discourses.  
I have described some of the complexities involved in interpreting verbal 
exchanges in which the point of the utterance differs from the “main point” or 
propositional content. Part of the complexity concerns the interpretation of the 
speech act: the interpretation of the commitments and expectations implicated by 
the utterance. When a speaker prefaces her statement with a phrase such as “I hear 
that…”, I believe that…” or “I expect that…” the propositional content of the main 
clause is generally said to stay the same, but the speaker is said to be indicating that 
she has a particular attitude towards it. In these examples she is reducing her 
commitment to the truth of the proposition, implicating that it is possibly or 
probably true and therefore that she is not taking full responsibility for its truth. 
The hearer has to recognize that the utterance is not a knowledge claim, or, if it is, 
the knowledge claimed does not relate to the proposition expressed in the main 
clause but to herself, the speaker, to what she has heard, what she believes or what 
she expects. A speaker implicates an increased commitment to the truth of the 
proposition, both by prefacing the main clause with a phrase such as “I know 
that…” or “ I promise you that …” and, more demandingly from the hearer’s point 
of view, by relying on pragmatic features of the utterance, including intonation. In 
other words, the same locutionary act can have different illocutionary force (and, it 
may be, different perlocutionary consequences). The hearer has to be sensitive to 
the nature of the speech act in order to interpret the utterance correctly, or at least 
reasonably, and this means that he has to recognize the commitments and 
expectations the speaker intends or that the illocutionary act implicates. If the 
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speaker’s intentions do not match the implicatures of the speech act that the hearer 
has reasonably interpreted the utterance to convey, then she has spoken 
infelicitously in some way, and may be at fault epistemically as well as 
linguistically. She may, for example, have overestimated her audience’s linguistic 
sophistication or cognitive development, or she may be assuming an epistemic 
authority to which she is not entitled.  
When philosophical discussion of testimony abstracts the words spoken from 
the interpersonal contexts in which they are uttered, as if they were simply 
grammatical or logical sentences, it fails to capture the nature of the rationality 
involved in the hearer’s responding to what the speaker has said.   Any evaluation 
of whether a speaker has acted rationally, reasonably or responsibly in testifying 
and believing as she has must take into account not just the propositional content of 
the locutionary act but what has been implicated by the pragmatic features of the 
speaker’s utterance, including the commitments and expectations made manifest to 
the hearer. Were these features not to be taken into account, the evaluation would 
relate to some abstract notion of what has been spoken rather than to what has been 
said. Equally, an evaluation of whether the hearer has responded reasonably in 
accepting (or not accepting) the information conveyed by the utterance has to take 
into account whether or not he has been sufficiently sensitive to the relevant 
pragmatic clues to the speaker’s intentions, commitments and expectations, and 
especially to the normative commitments and expectations of the specific speech 
act. We cannot hold the hearer to be epistemically at fault if he is linguistically at 
fault, unless he is linguistically at fault due to some current or previous epistemic 
failing or intellectual carelessness. 
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Assurance is one of the speech acts with which a speaker’s personal 
commitment to the knowledge claimed is emphasized and made manifest. Here are 
some examples: 
 
a) I know for sure that the Prime Minister personally authorized  
the attack. 
 
b) The dinosaurs were definitely wiped out as a consequence of a massive 
asteroid hitting Earth. 
 
In (a) the main clause is preceded by a clause that draws attention to the speaker’s 
avowal of knowledge. She is emphasizing that she is not reporting a belief, opinion, 
suspicion but what she knows. She is offering an assurance of knowledge. In (b) 
the word “definitely” is embedded in the main clause and again serves to raise the 
epistemic claim to an assurance that the speaker knows whereof she speaks 
(although “definitely” does sometimes serve either as a kind of “filler” or as an 
relatively weak intensifier, as “really” sometimes does: a further complication that 
has to be interpreted in context). 
According to Krista Lawlor’s Austinian account of the speech act of 
assurance, when a speaker offers an assurance that p she is offering a guarantee 
comparable to that offered by the speech act of promising. She vouches for the 
truth of the claim and undertakes to defend the claim if challenged. This 
distinguishes it from assertion insofar as the guarantee is exceptionless or unlimited 
(Lawlor, 2013, p. 12). Whereas an assertion can often be made in a context where 
the speaker expects disagreement, an assurance tends to be made where she does 
not expect disagreement; rather, she expects her utterance, her assurance, to be 
deemed epistemically acceptable to the audience because she is representing herself 
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as holding the proposition to be true on the basis of reasons that would satisfy any 
responsible and reasonable person. In both speech acts, assertion and assurance, the 
speaker vouches for the truth of the claim, but in the case of assertion she conveys 
that her claim is fallible, whereas in the case of assurance she conveys that she 
thinks the truth of the claim is not vulnerable to further evidence or circumstance. 
“In making an assertion, the asserter represents herself as having reason to think p, 
or perhaps as having more reason to think p than think not p, while in offering an 
assurance, the assurer represents herself as having conclusive reasons to think p” 
(Lawlor, 2013, p. 15). 
Lawlor’s Austin-influenced account of assurance draws also on the work of 
William Alston. Alston agrees that assurance is an illocutionary category in its own 
right (“assuritives”) with aspects of both promising and assertion built into it. He 
argues that we can use an understanding of this speech act in order to understand 
better what knowledge is, by looking at how we use the word “know” in particular 
sentences. He says that sentence meaning is “illocutionary act potential”; for 
individual components of sentences, such as words, to have meaning is for them to 
have the potential to affect illocutionary act potential. In other words, “know” has 
meaning by virtue of its potential to make a contribution to the meaning of 
sentences that make knowledge claims, where the sentence meaning is fixed by its 
illocutionary act. The rules or conventions governing illocutionary acts such as 
assurance fix the meaning of “knows” and its cognates. “Knows”, Alston says, 
means something like “has conclusive reasons for believing what is in fact the 
case” (Alston, 2000, p. 68; Lawlor, 2013, p. 42). 
Alston’s approach to word meaning here seems compatible with such 
Wittgensteinian pronouncements as “We are asking ourselves: what do we do with 
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a statement ‘I know’? …And that is how one must decide whether something is 
knowledge or not” (Wittgenstein 1953, §230). However, although it may be true 
that we use the word “know” to modify the illocutionary force of an utterance, we 
do not always have to employ the word itself in order for a similar effect to 
register. An assertoric sentence can become an assurance when the force of the 
word “know” is implicated tonally or contextually. For example, if at a crucial 
point a doctor who is a top authority on a particular medical procedure asserts a 
proposition about the best way to proceed, this could have the force of an assurance 
if it is evident that she is offering a conclusive or exclusionary reason for the 
audience to accept the proposition by taking her word, trusting her for the truth. In 
a different context – a ward round, perhaps – a similar pronouncement could 
implicate that she expects the junior doctors present to challenge or question her, in 
which case it is a different speech act. 
In one sense, of course, prefacing an utterance with “I know that…” adds 
nothing to the proposition asserted in the main clause. But it adds significantly to 
the pragmatically recovered meaning of the utterance, and therefore to what is said. 
It turns the assertion into an assurance and therefore changes the speaker’s 
commitments and expectations. The utterance now has something of the character 
of a promise and therefore the speaker and the hearer are both permitted by 
convention to feel aggrieved or betrayed if the other defaults on his or her 
commitments – one by speaking falsely, insincerely or in some other way 
infelicitously, the other by a reluctance to trust the speaker. 
Assertions and assurances both aim to effect the sharing of knowledge, but 
assurance has an additional function as a vital component of the network of social 
practices that depend on interpersonal trust. Lawlor argues that an assurance 
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represents the speaker as having reasons that should satisfy everyone, whereas with 
assertion the guarantee is not so whole-hearted. If hearers are offered “exclusionary 
reasons” for believing that p they can put aside doubts and proceed with any plans 
that depend on the truth of p. Assurances implicate the speaker’s willingness to 
shoulder the epistemic burden of any challenges. This is what makes an assurance a 
shortcut to knowledge for the audience. He has only to trust the speaker.  Once he 
has recognized the speech act to be assurance, and accepted it to be genuine, or 
sincere, he has reason enough to accept the information offered as knowledge. 
So should we simply identify testimony with assurance? While assurance is 
certainly better suited than assertion is to trust theories, I do not see a good reason 
for a restriction of this kind. Assertions, and other speech acts, such as confessions, 
also represent the speaker as transmitting knowledge without offering overt reasons 
for acceptance. The quest for a unitary account of testimony seems to me to be 
misguided, especially as it distracts attention from important epistemic differences. 
It is part of our linguistic and epistemic sophistication or sensitivity to distinguish 
between different kinds of information-giving speech acts and to recognize that 
they require different epistemic responses.  
It is partly a matter of epistemic authority. A speaker who offers an assurance 
implicates a greater degree of epistemic authority than one who makes an assertion: 
she knows and she has reasons that would meet any challenge: an eyewitness, for 
example, who testifies on the basis of what she has seen for herself or someone 
who “bears witness” on the basis of personal experience. An expert witness might 
offer assurances, too, for the fact that she represents herself as an expert implicates 
her authority and confidence that she can meet any challenges. When she is less 
than certain about the truth, it would be irresponsible of her not to indicate this by 
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her phraseology or prosody. An assurance is like a promise because the speaker 
effectively promises not just that she will attempt to answer any questions or 
challenges but that the reasons she has in reserve will satisfy any responsible and 
reasonable interlocutor. Because she accepts this responsibility, if she fails, or if 
she is proved wrong, she is both linguistically and epistemically blameworthy, for 
either she should not have offered the information at all or she should have offered 
it in a more cautious speech act. 
Someone who offers an assurance rather than an assertion is inviting the 
audience to take her word at face value and to rely on it. She is inviting the 
audience’s trust in a rich sense of “trust”, one that goes beyond reliance. Therefore, 
although the speaker accepts responsibility for the truth of the proposition, she does 
not expect or invite an epistemic challenge. What is implicated in an assurance is 
not an invitation to challenge but an invitation to trust the speaker, or, stronger, an 
expectation of trust in the speaker. This is different in cases of assertion, for then 
the speaker is not offering an “exclusionary” or sufficient reason for believing the 
proposition and she is not implicating that she expects the audience’s total 
confidence in her own authority and trustworthiness. That is not to say, of course, 
that the audience cannot choose to trust her or judge her to be trustworthy; it is only 
to say that she is not intending to bring about the perlocutionary effect of audience 
trust in her. She is providing the audience with a reason (one of many, possibly) for 
believing what she has asserted. 
The distinction between assurance and assertion has implications for the 
question of chains of testimony. Exclusionary reasons can be passed along a chain 
of assurers, and at each link the hearer has a sufficient reason to accept the 
information on trust, whereas each hearer who is offered an assertion has not been 
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freed from the obligation to infer his own reasons for belief, the assertion itself 
being one, but not necessarily a sufficient, reason for acceptance. The receiver of 
an assertion has different work to do from the receiver of an assurance: a different 
kind of judgement to make, and one where the linguistic and epistemic aspects are 
more distinct than is the case with assurance. 
Assertions and assurances can both fail epistemically, and they can also both 
fail linguistically, for reasons, as Austin puts it, of infelicity.  Speech acts can be 
infelicitous for a number of reasons. For example, imperatives or directives must be 
issued by someone with the appropriate authority, otherwise there is a 
“misinvocation”. Similarly in cases of testimony, but especially in cases of 
assurance, the speaker needs appropriate authority and/or expertise. There are also 
“abuses”, where the speaker does not have the right thoughts, attitudes or feelings 
required of someone employing the particular speech act, as when someone makes 
a promise or offers an assurance with her fingers (literally or metaphorically) 
crossed behind her back. With regard to sincerity, it is clear that sincerity is a more 
essential constituent of assurance than it is of assertion. The receiver of an assertion 
is not relying on the speaker’s sincerity in the way that a receiver of an assurance 
is. The assurer must be sincere not just in the sense that she truly believes what she 
avows but sincere in her commitment to honouring her implicatures. 
These considerations suggest that a speaker who offers responsible testimony 
has to be more than epistemically conscientious. She must also be conscientious in 
employing the appropriate speech act, and this requires linguistic sensitivity and 
skill. One implication of this is that critical thinking, effective reasoning and wise 
judgements depend on linguistic capacities that can be developed, and which can 
be incorporated in curriculum planning. When we think about “language across the 
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curriculum” or “thinking skills across the curriculum”, we should also be thinking 
about the very close relationship between the two. Similarly, when we think about 
classroom dialogue and dialogic teaching, we need to think about the linguistic and 
epistemic responsibilities and commitments involved in using particular speech 
acts. We sometimes make good and sometimes bad judgements with regard to 
speech acts but there are learnable and teachable processes involved in speaking 
and responding conscientiously: we can get better at conscientiously sharing 
knowledge with others and at receiving knowledge from others. There is a 
developmental aspect to our role as rational and conscientious providers and 
receivers of information and knowledge and this has implications for the 
prerequisites of effective teaching and of effective classroom dialogue. 
 
§6.5 Austin: Knowledge and Truth  
 
Drawing on Austin’s early essay “Other Minds” (1946), Lawlor argues for a 
relevant alternatives account of knowledge, whereby knowledge “requires one to 
be in a position to eliminate all the relevant alternative propositions to the 
proposition one knows” (Lawlor, 2013, p. 46). This looks highly demanding, but 
for Austin relevant alternatives are reasonable alternatives. If we tell someone that 
a certain bird is a goldfinch and are challenged to “prove it”, there must be some 
limit to what we are required to produce as reasons, on what would count as a 
sufficient response, as enough to show that (within reason, and for present intents 
and purposes) it ‘can’t’ be anything else, there is no room for a competing 
description of it. We wouldn’t have to rule out, for example, that it isn’t a stuffed 
goldfinch (Austin, 1946, pp. 154 – 155; cited in Lawlor, 2013, p. 46). We are 
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required to eliminate only the alternatives that are reasonably susceptible to 
elimination and that are contextually relevant.  Lawlor argues (p. 47) that what 
counts as elimination and what counts as reasonable is also to be thought of 
flexibly, depending on contexts. While it may be difficult to draw a line between a 
reasonable consideration and an unreasonable one, this is the kind of difficulty that 
any account of knowledge faces. There are always nuanced judgements to be made. 
So, the Austinian view is that when we assure another person that we know 
that p we are implicating that reasonable alternatives have been eliminated. 
Assuring is like promising, for promises are similarly constrained by an implicit 
reasonableness clause. Some circumstances are too disruptive for the speaker to be 
required to fulfil her promise; complaints by the receiver of the promise have to be 
assessed against considerations of reasonableness. Epistemic vigilance, 
conscientiousness, responsibility (or whatever we call the disposition to be alert to 
relevance and reasonableness) therefore enters at the point of utterance for the 
speaker, and at the point of comprehension for the audience, for what has been 
said, or implicated, can only be understood in terms of these reasonableness 
considerations. The key point here is that epistemic responsibility and 
communicative responsibility are intertwined. 
One objection to Austin’s comments on assurance, and to Lawlor’s 
development of the distinction between assurance and assertion, is that knowledge 
is already to be thought of as the defining characteristic, the constitutive rule, of 
assertion, and therefore there is no room for a speech act of assurance with the 
same defining characteristic.23 But Lawlor argues that assertion and assurance do 
																																																								
23 Sanford Goldberg’s (2015) Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric 
Speech argues that a robust epistemic norm of one kind or another is constitutive of 
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not share identical defining characteristics. She agrees with Bernard Williams’s 
description of assertion as “ground level telling that” (Williams, 2004, p. 78). In 
other words, it is a basic speech act for which the speaker does not requiring special 
authority, whereas assurance is defined by the implicating, not of knowledge as 
such, but of the speaker’s possession of exclusionary reasons, and therefore it does 
require special authority (Lawlor, 2013, p. 78). It therefore requires special 
reflection on the part of the speaker: a point that has implications for classroom 
talk, regardless of whether the person offering the assurance is a teacher or a pupil. 
One way in which assertions and assurances can both fail is by not being true.  
They are true, we might say, when they correspond to the facts. Lawlor presents 
this apparent truism, with which Austin concurs, as a significant insight. She 
interprets Austin as suggesting that “a knowledge claim is true only in light of the 
situation about which it is made (Lawlor, 2013, p. 55). A “situation” in this context 
is an epistemic one, “comprising not just elements of the world, but also what we 
reasonably believe to be live options” (ibid). If a claim to know is a play in a 
conversational game, which all speech acts are, then the conversational rules 
governing situations are some of the most fundamental rules of the conversational 
game. Taking a statement to be whatever is expressed or conveyed by an utterance, 
we can say that a statement is true when its descriptive content and the situation to 
which the speaker refers, as determined by the conventions of language, correspond 
or match. This foregrounds contextualism, for it suggests that statements that make 
claims to knowledge have context-sensitive-truth conditions.  
																																																																																																																																				
assertion, but it is context-sensitive, so whether the norm is knowledge, justified belief, 
rational belief, truth, or any other appropriate alternative, depends on the precise context. 	
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The position Lawlor adopts is contextualism about truth but invariantism 
about knowledge. “Know” always means the same. To know is always to be in a 
position to rule out alternatives to what is claimed (and for it to be true); whereas to 
be true a statement has to satisfy the truth requirements for the particular situation 
in which it is uttered. So, “S knows that p” has context-sensitive truth-values, even 
though the meaning of “knows” is invariant. This is compatible, I believe, with the 
account of what it is to say something that I outlined earlier. 
To employ the metaphor of a conversational game is to suggest that a 
conversation has rules and scorekeeping (Lawlor, 2013, pp. 66 – 69).24 The rules 
are those such as the Gricean maxims that specify salience and reference, and that 
also limit situations and the permitted moves or alternatives. For example, most 
conversations do not permit sudden changes of topic, nor cross-purposes with 
regard to situations. The participants keep score, following each other’s moves and 
choosing whether to accommodate each other’s contributions in order to keep the 
conversation going well. What is on the scoreboard affects whether a move (an 
utterance) is true or false. But keeping track of the scoreboard is tricky. Judgements 
concerning reasonable alternatives, for example, are difficult; it is not always easy 
for the participants to coordinate their judgements concerning the situation. This 
affects the course of the conversation, what each will say, for example, about the 
other’s statements. Crucially, for our purposes, it will affect how one responds to a 
knowledge claim about which one is uncertain. If the hearer is not confident that 
his judgement concerning the situation coincides with the speaker’s, he is more 
likely to try to find out more about the speaker and her judgement of the situation 																																																								
24 Lawlor traces the metaphor of conversational scorekeeping to David Lewis’s (1983) 
“Scorekeeping in a Language Game”, Philosophical Papers 1, pp. 233- 249. It has some 
similarity with Robert Brandom’s notion of deontic scorekeeping in Making It Explicit, 
Harvard University Press, 1994. 
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than he is to dismiss or challenge the claim outright. It is not generally permitted to 
challenge a claim when one suspects cross-purposes. This echoes a point I have 
made previously concerning testimony that we cannot immediately accept: that our 
first response should be to try to comprehend it better. We now understand this as 
requiring an interpretation of the implicatures of speech acts. 
 
§6.6 Conscientious Judgement 
 
From the argument so far I think we can draw some conclusions about what is 
involved in being an alert, reasonable and conscientious receiver of assertions and 
assurances. There is no reason to exclude either from the epistemological category 
of testimony. All things being equal, the receiver of an assurance, assuming he has 
been sensitive to the implicatures of the utterance, will trust the speaker for the 
truth, and therefore will accept the proposition offered. By “all things being equal” 
I mean to acknowledge that there are factors that can intervene and make trust 
unreasonable in the circumstances. These would include a suspicion on the hearer’s 
part that he and the speaker do not share an understanding of the “situation” and 
therefore are linguistically or epistemically at cross-purposes. This might be 
because the hearer judges that the speaker has made a linguistic or epistemic 
misjudgement by offering an assurance (when her authority to do so is in 
questionable) or it might be that he is not confident enough that he actually 
comprehends the utterance well enough to accept the implicated proposition on 
trust. Infelicity in the speech act is sufficient to undermine trust, and therefore 
acceptance. So, all things being equal, acceptance follows from comprehension 
because comprehension itself incorporates accepting the utterance as an assurance 
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– that is, as providing an exclusionary, or sufficient, reason for acceptance. If the 
hearer cannot accept it as an assurance because he suspects some kind of infelicity, 
he still has the option of evaluating it as he would an assertion. Inferences of the 
kind suggested by reductionists therefore apply to assertions and to infelicitous or 
rejected assurances. An alert, reasonable and conscientious receiver of assertions 
employs a range of capabilities in evaluating the epistemic status of the proposition 
asserted, including skill in inductive inference about the plausibility of the 
proposition, which depends also on his knowledge of the topic, as well as about the 
credibility or reliability of the speaker (and speakers of this kind). Inductive 
inference and critical thinking skills are relevant to testimony because they could 
be required at any point in a conversation, and judgements about when to deploy 
them are linguistic as well as epistemic judgements. 
Utterances occur in the context of a particular kind of discourse or 
conversation. Whether an utterance is an assurance or an assertion (or another kind 
of testimonial speech act, such as a confession) is influenced to some degree by the 
nature of the conversation in which it occurs. There are conversations or discourses 
where every act of telling is contextually marked as an assurance, others where 
they are all assertions; but, most commonly, I suspect, there is a variety of types of 
“telling” to which participants must be alert, and conscientious in responding to 
them appropriately and reasonably. We begin to acquire skill and sensitivity in 
recognizing and responding appropriately and reasonably to speech acts as we 
acquire language as a young child and as we experience a wider range of 
conversations and discourses, including, of course, in educational contexts. 
Unfortunately, curriculum guidelines on the development of children’s “speaking 
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and listening” have not been interested in the kinds of distinction I am suggesting 
are significant. 
 
§6.7 Bakhtin’s Dialogism 
 
The account of testimonial speech acts I have outlined does not take full account of 
what Mikhail Bakhtin calls “addressivity”. Utterances are addressed by particular 
individuals to a particular audience: people who have a particular kind of 
relationship to sustain in a particular social context. Grice’s Cooperative Principle 
recognizes that conversations rely on the participants following the conventions 
that keep it going, but neither Grice nor Austin fully acknowledged, as Bakhtin 
does, a) the extent to which the conversational situation is part of what constitutes 
the utterance, and b) how an utterance anticipates its response. 
In turning to Bakhtin we are moving from pragmatics to discourse theory. 
There are overlaps, as shown here by Jaworski and Coupland’s summary of ideas 
to which discourse theorists are committed (2006, p. 11):  
 
1) The meaning of an event or a single utterance is only partly accounted for    
by its formal features.  
2) Our interpretation of discourse relates far more to what is done by the 
participants than what is said.  
3) Attributing meaning to discursive acts is never a value-free process.  
4) Linguistic expression itself (as speech or writing) often needs to be 
interrelated with other physical, temporal and behavioural aspects of the 
social situation: discourse is more than language itself. 
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There is no explicit mention here of epistemic considerations. I have argued 
that epistemic evaluation is integral to comprehension and therefore that it is an 
ineliminable feature of communication and of social relationships. The conventions 
surrounding trusting others for the truth, inferring credibility, deploying words such 
as “know” and “true”, are crucial constituents of the social practices concerned 
with exchanging information and learning from others. Therefore, discourse 
analysis should concern itself with epistemology as well as with pragmatics. 
Bakhtin’s writings are seminal in the development of several disciplines, 
including discourse theory and argumentation theory.25 I will draw on his notion of 
speech genres in order to sketch an approach to the epistemological issues raised by 
informative utterances located in different types of discourse. This will allow me to 
bring the strands of my argument together when I return to classroom dialogue in 
the final chapter. 
“Each separate utterance is individual,” Bakhtin writes, “but each sphere in 
which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances. 
These we call speech genres” (1994, p. 81. Original italics). There is not one 
speech genre for each sphere of human activity but an ever-changing repertoire. 
Speech genres are heterogeneous. Relations between utterances, such as the 
relation of question and answer or assertion and objection, are part of the pattern 
that indicates the speech genre and therefore guides the behaviour of the 
participants. Speakers choose a speech genre on the basis of their speech plan, their 
overall intentions, which they adapt to the conventions of the genre.  
																																																								
25 For example, it influenced the account of audience in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
The New Rhetoric (1991). See also: Tindale (2015). 
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The range of speech genres is extensive but we are so skillful in adapting to 
them that we are hardly aware of them, having acquired them along with the lexis 
and grammar of our language.26 The speech genre – the particular style and 
composition of utterances – conveys meaning as much as the words used. It is a 
way of orienting oneself in the relationship between participants and between 
contributions to the dialogue. The speech genres that are generated between the 
participants are drawn from the social and institutional discourses available to 
them. Some discourses are more “monological” than others, in the sense of being 
authored by an authoritative single voice; others are more “internally persuasive” 
and are characterized by dialogues of exchange and challenge. Matusov (2009), a 
prominent advocate of dialogic pedagogy, argues that teachers need to engage 
actively with both the internally persuasive and the authoritative discourses as both 
are necessary components of pedagogy. Pedagogy cannot but be dialogic, Matusov 
claims, in the sense that to speak to another person is to bridge a gap between two 
consciousnesses that are non-transparent to one another. 
Bakhtin attends to the developmental aspects of language in a way that 
anticipates the sociocultural accounts of language learning of later writers, such as 
Halliday (2003). Bakhtin writes: “To learn to speak is to learn to construct 
utterances. The forms of language and the typical forms of utterances, that is, 
speech genres, enter our experience and our consciousness together, and in close 
connection with one another” (1994, p. 84). Learning to speak cannot be a matter 
																																																								26	Wittgenstein remarks that there are “countless kinds” of sentence (1953, § 25). 
Speech acts are not sentence types: if there were countless kinds of speech act we 
would never know what was expected of us as hearers, nor what to expect from 
speakers; comprehension and appropriate response would be impossibly complicated. 
The same applies to speech genres: the range is extensive but there are not countless 
kinds.	
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of learning to speak in words and sentences - because we do not speak in words and 
sentences: 
 
The sentence, like the word, has a finality of meaning and a 
finality of grammatical form, but this finality of meaning is 
abstract by nature and this is precisely why it is clear-cut…Like 
the word, it belongs to nobody, and only by functioning as a whole 
utterance does it become an expression of the position of someone 
speaking individually in a concrete situation of speech 
communication. This leads us to a new…feature of the utterance – 
the relation of the utterance to the speaker himself (the author of 
the utterance) and to the other participants in speech 
communication. (Bakhtin, 1994, p. 84) 
 
We respond to utterances, not to words and sentences. Utterances connect us not 
only with the other current participants in the dialogue but with our culture and 
speech community:  
 
Each utterance is filled with echoes and reverberations of other 
utterances to which it is related by the community of the sphere of 
speech communication. Every utterance must be regarded 
primarily as a response to preceding utterances of the given 
sphere…Each utterance refutes, affirms, presupposes them to be 
known, and somehow takes them into account. (Ibid., p. 85) 
 
Each utterance occupies a definite position within a given sphere of 
communication and it is impossible to determine its position without correlating it 
with other positions, so each utterance reverberates with reactions to other 
utterances of the given sphere. An utterance, whether highly structured and 
specialized or occurring in casual dialogue, and however monological it may seem 
to be, is always a rejoinder of some kind, oriented both to how it may influence the 
audience and to previous utterances. It is a link in a chain, a responsive position 
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under the complex conditions of speech communication in a particular cultural 
sphere. Whatever the topic of the utterance, it has already been articulated, 
disputed, elucidated and evaluated in various ways. Various viewpoints, 
worldviews and trends cross, converge and diverge in it. 
For Bakhtin, as for Vygotsky, meaning is socially constructed. The audience 
is active. The speaker anticipates an active responsive understanding. “The entire 
utterance is constructed, as it were, in anticipation of encountering this response” 
(1994, p. 87). The composition and style of the utterance are dependent on those to 
whom the utterance is addressed, on how the speaker (or writer) senses and 
imagines his addressees, and the force of their effect on the utterance. The 
utterance is enriched by the support or resistance it encounters. Each speech genre 
in each area of speech communication has its own typical conception of the 
addressee, and this helps to define it as a genre.  
 
*** 
 
This summary of Bakhtin’s notion of speech genres shows how his dialogism 
articulates with pragmatics.27 I will attempt to draw out some of the strands from 
the preceding sections of this chapter that I think are most relevant to the discussion 
																																																								
27 Bakhtin’s dialogism also connects to some extent with Wittgenstein’s later work, speech 
genres being similar to language games and both emphasizing meaning as use. Bakhtin’s 
essay “The Problem of Speech Genres” was published in the same year (1953) as the 
posthumous Philosophical Investigations, and Bakhtin’s older brother, Nicolai, who was a 
professor of linguistics at Birmingham University, was a close friend of Wittgenstein. See 
Terry Eagleton’s “Wittgenstein’s Friends” (New Left Review I/135, 1982; reprinted in 
Against The Grain: Essays 1975 – 1985, Verso, 1986).  Eagleton’s novel Saints and 
Scholars (Verso, 1987) imagines Wittgenstein and Nicolai Bakhtin travelling together in 
Ireland, in 1916, and encountering Leopold Bloom and James Connolly. 
 
	 238	
of testimony and learning from the words – the utterances, as we should say - of 
others. 
Bakhtin’s theory is incompatible with any account of testimonial speech acts 
which depicts the testifier as the possessor of a piece of knowledge that she then 
couches in words, in a proposition, and the receiver as taking the content to be an 
input into the process of forming a belief and as having acquired thereby a piece of 
knowledge.28 In such an account, the receiver deliberates about the propositional 
content. Bakhtin would reject this because for him the speaker’s knowledge cannot 
be abstracted from the utterance. The proposition that the recipient is said to 
deliberate about would be a philosophical abstraction. In the actual situation of a 
live communication, what the recipient accepts is what is communicated in the 
utterance. Austin emphasizes that this depends on features of the situation the 
participants share. Bakhtin emphasizes that the utterance itself is positioned in a 
speech genre characterized by certain kinds of utterance, rejoinders and 
relationships and positioned in a discourse, the form and scope of which is 
constrained by social and institutional conventions. Therefore to describe the 
recipient’s “deliberation” only in terms of epistemic evaluation greatly 
underestimates the resources he brings to bear on its evaluation. He brings to bear 
all his understanding of language as it is used in his culture and, specifically, as it is 
used in this particular discourse and “cultural sphere”. Whatever the claim 
contained in the main clause may be, it is only in specific kinds of discourse, and in 
specific circumstances of doubt or scepticism, that we attempt to isolate it for the 
kind of epistemic assessment that draws on evidence. 
																																																								
28 This is what Michael Welbourne calls the “evidence theory” (Welbourne, 
1993, pp. 34/35. See also Kusch, 2002, p. 56. Welbourne and Kusch are both 
critical of this approach). 
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Bakhtin and Austin encourage us to think of knowledge in terms of activity, 
of verb forms, such as “I know that…”. The verbs play a role in the articulation or 
positioning of the discussants with one another and with their cultural inheritance, 
in what Welbourne (1993) calls “the community of knowledge”. It has a social 
status that we learn as we learn how and when to use it. It plays a role in inquiries 
that the non-factive verb “to believe” cannot play. We begin to learn this as we 
begin to learn our language, just as we begin to learn the contexts in which we 
ought to trust and ought to challenge. We begin to learn these things and 
subsequently we come to understand them better and to deploy our words more 
sensitively. 
A key point is that recognizing the utterance to have the meaning it has, in 
the context of a specific speech genre and discourse, does not release us from a 
normative requirement to be epistemically responsible or vigilant. On the contrary, 
epistemic responsibility extends to recognizing and comprehending the utterance, 
with all its commitments and implicatures. Sometimes this leads us to infer that 
further epistemic evaluation is called for, either because the speech act implicates 
that or because there is something infelicitous, unrecognizable or incomprehensible 
that triggers a different kind of response, rejoinder or deliberation. But the 
epistemic response itself, including trusting the speaker for the truth, is constitutive 
of the utterance and speech genre or discourse. Sharing knowledge is always 
dialogic, even when the recipient’s voice is not currently heard, and even when it is 
teachers talking informatively. 
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Chapter 7: Teaching Matters 
 
§7.1 Fruitful Encounters 
 
One of the few educationalists who has discussed the epistemology of testimony in 
relation to schooling is Padma Sarangapani, whose book Constructing School 
Knowledge (2003) is an ethnographic and epistemological study of children’s 
experience of schooling in a government primary school in India. This location is 
significant because modern Indian philosophers contributed to the renewal of 
interest in the epistemology of testimony in the 1990s. Philosophers such as B. K. 
Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (who together edited the 1994 collection of essays on 
testimony, Knowing From Words) were able to draw on a long and rich tradition of 
interest in testimony, especially stemming from the Advaita and Nyāya traditions 
of Hindu philosophy, some of whose central tenets the non-reductionists and trust 
theorists have echoed. Sarangapani quotes Matilal: “Words plus trust generate 
knowledge directly” (Matilal, 1990, p. 62; Sarangapani, 2003, p. 187). The Nyāya 
thinkers argued that knowledge can be acquired directly from the words of others, 
provided we are sure the speaker is trustworthy (Jha, 2005; Bilimoria, 1988). 
Bilimoria’s detailed study puts śabdapramāna, words as knowledge, in the context 
of Indian linguistic philosophy and the wisdom and authority of Vedic scriptures. 
Other writers emphasize the importance of śabdapramāna as a source of 
knowledge in everyday life (Satprakashananda, 1974). Padma Sarangapani is 
influenced by these Indian writings on testimony but also by one of the other books 
that stimulated a new interest in the epistemology of testimony, the British 
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philosopher Michael Welbourne’s The Community of Knowledge (1993). 
Sarangapani quotes Welbourne:  
 
To speak from knowledge in the most complete sense is to say 
something which you know to be the case and to say it intending 
that your utterance be received as grounded on and thus 
expressing knowledge. (Welbourne, 1993, p. 19; Sarangapani, 
2003, p. 190) 
 
Sarangapani goes on to emphasize the importance of children being in a position to 
trust the teacher, of having good reason to trust her authority, authenticity, sincerity 
and competence, and, equally, the importance the children themselves place on 
authenticity and authority in their own acts of “speaking from knowledge”. I see 
this as the children recognizing the epistemic, linguistic and social difference 
between voicing an opinion and speaking from knowledge. As we shall see later, 
this has relevance for the debates concerning “student voice”. 
Sarangapani brings Indian philosophical traditions and Western epistemology 
together in a risky but fruitful  encounter. In this final chapter I bring the 
epistemology of testimony together with Bakhtinian and sociocultural perspectives 
on pedagogy in what is also a somewhat risky and tense encounter that is 
nevertheless, I hope, fruitful.  
 
*** 
 
We have learned from Bakhtin and others that when children learn to speak they 
learn much more than how to string lexemes together more or less grammatically. 
In learning to communicate dialogically they develop their capacity to learn. 
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Bakhtin’s dialogism has close links with the sociocultural analysis of speaking and 
thinking that is most associated with the work of Vygotsky.29 Jerome Bruner, from 
a similar perspective, employs an apt metaphor for the child’s entry into a speech 
community: 
 
When we enter human life, it is as if we walk on stage into a play 
whose enactment is in progress – a play whose somewhat open 
plot determines toward what denouements we may be heading. 
Others on stage already have a sense of what the play is about, 
enough of a sense to make negotiation with a newcomer possible. 
(Bruner, 1990, p. 34) 
 
This captures the non-deterministic nature of sociogenesis. A child enters a world 
where the people she encounters, especially those who care for her, make use of, 
and help her to make use of, the “psychological tool” of language. It is not so much 
that she inherits this tool as that it is what makes her an individual self at all, a 
distinct consciousness with a conceptual scheme that enables, but is itself 
constituted by, meaning-making and the sharing of knowledge. It enables her to 
find or improvise a role for herself, to position herself in relation to the props and 
characters she encounters and to develop a degree of autonomy through their 
mediation in her learning. She will spend her life improvising in communication 
with other people who are also “winging it”. But this does not mean that anything 
goes, that any move or line of dialogue is permitted. The play fails, the cast 
																																																									29	Just as Bakhtin’s intellectual world overlapped (through his brother) with 
Wittgenstein’s, it must also have overlapped in the Soviet Union with Vygotsky’s, 
although there is no evidence that they ever met (John-Steiner, 2007, p. 147; Van der 
Veer and Valsiner, 1991, p. 371).  	
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members “corpse”, if the wrong words are spoken in the wrong way at the wrong 
time. We have to learn to speak and think felicitously. 
The relationship between speaking and thinking is the subject of Vygotsky’s 
most famous work. Like Bakhtin, Vygotsky argues that language is central to 
human consciousness: consciousness develops in the coming together of thought 
and word in meaning. This is echoed in Michael Halliday’s (2003) and Michael 
Tomasello’s (1999) sociocultural accounts of child language development. John-
Steiner and Tatter summarize the process thus: 
 
From birth, the social forms of child-caretaker interactions, the 
tools used by humans in society to manipulate the environment, 
the culturally institutionalized patterns of social relations are used 
by the child in cooperation with adults to organize behaviour, 
memory and complex mental processes. For children, the 
development of language is a development of social existence into 
individuated persons and into culture. (John-Steiner and Tatter, 
1983, p. 83. Cited in John-Steiner, 2007, p. 148/9) 
 
Meaning is created through interaction with others, through speaking. The 
languages we learn in childhood “are not neutral coding systems of an objective 
reality. Rather, each one is a subjective orientation to the world of human 
experience, and this orientation affects the ways in which we are speaking” (Slobin, 
1996, p.83; cited by John-Steiner, 2007, p.149). We might quibble with the word 
“subjective”, but the main idea is surely correct. What we can say, how we can say 
it, what we can think and how we convey our thinking, how we complete thoughts 
in words, are constrained (if that is the right word: “liberated” might be better) by 
the conventions of our language and social interactions – and by our personal 
linguistic skill, sophistication and sensitivity. 
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My aim in the previous chapter was to show that communication is not 
something that can be looked at one-sidedly. Dialogue is Janus-like. The hearer’s 
role in making the meaning that the participants share is crucial. Whether we look 
at speech from the point of view of a single utterance or from the point of view of 
an extended dialogue, it is in the interaction between the speaker and the audience 
that meaning emerges. Therefore, it is in the dynamics of this interaction that we 
must locate the knowledge that is “transferred” in speech acts that have assertoric 
force. This is especially true in the case of speech acts such as assurance, where the 
speaker is avowedly “speaking from knowledge”, implicating that his śabda is 
pramā , that it is the word of a trustworthy person (apta vakya) (Sarangapani, 2003, 
p. 188). 
While both Vygotskian sociocultural theory and Bakhtinian dialogism 
emphasize the social nature of experience, and the importance of speech for human 
consciousness, meaning and thought, the latter pays special attention to the role of 
context and genres in allowing participants to interpret intentions, and therefore has 
more to say about this aspect of the inherently intersubjective nature of language 
and thought. For Bakhtin even private thought, or inner speech, is dialogical and 
conforms to learned generic and semiotic patterns; therefore, there is always an 
implicit reciprocity or mutuality. The epistemological and pedagogical implications 
of Bakhtin’s theory are summarized by White as follows: 
  
[T]he intended outcome of education for Bakhtin can be viewed 
as a quest for alterity – the transgradient relations between self 
and other that constitute aesthetic activity and are manifest in 
utterance… Knowledge is therefore recognized as experienced 
gestalt rather than a neatly packaged set of goals to be achieved. 
(White, 2014, p. 229) 
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This suggests that it is not consensus or epistemic agreement that is the goal of 
dialogic or pedagogic encounters but, in White’s phrase, “mutual enrichment 
through difference”. She cites Sullivan, Smith and Matusov (2009, p. 375), who 
suggest that dialogic pedagogy should “risk genuine encounters of a multiplicity of 
others”. There is an ethical and political dimension to Bakhtinian dialogism and to 
dialogical pedagogy that could be compared with the ethics of responsible 
testimony, and also with the notion of integrity suggested by the account of self-
trust and autonomy I outlined in Chapter 5. 
In bringing different traditions together in potentially fruitful encounters I 
am not anticipating a complete convergence but, rather, I am aiming (appropriately 
enough) for mutual enrichment through difference and dialogue.30 
 
§7.2 Perspectives on Dialogic Pedagogy 
 
Sociocultural approaches to thought and speech are closely associated with dialogic 
pedagogy, as espoused by educationalists such as Robin Alexander (2006), Neil 
Mercer (2000), Gordon Wells (1986), Rupert Wegerif (2012) and Robert Fisher 
(2011), and by philosophers of education such as Tasos Kazepides (2010). Like 
them, I am an advocate of dialogical practices in the classroom, but I have some 
misgivings concerning how their ideas are filtered down to teachers and student 
teachers. For example, Neil Mercer’s emphasis on “common knowledge” and  
																																																								30	Other potentially fruitful encounters, given the key role that testimonial speech acts play 
in argumentation, is with Habermasian communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984) and 
with writers in the New Rhetoric tradition instigated by Chaim Perelman (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1991; Tindale, 2015).  	
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“interthinking” are, I believe, completely compatible with my argument. 
Nevertheless, I think we need to contest the conclusion often drawn from, or 
implied by, work on classroom dialogue that testimony, in the guise of “teacher 
talk” or “didactic teaching”, is (in the relevant sense) monological and that 
acquiring knowledge in this way is necessarily a passive form of learning. 
Oga Dysthe (2011, p. 97) argues that the problem with monological talk is 
that it “allows authority to present itself as a bearer of a truth that has not been the 
result of intersubjectivity”. This sounds potentially critical of direct teacher 
instruction or exposition, but, as I have argued, informative speech is 
intersubjective in that its success depends on the recognition by both sides (speaker 
and audience) of a shared set of assumptions, commitments and expectations, and 
by the recipient’s interpretation of the speaker’s communicative intentions. 
Matusov, a leading advocate of a Bakhtinian approach to pedagogy, acknowledges 
that “teacher talk” can be dialogical and draws attention to the tension inherent in 
schooling. On the one hand, the realization that the meaning-making process is 
inherently dialogical has important consequences for education, in three ways: 
 
First, since learning is the transformation of a student’s meaning, 
it is unpredictable, undetermined, and cannot be designed or 
controlled by the teacher…Second, learning is always discursive, 
that is, the process and product of a new meaning always exists 
among diverse, real or virtual, consciousnesses. Third, learning is 
always mediated by the students’ questions (explicit or tacit). 
(Matusov, 2009, p. 3) 
 
 
On the other hand, teaching is a goal-directed activity: 
 
 
It has its curricular endpoints that the state or even an individual 
teacher often tries to prescribe, “By the end of the 
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lesson/term/year/education, the students will know, be able, 
master…” These endpoints of education seem to be anti-
dialogical. Dialogue is impossible if a participant knows its 
endpoint in advance. It is, at best, skillful manipulation or leading 
a dialogic partner to the known endpoint or, at worst, violent 
imposition of the teacher’s knowledge, skill, attitude on the 
student. In both cases, it is not a genuine dialogue. (Ibid.) 
 
 
So, there appears to be a contradiction. Teaching is necessarily dialogical because it 
involves communication, but it does not involve genuine dialogue because it is 
necessarily goal-directed. A distinction exists between the practice of education, 
which is inherently dialogical, and the conventional project of education, which is 
anti-dialogical insofar as it specifies the knowledge to be learned, the outcomes to 
be achieved. Matusov goes on to argue, somewhat in the manner of writers from 
the critical pedagogy tradition, for as open-ended an approach to education as 
possible. Similarly, Nicholas Burbules (1993) argues for a non-teleological 
conception of dialogue, without predetermined outcomes. Equality and reciprocity 
are present in all dialogues. Therefore “dialogue”, as Burbules uses the term, is not 
defined by terms such as “conversation”, “discussion”, “debate” or “inquiry” but 
by the nature of the social relationship between the participants, a social 
relationship involving respect, trust, patience and the ability to listen. For Burbules, 
a dialogue simply cannot be assymetrical, monological in the sense of one person 
doing all the speaking, a one-way flow. For Matusov the kind of “conversation” 
children are likely to encounter in the classroom is, though necessarily dialogical in 
one way, essentially monological in terms of who does the talking and what its 
goals are.  
Differences in how terms such as “dialogic” and “monologic” are used 
present problems for a discussion of information-sharing speech in the classroom. 
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On some accounts such talk is simply monological, for others it is dialogical 
because all speech is dialogical, and for some it is both monological and dialogical. 
But it is not surprising that there are differences of opinion concerning the 
dialogicity of teacher-dominated informative classroom talk, given the range of 
influences on dialogic pedagogy. For example, one important influence on 
theorists, Martin Buber’s analysis of the I-Thou relationship, emphasizes the 
existential status of reciprocal relationships, and provides a further potential 
criticism of non-reciprocal classroom encounters (Buber, 2004). 
The implication of my account of Bakhtin’s theory of speech genres is that a 
teacher’s talk is always potentially dialogical. Even when teaching is monological 
in the sense of one person doing all the talking, it can be dialogical in the sense of 
being intersubjective, with meaning emerging from the interaction of participants 
rather than being “passed on” in prepackaged units. It is the utterance, not an 
abstract proposition, that is the basic linguistic unit, and this is always directed 
towards a response that is mutually recognized. It is the audience’s acceptance of 
an utterance as, for example, an assurance that provides a positive reason for 
trusting the speaker for the truth. The utterance is embedded in a speech genre 
(discourse, language game, conversation game) and this, too, is mutually 
recognized as involving speaker and audience in reciprocal commitments and 
responsibilities. For example, within the wider discourse of the classroom, there is 
often the sub-genre of argumentation, in which it is mutually recognized that the 
audience is required to interpret, reason, make connections, compare, evaluate, 
construct understandings and arguments, and which typically incorporates speech 
acts such as assertion and assurance. In this context, what the teacher has to tell the 
students, the subject knowledge that she (dialogically) shares with them, is just one 
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aspect of a wider communicative achievement and relationship. It is a relationship 
achieved through mutual trust, as all successful communicative relationships are.31  
If speech is inherently dialogical in that there is a kind of reciprocity built 
into it, it does not follow that it is always ethical. The dialogicity of teaching 
permits indoctrination, manipulation and distortion. Furthermore, dialogicity 
cannot guarantee that what a student takes from a teacher achieves the social and 
epistemic status of knowledge, nor even that it is “true enough” (Elgin, 2004) for 
his purposes. But we can claim that the dialogical nature of speech incorporates a 
set of enduring social norms that we learn as we learn to speak, norms which 
constitute speech acts and genres that implicate that the speaker speaks from 
knowledge. As we become more skillful and sophisticated in using language and in 
making meaning with others, we learn when to be more cautious, even sceptical, in 
relation to certain topics, sources and types of speaker. We learn when to be 
prepared to interrupt the conversation, to step back and challenge, question and 
critically assess how justified or reasonable we might be in accepting the 
information proffered as knowledge.  
What this line of thought suggests is that dialogical teaching need not involve 
equal participation in speaking but that there must be a relationship between 
teachers and students that permits reasonable responses and rejoinders, questions, 
clarifications and challenges. The absence of such a relationship should be 
criticized from both an epistemological and a dialogical perspective (and also from 
the point of view of epistemic justice that I discuss in §7.6). 
 																																																								
31 For discussions of the role of trust in dialogue, see the contributions to P. Linell and I. 
Markova (eds) (2014) Dialogical Approaches to Trust in Communication, Charlotte, NC: 
Information Age Publishing Inc., especially “Trusting for Learning” by Tania Zittoun, 
pp. 125 – 153. 
	 250	
*** 
 
Research into classroom dialogue and theorizing about dialogical pedagogy have 
drawn on Vygotsky and Bakhtin, and on Buber, Gadamer, Habermas, Bruner, 
Halliday and others. Dialogical teaching is said (with good reason) to stimulate 
thinking together, reasoning, learning and the collaborative construction of 
knowledge. It provides “cognitive challenge” and “interthinking” (Mercer, 2000). It 
promotes Habermasian “communicative rationality” (Fisher, 2011, p.92). Barnes 
(2008) distinguishes “exploratory talk” in the classroom from “presentational talk” 
and associates the former with “working on understanding”.  
But I contend that the tendency to place “dialogical teaching” in opposition to 
“traditional teaching”, and/or “transmissive teaching”, which are said to be 
characterized by “teacher talk” and the “imparting of knowledge”, and the 
occasional conflation of these with rote learning (Fisher, 2011, p. 91), is supported 
neither by the theoretical base claimed nor by epistemological considerations. 
Significantly different utterances, speech genres and discourses are conflated and 
the opposition does not take sufficient account of how informative utterances are 
generally embedded in complex developmental discourses.  
What do these writers mean by “dialogic teaching”? Robin Alexander argues 
that “teaching which is dialogic rather than transmissive” meets five criteria 
(Alexander, in Mercer and Hodgkinson, 2008, p. 105). These are: 
   
• Collective in that teachers and children address learning tasks 
together, whether as a group or as a class; 
 
• Reciprocal in that teachers and children listen to each other, 
share ideas and consider alternative viewpoints; 
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• Supportive in that children articulate their ideas freely, without the 
fear of embarrassment over “wrong” answers, and help each other 
to reach common understanding; 
 
• Cumulative in that teachers and children build on their own and 
each other’s ideas and chain them into coherent lines of thinking 
and enquiry; 
 
• Purposeful in that teachers plan and steer classroom talk with 
specific educational goals in view.  
 
My complaint with this set of principles is that the dialogic/transmissive opposition 
(like the progressive/traditional opposition) misrepresents classroom discourse. In 
acknowledging the importance of a variety of kinds classroom talk, including 
structured and less structured group work, discussions, debates and conversations, 
we should also acknowledge that sharing knowledge via testimonial speech acts 
can be both as dialogical and as apt for successful teaching and learning as other 
kinds of discourse. 
 
§7.3 Rejecting the Transmissive/Dialogic Opposition 
 
The opposing of “dialogic teaching” to “transmission” and “traditional teaching” 
reflects the horror of Gradgrindism that is pervasive in education theory. But 
tarring “teacher talk” and direct instruction with a Gradgrindian brush is a 
conflation of very different processes and discourses.32 Why should a teacher’s 
																																																									
32 In satirizing Gradgrind’s insistence on “facts”, Dickens could hardly have been 
disparaging speaking from knowledge, given that his own eye-witness testimony, 
concerning such issues as public hangings and the conditions in workhouses, powerfully 
influenced public opinion and government policy. We can say the same about many 
writers who have borne witness to social realities and customs. Montaigne, George 
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testimony be described as “the imparting of facts” but students’ as “sharing 
knowledge” (Fisher, 2011, p. 92)? The sharing of knowledge is a component of 
teaching and of classroom discourse in general as it is of speech genres such as 
conversation and dialogue. Advocates of critical reasoning should recognize the 
extent to which testimony is a crucial component of argumentative discourses 
(Tindale, 2015, pp. 126 -147). Furthermore, informative teacher talk can be as 
varied and engaging as any classroom activity or discourse. This is not to deny that 
teachers sometimes speak dully and ineffectively: of course teachers need to 
communicate felicitously and to consider conscientiously the needs and nature of 
particular audiences. They also need to help those audiences to respond sensitively 
to a full range of speech genres or discourses. 
Gradgrindian “facts” are incomprehensible when they are isolated from a 
living context, from a conversation or dialogue. Comprehension, and therefore 
reasonable acceptance, requires utterances to have relevance to a discourse in 
which the participants are both comfortable and engaged. In Hard Times Sissy Jupe 
cannot understand what is required of her because her first-hand knowledge of 
horses prevents her from connecting with the type of “facts” Gradgrind wants her 
to recite. She has never learned these in class (memorized them) because she she 
could not see what relevance the utterances that contained them, or that kind of 
discourse, had to her experience of horses and to her feelings concerning them. The 
kind of teaching approved by Gradgrind and M’Choamumchild is monological in 
the sense of being decontextualized, non-reciprocal, insensitive and unempathetic. 
What can you do with Gradgrindian facts except memorize and recite them? The 
																																																																																																																																				
Orwell and Primo Levi, for example, understood the importance of bearing witness to 
what they knew from experience, of testifying to knowledge. 
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aptly named Bitzer, who recites that a horse is a “graminivorous quadruped”, has 
bits of terminology, not knowledge.  
The mirror image of this polarization is reflected in books associated with the 
British policy think-tank Civitas: books such as Progressively Worse (2014) by 
Robert Peal, and Inside the Secret Garden (2007) by Tom Burkard, and also by the 
influential Seven Myths About Education (2014) by Daisy Christodoulou, published 
by the Curriculum Centre, an organization which, like Civitas, campaigns for a 
knowledge-based curriculum and against a progressivist pedagogy it claims has 
been imposed on generations of teachers by an educational elite whose real interest 
is egalitarianism and social engineering. Influenced by American educationalists 
such as Dan Willingham (2009) and E. D. Hirsch (1987), these writers all refer to 
the false identification by progressivists of traditional instruction with the rote 
learning of facts. Here is Robert Peal: 
 
The perception of a school’s mission as the transfer of knowledge 
is deeply mistrusted by today’s profession. Such a standpoint is 
seen as unforgivably old-fashioned and draws comparison with 
Thomas Gradgrind in Charles Dickens’s Hard Times…“Education 
is not the filling of a vessel, but the lighting of a fire.” Such 
thinking has entered the received wisdom of the modern teaching 
profession, where it is generally assumed that focusing lessons on 
“mere knowledge” and “rote learning” is poor practice, whilst 
developing greater powers, such as critical thinking, transferable 
skills or creativity is good practice. (Peal, 2014, p. 197) 
 
Christodoulou also mentions how frequently teacher education literature 
associates knowledge-based teaching with Gradgrindian rote learning and the 
filling of “empty vessels” (2014, p. 13). She describes this as a progressivist 
prejudice traceable to the influence of Rousseau, Dewey, Freire, Piaget and 
Vygotsky. Three of the “myths” about education that she identifies are: 1) facts 
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prevent understanding; 2) teacher-led instruction is passive; 3) teaching knowledge 
is indoctrination.  
Some of the points made in these books are trenchant, but when their 
criticisms are said to be supported by evidence from modern cognitive science on 
the nature of memory, they take for granted an underlying theory concerning 
epistemic terms such as “fact”, “truth”, “understanding” and “knowledge”. 
Implicitly they associate learning with memory, thereby appearing to validate one 
pole of the dichotomy they claim to reject. Christodoulou quotes Dan Willingham: 
 
Data from the last thirty years lead to a conclusion that is not 
scientifically challengeable: thinking well requires knowing facts, 
and that’s true not just because you need something to think about. 
The very processes that teachers care about most – critical 
thinking processes such as reasoning and problem solving – are 
intertwined with factual knowledge that is stored in long-term 
memory (not just found in the environment). (Willingham, 2009, 
p. 28; cited in Christodoulou, 2014, p. 21) 
 
These writers are right to oppose a significant trend in schooling and in 
educational theory. As I showed in Chapter 1, the idea has been promoted that 
processes of learning and intellectual development are more concerned with 
“learning skills” and “competences” than with knowledge. However, the 
characterization of knowledge as facts, even when they are said to join together 
somehow to form a schema (Christodoulou, 2014, p. 20), and the identification of 
knowledge “acquisition” with memorization, is a serious misrepresentation of the 
kind of achievement that learning represents. Teachers have important and 
powerful knowledge to share with students and children can come to know by 
being taught – that is, by participating in a variety of ways in classroom discourses 
of various kinds. Learning cannot be a question of memory only, as Willingham 
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seems to suggest it is. Epistemological and linguistic considerations have to be 
brought into the discussion, including the sociocultural considerations that 
Christodoulou, Peal and others would presumably dismiss as “progressive”. The 
idea that thinking well requires knowing “facts” requires a much more theoretically 
informed understanding of what might be meant by “knowing facts” in this context. 
A richer account of knowledge, knowing, comprehending, believing, language and 
communication requires a recognition that coming to know, for example on the 
basis of responding to the words of a teacher, is not just an individualistic feat of 
memory but an interpersonal achievement with normative criteria. Achieving 
knowledge and understanding is at the heart of education, but it is not a game of 
pass the parcel: it is an interpersonal social practice with linguistic and epistemic 
norms and conventions that we begin to learn as we begin to learn to speak. 
 
§7.4 The Repertoire of Dialogic Pedagogy 
 
Talk that is principally informative can engage our attention, our imaginations, our 
memories, our beliefs and our evaluative systems just as much as other kinds of 
talking and learning can. Criticisms of direct teacher instruction on the ground that 
it reinforces the teacher’s authority as a transmitter of “received wisdom” is 
misdirected for several reasons: 1) because epistemic authority is a vital component 
of communication, 2) because knowledge is not “transmitted” in the way the 
criticisms imply, and 3) because the assumption that direct teacher instruction is 
inevitably accompanied by student passivity is false.  
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In his analysis of 800 meta-studies of the importance of direct teacher 
instruction, John Hattie discusses the value of direct teacher instruction, which he 
describes as follows: 
 
The teacher decides the learning intentions and success criteria, 
makes them transparent to the students, demonstrates them by 
modeling, evaluates if they understand what they have been told 
by checking for understanding, and re-telling them what they have 
been told by tying it all together with closure. (Hattie, 2009, p. 
206) 
 
According to Hattie’s findings, 30% of the variance in students’ achievements is 
due to differences in what teachers do, know and care about.33 Hattie does not refer 
explicitly to the nature of teacher/student verbal interaction, but his description of 
direct teacher instruction is clearly multi-faceted; there is scope in it for student 
participation, clarification, questioning and challenge. There is no suggestion that 
the whole lesson is taken up with teacher exposition. Group work, open-ended 
discussion and inquiry could very well follow on from the platform provided by the 
teacher’s initial talk, and it is clear that students’ role during teacher instruction or 
exposition is not passive. As I have argued, comprehension/interpretation and 
epistemic acceptance require alert listening and sensitivity to what is implicated in 
the teacher’s speech. This point is developed in the next section. 
A Bakhtinian perspective on classroom talk suggests that whatever modes of 
interaction a teacher chooses, she exerts a measure of control over the structure and 
organization of discourse, with an orientation toward controlling what knowledge 
																																																								
33 50% of the variance is due to students’ prior cognitive abilities, disposition to learn and 
other attributes; and the remainder is due to home factors and to school policies and 
procedures. 
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is produced or toward structuring the ways in which knowledge is produced. 
Nystrand tells us that different modes of interaction position students as learners in 
different ways: 
 
Specific modes or genres of discourse engender particular 
epistemic roles for the conversants, and these roles, in turn, 
constrain, and empower their thinking. The bottom line for 
instruction is that the quality of student learning is closely linked 
to the quality of classroom talk. (Nystrand, 1997, p. 29) 
 
Nystrand warns that it is not enough to code interactions as “teacher recitation” or 
“group work”, or questions as “authentic” or “display”: evaluating the quality of 
classroom talk demands detailed analysis of transcripts. Although he affirms the 
importance of more open and dialogic interactions, he acknowledges a role for 
teacher exposition to serve as platform for later activities. 
Many studies have emphasized the potential of dialogic styles of pedagogy to 
enrich students’ learning. Wells (1999), for example, emphasizes the potential of 
the teacher’s feedback response in I-R-F (initiation-response-feedback) exchanges. 
These are sometimes disparaged as too teacher-led and inquisitorial, reinforcing 
“the teacher’s authority as the transmitter of received wisdom” (Skidmore, 2007, p. 
507), and restricting the scope for more thoughtful talk; but a teacher’s response, 
Wells shows, can develop or clarify what the student has said. There can be further 
exchange of knowledge in a context of trust and reciprocity. So any questioning of 
the teacher’s representation of herself as an authoritative knower in this context is 
beside the point. She has to be, and the nature of the dialogue would be different if 
she were not. The question should not be whether the teacher has epistemic 
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authority but whether she allows the students to represent themselves as having it 
when they speak from knowledge. This is a point that I will return to in §7.6. 
In his international comparison of primary education, Robin Alexander 
(2001) analyses types of classroom discourse by considering:  
 
a) classroom organization (whole class, group, individual);  
b) pedagogic mode (direct instruction, discussion, monitoring);  
c) pedagogic function (rote learning, instruction, scaffolding, assessment, 
information sharing, problem solving, supervision);  
d) discourse form (interrogatory, expository, evaluative, dialogic).  
 
Dialogic classroom discourse is distinguished from conversation by its purposeful 
questioning and pursuit of enquiry. Unlike direct teacher instruction, Alexander 
says, it recognizes students as thinkers in their own right. It does not treat them as 
“empty vessels” to be filled with received wisdom but fosters a “pedagogy of 
mutuality”. In advocating this alongside interactions such as “scaffolded dialogue”, 
Alexander underpins his analysis, and his conclusion that teachers need to be able 
to draw on a repertoire of approaches and discourses, with both Bakhtinian and 
Vygotskian theory.  
Hattie shows that good teaching matters, Nystrand, Wells and Alexander 
argue for a more dialogical style of pedagogy, and they all acknowledge that 
teachers need a repertoire of approaches. Nevertheless, I think there is a tendency 
to underestimate the linguistic and epistemological achievement in learning by 
talking and listening. As I have shown in previous chapters, authority and trust are 
connected as ineliminable features of informative speech acts and genres. When the 
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teacher tells students things, when students tell the teacher things, and when 
students tell each other things, their exchanges take place in an epistemic 
environment where, when things are going well, there is an ethos of trust, 
reciprocity and challenge, where students speak and listen with the skill, sensitivity 
and sophistication appropriate to their cognitive and linguistic development, 
exercising optimal vigilance in the way they interpret and respond to what others 
tell them. Writers who draw on sociocultural and dialogistic theories that 
emphasize the social nature of speaking and thinking should also recognize the 
epistemic and linguistic commitments and responsibilities of all the participants. 
This is important if what we want is for students to be conscientious, rational 
knowers as well as confident believers. 
Dialogistic and sociocultural theories of pedagogy need to be informed by a 
socialized epistemology that: a) is responsive to the pragmatics of language, b) 
incorporates a notion of autonomy founded on self-trust and integrity, c) 
emphasizes the role of intellectual conscientiousness and virtue in epistemic and 
linguistic achievements. 
 
§7.5 Contesting the Passivity Criticism 
 
Passivity is a common criticism of pedagogy characterized as consisting 
predominantly of informative “teacher talk”, whereas dialogical teaching is 
commended for being active. Dialogical teaching, Tasos Kazepides writes, is the 
most suitable manner of educating the young because “it engages and energizes the 
students and makes them active participants – not passive receivers” (2010, p. 89). 
My contention is there while there may well be a valid distinction between active 
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and passive teaching and learning, it does not lie between telling and discussing. 
When teachers drone on while students allow the words to pass by without alert 
comprehension, there is not passivity but an utter failure of communication. 
Successful communication of any kind implies both comprehension and sensitivity 
to what is being said, and this cannot be a passive process on the receiver’s part 
because it involves layers of judgement. If it is an information-giving 
communication there are epistemic and interpretative judgements to be made, about 
the plausibility of the content or the trustworthiness of the speaker, or both. We 
consciously separate these judgements only when we are aware of some infelicity 
or are alerted to some potential defeater. 
Learning achieved via the social practice of exchanging knowledge through 
verbal utterances, where the speaker sensitively adapts what she wants to say to the 
addressee, taking his existing knowledge into account, speaking sincerely and as 
accurately as the context demands, and where the hearer comprehends the utterance 
through, perhaps, a degree of semantic decoding but very largely through 
contextual interpretation, processing it for optimal relevance, in many cases making 
a judgement about whether or not he trusts the speaker to be offering an 
authoritative and sincere assurance of the truth of the utterance – is the result of 
intersubjectivity. We “find our voice” as testifiers, in a community of testifiers, by 
learning to trust others, and by being trusted ourselves to make sense, to mean what 
we say, to say what we mean, to speak the truth. In fact, sharing knowledge is a 
paradigmatic intersubjective social practice. The fact that teachers sometimes 
dominate classroom discourse in an irresponsible and insensitive fashion does not 
justify the characterization of testimonial practices in the classroom as essentially 
monological and their reception as passive. A conversation between friends is not 
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monological when one person “holds the floor” and the others pay attention, 
comprehend and participate as active listeners, “back-channeling” through eye-
contact and body-language – and especially when the potential for interruption, 
turn-taking, questioning and challenging are implicated by the context and the style 
of dialogue.34 The same is true in the classroom. 
An important reason why it is misleading to disparage learning from 
testimony as passive is that (as we saw in Chapter 6) there is a plurality of 
testimonial speech acts, so the identification of the particular speech act employed, 
and therefore the recognition of the expectations and commitments it implicates, is 
key to the interpretative and epistemic evaluations and judgements the hearer is 
required to make. If meanings were straightforwardly encoded in words and 
sentences, and if “tellings” were always simple assertions indicated by the use of 
the declarative mood, their comprehension might be regarded as relatively 
straightforward and passive, a kind of programmed decoding; but that is not how 
communication works.  
In the context of the classroom and of a lesson taught by a conscientious 
specialist with a sensitivity to the background knowledge and linguistic 
competency of her students, it will generally be the case that the teacher speaks 
from knowledge and offers the students assurance that they can trust her for the 
truth – trust, that is, that what she tells them is both relevant and true enough for 
their current purposes. Crucially, the conscientious student’s comprehension cannot 
be passive because he has to grasp what the teacher is really saying, what her point 
or meaning is. In the case of “tellings” of one kind or another, he has to grasp what 
the teacher is really telling him. As meaning is not simply a matter of what is 																																																								
34 See Goffman (1981), especially chapters 1 - 3, for a perceptive account of these and 
related features of speech. The book also includes an interesting chapter on lectures.	
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encoded in the words and syntax, the student always has to interpret, to process the 
teacher’s utterance with the help of his accumulated knowledge and experience of 
communication, contexts and people (including this teacher). This is not a passive 
process, but if the student is passive in the sense of not paying sufficient attention, 
if he is linguistically or epistemically passive, communication and learning will be 
impaired and may fail completely. 
A good teacher interacts with her audience, even when mainly sharing 
information or knowledge, for she is conscientious in implicating ways in which 
she expects the audience to respond to her. If she asserts, the expectation is 
acceptance or belief of the content; so it is with assurance, but by a different route, 
with additional personal commitments and guarantees. If the students are paying 
attention, given an appropriate degree of sophistication and sensitivity in their use 
and interpretation of language, their processing of the talk will be both 
epistemically responsible and cognitively engaged. Implicitly or explicitly they are 
in a dialogue with the teacher. It is not the case that teacher exposition or 
instruction, what Skidmore dismisses as “monologic recitation…with the aim of 
transmitting knowledge” (2007, p. 504), requires the students to memorize rather 
than to think. 
Classroom talk and activities of all kinds are infused with tellings, with 
informative utterances, with examples of participants speaking from knowledge. In 
group discussions, for example, students explore ideas but they also share 
information. One person will tell another something that he did not previously 
know. Each instance will be a speech act of a particular kind. The hearer interprets 
the utterance in context. He may have to make an epistemic judgment, whether to 
believe it or not, which may involve a judgement concerning the speaker’s 
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reliability and/or trustworthiness; and he may also have to make a judgement about 
whether, in the context, it would be appropriate to question or challenge the 
speaker. Sometimes it is better not to interrupt the conversation, or better not to 
trigger the reactive attitudes (resentment, for example) that questions, challenges 
and disbelief can trigger. Once again, sensitive judgement is required. We cannot 
restrict notions of epistemic and linguistic responsibility in responding to others to 
isolatable knowledge claims. The development of sensitive and responsible 
judgement in responding to informative speech acts and genres is, or should be, an 
important curricular aim: it is one of the aims, surely, of the study of literature and 
drama, and of the whole range of classroom discussion and group work. 
 
§7.6 Student Voice and Epistemic Justice  
 
My argument suggests we all need to be acknowledged and trusted as knowers, as 
competent tellers of truths and “speakers from knowledge”. For children this is 
important for their development as conscientious, rational thinkers and 
communicators, people capable of making not only autonomous but also informed 
and wise judgements. It is therefore the responsibility of teachers to ensure that 
epistemic justice is achieved in the course of a continuing dialogue. Pedagogic 
styles and a school’s curriculum should aim at developing the cognitive and 
linguistic capacities, and the intellectual virtues - sensitivity to language, integrity 
in communication, responsibility and consistency in epistemic judgement  - that 
allow students to talk and learn successfully in dialogue with others.  
The idea of epistemic justice has been explored by philosophers such as 
Miranda Fricker (2007) and José Medina (2013). My argument connects epistemic 
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justice with both virtue epistemology and the concept of student voice. Epistemic 
justice in the classroom is not just a question of whether the “voices” of students 
are heard sufficiently: it is a question of acknowledging all students as knowers 
and testifiers in their own right. We have seen how successful communication 
depends on speakers being sensitive and responsible in their choice of speech acts. 
It is important that they implicate the commitments and expectations that will allow 
their hearers to comprehend and accept what they are saying. We have also seen 
that hearers too have responsibilities, both linguistic and epistemic, and that their 
role is not passive. The speaker is entitled to feel resentful when a hearer disrupts 
the conventions of the speech act or genre to challenge or reject what she has 
assured him she knows. Miranda Fricker identifies this as a particular kind of 
epistemic injustice: “testimonial injustice”. This occurs when a hearer fails to grant 
the speaker the credibility she deserves. Often such failures are relatively minor, 
but sometimes they are significant and are due to prejudice. Fricker makes her case 
with examples from literature, including the account in Harper Lee’s To Kill a 
Mocking Bird of the injustice suffered by Tom Robinson, a black man accused of 
assaulting a young white woman. The men on the all-white jury reject Tom’s 
testimony: they are unable to bring themselves to assign greater credibility to a 
black man than to a young white woman (who herself would come low down in the 
hierarchy of credibility in this small town). This is a case of systematic testimonial 
injustice because the prejudice concerns the individual’s social identity. Fricker 
also discusses cases that are based on sexism and on other kinds of prejudice. She 
argues that identity-based prejudice is especially pernicious because it “renders one 
susceptible not only to testimonial injustice but to a gamut of different injustices, 
and so is systematically connected with other kinds of actual or potential injustice” 
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(Fricker, 2007, p. 27). Testimonial injustice leads to the victims of identity 
prejudice not being given a fair hearing, but it can also lead to a systematic 
undermining of victims’ self-confidence and trust in their own epistemic 
judgements. Also, where there is epistemic injustice there is epistemic privilege, 
the overestimation of a speaker’s credibility due to their social or occupational 
position.35  
In The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, 
Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations (2013), José Medina emphasizes 
also the epistemic loss to the perpetrators of the injustice. When victims of identity 
prejudice suffer systematic epistemic injustice as speakers they can actually end up 
in a better position epistemically than the perpetrators. They are oppressed, but at 
least they are likely to know that they are: resistance is possible. The perpetrators, 
on the other hand, are unknowing victims – victims of “active ignorance” and a set 
of epistemic vices that they have absorbed from their upbringing and education: 
epistemic arrogance, laziness and closed-mindedness.  
In a way, the perpetrators of epistemic injustice suffer from Fricker’s second 
variety of epistemic injustice, “hermeneutical injustice”, where victims suffer an 
intelligibility deficit that stems from belonging to a particular social group or point 
in history that does not have access to the interpretive resources required to make 
sense of certain social experiences. Speakers, such as teachers and students, are 
undermined in the case of testimonial injustice as givers of knowledge; in the case 																																																								
35 This was, for example, the case in the England of Locke and the early days of the 
Royal Society, when, according to Shapin (1994), norms governing scientific credibility 
were based on codes of honour current among “gentlemen”. Richard Holmes (2008) 
recounts how the astronomer William Herschel, a lowly organist at a chapel in Bath, 
suffered epistemic injustice in struggling to get his scientific claims taken seriously by 
the epistemically arrogant gentlemen in London, including his claim to have discovered a 
“new” planet (Uranus). After his eventual acceptance, his sister Caroline, who 
contributed to the discoveries, continued to be disregarded.  	
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of hermeneutical injustice, they are undermined in their capacity for intelligible 
social experience.36 
These arguments from Fricker and Medina have powerful pedagogical 
implications. It may seem exaggerated to think of school students (and sometimes 
school teachers) as victims of epistemic injustice, but I think this is one of the 
implications of my account of testimony in relation to education. I do not just mean 
that teachers should enhance the development of intellectual virtues such as 
epistemic humility, curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness, although I think this 
would contribute to overcoming prejudices in relation to credibility deficits and 
surfeits. I mean, also, that ethically, epistemically and pedagogically students 
should be given a variety of opportunities in which to be both receivers and 
producers of testimony. I see this as an extension of the notion of student voice. 
I will say a little more about intellectual virtues before I develop the point 
about student voice. Philosophers who have written on intellectual virtues include 
Linda Zagzebski (1996) and Jason Baehr (2011). They tend to present intellectual 
virtue as having an epistemological role, albeit as one with close links to character-
based ethics. This is true also of philosophers of education, such as Hugh Sockett 
(2012), who have written about intellectual virtues in relation to teaching.  
Sockett categorises intellectual virtues as virtues of character 
(trustworthiness, sincerity), of intellect (truthfulness, clarity, impartiality), of care 
(tolerance, tact, compassion, civility) and of personhood (integrity). It is important, 																																																								36	A dystopian account of systematic epistemic injustice is depicted in 
George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eight-Four, in which only the “proles” are 
permitted any capacity to exchange information with a degree of confidence, 
but they are victims of a systematic intelligibility deficit and are unable to 
frame questions about their present situation or about the past. The 
disintegration of trust and free discourse has led to the distortion of the 
concepts of truth and knowledge shown in O’Brien’s attempt to “persuade” 
Winston to love Big Brother.	
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Sockett argues, that teachers both exemplify and teach intellectual virtues. I agree; 
however, I do not see the importance as purely to do with the virtues’ role in 
epistemic justification (Zagzebski), or, in a weaker version, epistemic reliability or 
evidentialism (Baehr). Intellectual virtues relate to our orientation to other people, 
especially with regard to information-providing communication. They apply to 
comprehension and interpretation as well as to acceptance or belief. They also 
apply to our dialogues with ourselves, our reflections on self-trust and the coherent 
integration of our acceptances with our preferences (discussed in in Chapter 5 in 
relation to Lehrer’s coherentism). Integrity is the virtue of responsible integration, 
bringing various considerations together in a reasonable and responsible judgment. 
Many of these judgements are judgements concerning trust and credibility. An 
aspect of integrity not to be overlooked is the integrity we display in the way we 
formulate and communicate our thoughts, ideas and knowledge.37  
The relevance of these ideas to education, and specifically to schooling, is 
clear. A teacher who promotes or tolerates epistemic injustice, or who displays 
epistemic arrogance, is not a teacher in whom a student can have complete trust. It 
is a contradiction of the role. Nor is an education system that does nothing to 
counter credibility deficits one that puts students in a testimonially or 
hermeneutically just position. But the relevance of the idea of epistemic injustice 
goes beyond points about how vices such as epistemic arrogance and closed-
mindedness restrict one’s chances of learning from others, thereby weakening 
potential social bonds, although these are certainly important questions. The 
																																																								
37 For a detailed discussion of whether or not integrity is an epistemic, rather than a 
moral, virtue, see Scherkoske  (2012). For a discussion of virtue epistemology in relation 
to the philosophy of education, and especially to the Hirst/Carr debate concerning 
philosophical knowledge about teaching, see MacAllister (2012.) 
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relevance extends also to the developmental needs of children as speakers and 
thinkers. If children are denied a voice as knowers and testifiers their intellectual 
and linguistic development is put at risk. This point can be approached by way of 
the debate concerning “student voice”. 
 
*** 
 
Madeleine Arnot and Diane Reay remark: ‘The umbrella of student voice hides a 
diverse and complex alliance of reform agendas” (2007, p. 311). Their own 
perspective is sociological and they are interested in what they call, following 
Bernstein (2000), “the sociology of pedagogic voice”, and in “the elicitation of 
suppressed, inner and outer voices”. They conclude that whatever the types of talk 
in the classroom, students speak in “the voice of pedagogy”. They recommend 
researchers to discriminate more subtly types of talk and the relationships between 
pedagogic voices and social identities. The communicative procedures embedded 
in teaching create the pedagogic voices that pupils employ. Like other researchers 
of student voice, Arnot and Reay urge caution in relation to the potential for 
student participation and consultation, as exemplified by school councils, to 
overcome the strong boundaries between teachers and students.38 The process of 
consultation is not substantially different from other pedagogic encounters, and 
students who have a “voice”, who are the ones consulted and listened to, are “well-
behaved”, “ideal” students, who in the context of a dominant regulative discourse 
become enlisted in the project of social control. There is a danger, therefore, that 
the process of pupil consultation is one that hides the social stratificational aspects 																																																								
38 For similar points with regard to student voice, see: Whitty and Wisby (2007), 
Ruddock and Flutter (2000), Thornberg (2010), Fielding and McGregor (2005). 
	 269	
of schooling. The mask of neutrality repositions responsibility for learning with the 
pupil rather than with the teaching. Thus, although student consultation appears 
democratic, it is a clearly bounded pedagogic event (Arnot and Reay, 2007, p. 322). 
Arnot and Reay’s caution about student voice, participation and consultation 
is reflected in other studies. For example, Whitty and Wisby (2007) discuss the 
various drivers of student voice policies and practices, such as the requirement to 
respect children’s rights, encouraging active citizenship by participation in 
democratic practices, promoting school improvement by consulting pupils, 
personalization and consumer choice. While many schools see student voice, and 
school councils, as empowering students, teachers commonly cited improvement of 
the school facilities and environment as the main driver.  
Student voice has fallen short of its potential to transform relationships 
within schools. Michael Fielding (2003) sees student voice as having the potential 
to contribute to “a future that is more engaging, more imaginative, more just, more 
democratic” (p. 296), but he warns of the danger of reducing big questions about 
the nature of education and the good life to narrow questions about effective 
schooling. Writers who claim to speak about or for a particular social group need to 
be aware of the danger of “the extent to which social location or identity shapes the 
way they see and understand the world “ (p. 299). Drawing on Alcoff (1991/92) 
and Lincoln (1993), Fielding argues that traditional epistemologies cannot capture 
minority voices. “We can only hesitantly speak on behalf of others significantly 
unlike ourselves because we lack, not only understanding, but the means to 
understand those whose interests and causes we would represent” (p. 300). Alcoff 
herself draws on Foucault’s attention to the “rituals of speaking”, the different 
aspects of social reality that constitute the discursive context in which meaning is 
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made. “Who is speaking for whom turns out to be as important for meaning and 
truth as what is said; in fact what is said turns out to change according to who is 
speaking and who is listening…How what is said gets heard depends on who says 
it, and who says it will affect the style and language in which it is stated, which will 
in turn affect its perceived significance” (Alcoff, 1991/2, pp. 12/13; cited by 
Fielding, 2003, p. 300). Social location, or identity, may not determine meaning 
and truth, Fielding says, but it has a bearing on both. One of his fears is that student 
voice policies and research may simply reinforce the status quo. “There are some 
voices we wish to hear and others we do not and in dismissing those that seem to us 
too strident, too offensive or too irresponsible we may often miss things of 
importance and of a deeper seriousness that our first impressions allow” (p. 303).  
Fielding goes on to discuss what he calls the “dialogic alternative”. Simply to 
allow students to speak for themselves is to treat the inclusion of students’ voices 
as “unproblematically insightful and liberating” (p. 305). Instead we need to 
explore the possibility of constructing new opportunities for “dialogic encounter”, 
taking students into genuine partnership as collaborators and researchers, with, 
ideally, the students identifying issues for investigation. “The strength of dialogue 
is in its mutuality. Its transformative potential lies in its reciprocity because it is in 
these kinds of person-centred…arrangements that trust and creativity are most 
likely to grow” (p. 308).  
The potential of student voice to bring about more equal relationships is not 
realized when it fails to transcend embedded power relationships concerning who 
says what to whom, when and how, especially when it has been conscripted in the 
cause of school effectiveness. I think, however, that there is an important 
dimension that is missing from this debate: the students’ epistemic right and 
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developmental need to be trusted as knowers. Fielding anticipates a dialogic 
alternative in which trust and creativity can grow, but trusting students as speakers 
must go beyond seeking their opinions or perspectives. It must include their being 
trusted to be speakers from knowledge, speakers who frame what they say 
reasonably, responsibly and sensitively, in utterances that allow their hearers to 
comprehend their commitments and responsibilities, and to respond appropriately. 
How else can the discourses of school life, and of the classroom, give young people 
the experience of trust and mutuality that underpin the practices of learning from 
and with others? Except by taking epistemic risks in a potentially challenging but 
supportive arena, how can they rehearse and develop their rational commitments, 
their conscientious responsiveness to reasons, their integrity in maintaining a 
coherent, harmonious, trustworthy scheme of acceptances and preferences? How 
else can they come to trust their own judgments about whom to trust for the truth 
and their own trustworthiness as testifiers? 
No doubt giving students opportunities to speak from knowledge does not 
provide all the answers to the concerns raised by Fielding and others; my claim is 
that this is a dimension of student voice that demands attention, especially in a 
context of a concern for democracy and justice. 
Paul Standish (2004), commenting on the “oddity” of the term “student 
voice” (rather than “my voice”, “her voice”, etc.), suggests that “voice” is a 
metonym for “something like authenticity”: I would add “something like 
authority”. The student’s authenticity lies, in part, in what she can authoritatively 
give voice to, what she can expect others to accept from her assertions and 
assurances: her knowledge. Not all such verbal exchanges will be comfortable or 
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consensual: genuine dialogue requires challenge and resistance as well as trust and 
reciprocity. 
 
*** 
 
Let us return now to Fricker’s account of epistemic justice and see if we can find 
further support for my argument in her approach to testimonial justice and 
intellectual virtue. 
Fricker refers to the primary and secondary practical and epistemic effects of 
testimonial injustice. The primary effect is dishonour: “When one is wrongfully 
mistrusted, regardless of whether it is one’s competence or one’s sincerity that is 
being impugned, one is dishonoured” (M. Fricker, 2007, p. 46). To have one’s 
competence or sincerity impugned is a personal insult, and in cases where the 
injustice is due to a prejudicial stereotype, it is degradation of our social identity.39 
Fricker refers to cases where testimony is offered but not trusted; I think we can 
extend that to cases where testimony is not sought. I am thinking, of course, of the 
pedagogical situation where students are not required to be knowers – knowers, 
that is, not just in the limited sense of people who are asked to display what they 
have learned, as exam candidates are, but in the sense of people who can testify to 
things that others do not know, who have an authority or expertise in respect of a 																																																									
39  Fricker finds support in Hobbes’s Leviathan: 
 
When wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from 
arguments taken, not from the thing itself, or from the principles of 
natural Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of 
him that hayth sayd it; then is the speaker, or the person we believe in, or 
trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and Honour 
done in Believing, is done to him onely. (Hobbes, 1991, Chapter 7, pp. 
48-49; cited in M. Fricker, 2007, p. 46) 	
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certain topic, and whose knowledge might contribute to further collaborative 
exploration. To be wronged in this way is to be wronged as an informant and 
potential provider of knowledge. 
Fricker’s secondary effects relate to the harm done to a person whose 
confidence is so undermined that he ceases to satisfy the conditions for knowledge, 
or, longer-term, whose experience of persistent testimonial injustice leads her to 
“lose confidence in her general intellectual abilities to such an extent that she is 
genuinely hindered in her educational or other intellectual development” (ibid., p. 
48). Someone who is caused to suffer prolonged self-doubt, and thereby loses the 
confidence that is a condition of knowing, is undermined not only as a testifier to 
knowledge but also as an acquirer of knowledge. From the point of view of the 
account I have offered in Chapters 5 and 6, I would relate this point to the 
“keystone” role of self-trust in epistemic justification and to the role of reciprocal 
trust in successful speech and comprehension of any kind. Students who are 
undermined as knowers are undermined as rational (reasonable and responsible) 
thinkers, capable of achieving an optimally coherent conceptual scheme and of 
framing thoughts in optimally relevant and efficient utterances. Their integrity, 
authenticity and autonomy are undermined.  
Interestingly, Fricker herself refers to Lehrer’s coherentism and to self-trust 
as equivalent to epistemic confidence (ibid., fn 20, p. 49). She also develops her 
account of how a general loss of epistemic confidence might lead to a persistent 
failure to gain knowledge due to its effect on the development of virtues such as 
epistemic courage. Commenting on the extensive epistemic harm that the loss of 
such a virtue could do, Fricker says: 
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The value of an intellectual virtue is not reducible to the value of 
those particular items of knowledge it might bring, but derives 
also from its place in the harmony of a person’s overall 
intellectual character, a harmony which is spoiled by the loss of 
intellectual confidence that persistent intellectual injustice can 
cause. (Ibid, p. 50) 
 
This is close to what I understand by “integrity”. Fricker relates it to the process 
that Bernard Williams calls “steadying the mind”. It is by a process of mutually 
trustful dialogue with others that the mind becomes settled: 
 
The basic mechanism depends on the fact that there are others 
who need to rely on our dispositions, and we want them to be able 
to rely on our dispositions because we, up to a point, want to rely 
on theirs. We learn to present ourselves to others, and 
consequently also to ourselves, as people who have modestly 
steady outlooks or beliefs…[The subject] is engaged in trustful 
conversation with another who relies on him, and the question is 
whether he can give that person to believe his proposition. In 
doing that, he may well, in such a case give himself to believe it as 
well. It is the presence and needs of others that help us to 
construct even our factual beliefs. (Williams, 2002, p. 194. 
Fricker, p. 52) 
 
 
This connection of knowledge with trustful dialogue takes us back to Bakhtin 
and to dialogic pedagogy. Dialogic encounters include those in which knowledge is 
shared by a process of mutual trust. Teachers need to monitor the rationality and 
consistency of their students’ rational commitments and claims, and to help them 
(by sensitive questioning and skillfully devised tasks) to recognize their 
implications and ramifications. But teachers also need to develop students’ rational, 
conscientious self-trust as both providers and receivers of testimony. To undermine 
this self-trust is to disturb the steadying of the mind, to inhibit learning and the 
process of identity-formation, of achieving authentic selfhood. Fricker observes: 
	 275	
“The process by which the mind is steadied is the process by which we may 
become who we deeply, perhaps essentially, are” (p. 53). 
 
§7.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
My argument has emphasized the linguistic and epistemic commitments and 
responsibilities of teachers as providers of knowledge via testimonial speech acts. 
A conscientious teacher has the responsibility to ensure more than that the 
classroom is a reliable epistemic environment in terms of what the students hear 
from her and of how they learn to respond to the range of sources of information.40 
She also has the responsibility to ensure that the classroom is an epistemically just 
environment for all students. This should be seen as a precondition of dialogic 
practices, including group discussions and enquiries. Such a conclusion takes us 
some way beyond the sterile traditionalist-progressivist debates about the 
curriculum and toward a pedagogy that confidently embraces a wide range of 
speech acts and genres and that emphasizes the developmental role of students 
learning to respond with linguistic and epistemic sensitivity, self-trust and 
responsibility to the authoritative testimony of teachers and fellow students. 
 
																																																								40	As David Coady discusses in his 2012 book, What To Believe Now, 
rumour-mongering, whistle-blowing, the leaking of classified information and 
conspiracy theories are features of the epistemic environment in which 
children are coming to maturity as knowers and testifiers. I think my strategy 
of bringing the epistemology of testimony into a dialogic encounter with 
pragmatics and dialogism has the potential to make a useful contribution to 
the discussion of the implications for education of new technologies and 
information sources.	
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